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Editorial Page

ith this issue, we introduce THINKING:
for Children.

Wof Philosophy

The Journal

One more periodical? Perhaps. But THINKING is needed.
Ever since philosophy for children ventured out of its
shelter in the university and found itself at home in the
elementary school as the basic thinking skills program,
there has been a need for some more efficient way of
sharing the news about this new educational development.

THINKING seeks to act as a clearinghouse of information, an arena for controversy, and a forum for philosophical and educational articles dealing with philosophy for
children and related topics.
So that readers can judge for themselves whether or not
what goes on in the elementary school classroom is genuinely philosophical and educational, THINKING
will
publish transcripts of classroom dialogue.

THINKING will present reports of educational experiments which are seeking to ascertain whether philosophy
can make a demonstrable and measurable impact upon
children·s academic performance.
For those who are curious to know more about the
historical ancestry of philosophy for children - just
where in traditional literature it was foreshadowed THINKING will reprint selections from relevant writers of
earlier periods as well as more recent articles which may
not be familiar to our readers.
Since philosophy entails independent, critical and imaginative reflection or, more simply, ··thinking for
oneself'" - there may be some juridical aspects to introducing such thinking into the schools. THINKING will attempt to throw light on this problem by publishing articles by philosophers of law on children's intellectual
rights.

Some teachers report that philosophy in the classroom is
nothing new. THINKING will invite discussion to make
explicit what specifically makes a classroom discussion
philosophical and how teachers can encourage children
to think and converse philosophically among themselves.
For those interested in funding innovative philosophy
programs in their local school districts, THINKING will
contain up-to-date announcements
about developing
grant possibilities. It will also print bulletins regarding
domestic and overseas developments in philosophy for
children, with reports from Europe, the Middle East,
Asia, South and Central America - wherever .the program is being taught.

THINKING will also invite contributions
from other
scholarly areas - such as psychology and the social
sciences - which bear on the development of a common
front for reflective education. Likewise, there will be articles from classroom teachers themselves, reporting on
their experience.
Each volume of THINKING will contain articles from still
other areas - on moral education, on the teaching of
logic, on the availability and nature of teacher-training,
and on countless topics that are relevant to this emerging
educational field.
It will be our policy to report what we see happening in
the thinking skills area; it is not our wish to provide
favored treatment to reports about IAPC curricula. There
is a definite need for a broad spectrum of philosophical
materials, and perhaps we can encourage the development of a variety of such curricula for children by inviting
relevant contributions to the pages of THINKING.
These are some of the ways, we believe, that THINKING
can make a contribution of sorts to the emergence of a
more reflective community.
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THINKING
IN
STORIES

Gareth Matthews teaches
philosophy at the University of
Massachusetts. Amherst.

By Gareth Matthews

Arnold Lobel, Frog and Toad Together, New York
Harper & Row 1972.

LOOKING FOR MEANING
To be aware of having been a child - and
who am I but the child I was, wounded,
scarred and dirtied over, but still es·
sentially that child, for essence cannot
change - to be aware of and in touch
with this fact is to have the whole long
body of one's life at one's disposal,
complete and unfragmented. You do not
chop off a section of your imaginative
substance and make a book specifically
for children for - if you are honest you have, in fact, no idea where child·
hood ends and maturity begins. It is all
endless and all one. And from time to
time, without intention or invention, this
whole body of stuff, each part constantly
cross-fertilizing every other, sends up what is the right word? - intimations.
And the best you can do, if you are lucky,
is to be there to jot them down. This being
there, this being present, is important,
otherwise they are lost. Your role is that
of the necessary lunatic who remains attentive and in readiness, unself-conscious,
unconcerned, all disbelief suspended, even
when frogs turn into princes and when
nursemaids, against all gravity, slide up
the bannisters ... what is real is real
for everyone, not only but also for
children . .. the country mentioned in
"Rumpelstiltskin," where the fox and the
hare say good night to each other - that
this country is the place we are all seeking,
child and grown-up alike. Perhaps we are
looking for miracles. Most certainly we are
looking for meaning. We want the fox not
to eat the hare, we want the opposites
reconciled. Child and grown-up alike,
we want it.
P.L. Travers, "I Never Wrote for Children,"
New York Times Magazine,
July 2, I 978, pp. 19. 30.

Many of Arnold Lobel's stories, both in this collection and elsewhere. make wry comments on language. on life and on human
nature. One of my all-time favorites is a story in this collection
called "Cookies" (pp. 30-41 ). It goes this way.
Frog and Toad begin eating cookies Toad has baked. They eat
and eat, until Frog finally says (with his mouth full of cookies). "I
think we should stop eating. We will soon be sick."
Toad agrees. but wants to eat one last cookie:they do.Then they
eat one very last cookie. Frog says that what they need is will
power. To Toad's question, 'Whal is will power?' Frog answers.
"Will power is trying hard not lo do something that you really
want to do."
Frog puts the remaining cookies in a box and announces that
they will eat no more. "But we can open the Box," says Toad.
"That's true," admits Frog. So Frog ties a string around the box.
"But we can cul the string," Toad points out. "That's true," admits
Frog. Frog gets a ladder and puts the box on a high shelf. "But we
can climb the ladder ... Toad points out. Finally. in desperation,
Frog goes outside and gives the remaining cookies to the birds.
"Now we have no more cookies lo eat," says Toad sadly, "Not
even one."
"Yes," says Frog, "but we have lots and lots of will power."
The notion of the will, and the associated notion of will power.
are philosophically both vexed and vexing. Some of the vexations
have to do with the idea of determinism and whether determinism
is compatible with free will. But others have to do with the idea of
weakness of will, incontinence (akrasia) - lack of will power.
Frog says that will power is "trying hard not lo do something
you really want lo _do." There is something very puzzling about
the idea of trying not to do what you really want to do. If you
really want lo do it, you won't really try not to. On the other hand,
if you really try not lo, it will be because you want not to do it.
What Frog (and we) describe as a lack of will power begins lo look
like a case of conflicting desires. Toad wants lo stop: but also(and
even more strongly) he wants to continue to eat cookies.
Al this point it is easy to think of Toad as a collection of desires,
including the desire lo slop eating cookies (not very strong just
now) and the desire lo continue (very strong). Suppose Toad continues lo eat cookies. Who is to blame? The desire to slop - for
being loo weak? Or the desire to continue - for being too strong?
Or is it silly to blame a desire for being too strong. or too weak?
When St. Paul says, "Now if I do what I do not want. it is no
longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me ... (Romans 7:20)
he seems to be identifying himself with his good desires and disowning the others as alien and subversive (sin). But isn't the
person, St. Paul, as much the bad impulses as the good ones? As
much the ego, or id, as the superego?
Arnold Lobel's gentle and loving mockery of Frog and Toad invites us to reflect on the phenomenon of weakness of will and to
join philosophers from Aristotle (see Bk. VII of his Nicomachean
Ethics) to the present in trying to understand it. The phenomenon
is as familiar as it is difficult to be clear about.
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Part I of this article is by Joseph Roddy,
and is a portion of an article published
originally in RF Illustrated, Vol. 4,
No. 1, April, 1978. It is reprinted here with
the permission of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Part II is by James Watras, a teacher of
gifted students in Beverly, Massachusetts.

Challenging

Children to Think
by Joseph Roddy and James Watr)ls

he chairs in the classrooms of the Hardie School in
Beverly, Massachusetts.are not sized for visitors of my
height and displacement. They fit the likes of Barry Madore,
who was more composed than I thought he should have
.been when he sat across from me at the schoolroom table
my knees did not fit under. Barry Madore is a ten-year-old
in the fifth grade at Hardie and he had agreed to tell me
what he felt was happening in his philosophy course, which
is listed in his principal's office as the Elementary Enrichment class. As he spoke, Barry leaned back in his chair to
deepen my envy of his ease, while I studied him from a
cramped perch close to the floor and beat back the urge to
ask if he knew that Aristotle was the first to propose that
learning is pain.

T

Aristotle, as I was relieved to learn, is not yet a big formative
presence in Barry's philosophy studies. That afternoon in
Beverly, the cynosure of his mind's eye was still Harry
Stottlemeier, a fictional contemporary who is the protag·
onist of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery.
In the book what Harry does is ... he thinks. He cerebrates,
syllogizes, inducts and deduces better than anybody on
his turf, which is an elementary school where a nicely
turned major and minor premise leading to a rigorous
conclusion would get more notice than a record-breaking
toss with a Frisbee.

The Most Interesting Thing
The children's story is a classroom philosophy text for fifth
and sixth graders and it was written by Matthew Lipman,
an RF grantee and head of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State College
in New Jersey. Wherever Lipman gets his program started,
Harry Stottlemeier becomes as familiar a character to the
ten-to-twelve-year-old
set as Tom Sawyer was to their
grandparents.
When we talked that morning late last fall, Barry told me
his class had read to page fifty of the book but that he had
read on to page seventy-five. I, however, cunning with years,

had read to the end, or another twenty pages. I had not
come all the way around wintry Boston on Route 128 to get
tripped up in any textual analysis showdowns with adversaries half my height and a fifth my age. Since we had
no prefatory pipes to light up, or sherries to sip, Barry and
I got right to our subject.
I opened my marked-up copy of Lipman·s text to page sixteen where I had jabbed a few exclamation points into the
margin. The sentences beside them were the opeining
paragraph of a composition
assignment on "The Most
Interesting Thing in the World", which Stottlemeier
had
written for his history and geography class.

To me, the most interesting thing in the whole
world is thinking. I know that lots of other things
are also very important and wonderful, like elec·
tricity and magnetism and gravitation. But although
we understand them, they can't understand us. So
thinking must be very special.
Barry agreed that it was. "What I like best is thinking about
how to think," he told me. "And I like a lot of the thoughts
I get from reading this book." I wanted to know what some
of his recent thoughts were, and Barry told me one.
Backwards

and Forwards

"Right now, I'm thinking about how the universe got here,"
he said, and then shared with me a few pensees on the
possible causes for its arrival. While he talked, he kept
checking to be sure I was keeping up with him.
"But I.don't just think back all the time now. Sometimes I
think about why things keep going forward." I told him that
was one of the puzzlements that drove me to thinking at
times too, usually at night, but that I did not always turn
up any answers I thought valua~le. Barry allowed that he
had had the same experience. "Sometimes when I am thinking hard about something I get frustrated," he said. "You
know," he continued, "things can be real even if you can't
see them. For example, you can't see thoughts but they
are real. ..
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We went on that way for a while longer, battling the old
dialectic back and forth, exchanging Socratic roles, hammering together a few syllogisms, some with holes in them.
All minnows are fish/All sharks are fish/And therefore, all
minnows are sharks; that was one I tried on him. By then I
felt it was time to return him to the other fifth graders and
I had my last question ready.
"Who was Aristotle?"" I asked him.
'"He was a Greek philosopher,
about him."

hut I haven't heard much

That left me with two more last questions. '"How many syllables are there in Harry Stottlemeier's last name?" Barry
thought with his eyes closed and then told me there
were four.
·Take away the last two and what would your friend
Harry's name be?" Barry closed his eyes again, thought
contentedly, and then snapped them open wide. "Now I
see.'" he said delightedly. "Stottle. Harry Stottle. That"s
Aristotle. That's who he is," We shook hands and exchanged assurances that we would meet again.
All Fish Are Tuna?
Barry's philosophy teacher is James Watras, a lean and
soft-voiced Vermonter who turns up once a week at Hardie

ON ENCOURAGING

LOGICAL CHILDREN TO BE CREATIVE

In terms of pedagogy, I feel that the clearest educational
challenge exists in the case of the children who are relatively able to analyze implications but relatively unable to
generate conceptual possibilities. There is little doubt that,
as educational environments become richer and teachers
become equipped with a wider variety of technical aids,
general improvements can take place in the level of analytic
skills possessed by children who are initially poor at
analysis of Implications. The gradual rise in scores on
intellective-ability tests that we have witnessed over recent
years testifies to. this kind of pedagogical effect. It is an effect, however, that amounts to cultivating "more of the
same," since we have found that sensitivity to what Is correct and incorrect in terms of given rule systems already
constitutes the very core of what qualifies in our society as
educability and as educational achievement. The educational message that gets communicated to those children
who are capable of analyzing /mpl/cations but poor at pro•
ducing conceptual possibilities, on the other hand,
represents in my estimation a serious deception. These
children are informed that as far as the society Is con•
cerned, they are doing fine educationally. Yet, they cannot
adopt the kind of tolerance toward error that may lie at the
root of much significant innovation in mathematics, science,
and the arts. The challenge for education, then, Is to do
something different for these chlldren-something
that may
have the effect of freeing them from an Inflexibly maintained
attitude of avoidance toward error. It would seem that they
need to learn that circumstances exist under which it is an
acceptable practice to withhold one's judgment about correctness or incorrectness - to five with the chance of making a mistake.
-from Michael A. Wallach, "Creativity and the Expression of
Possibilities," In Creativity and Learning (Boxton: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1967), Jerome Kagan, ec., p. 51.

for its Elementary Enrichment class. I met Watras in the
library across the street where he was showing a band of
earnest youngsters how to use the card catalog. It was
Watras who had booked my twenty minutes with Barry:
were there any more like him in the school district, I
wondered? To convince me that there were, Watras had
three more ten-year-olds, John Higgins, Kevin Wesley, and
Joanna Murphy, waiting at the Brown School a few miles
away. All of them, quite obviously, had spent a lot of lime
thinking about thinking, and talking to one another about
thought. I felt excluded from their deliberations while they
fell into noisy disputes. about the difference between se_ntences beginning with "no" and sentences beginning with
"all." What they called "no" sentences, such as ''No lions
are eagles,"' are true, they explained to me, even when they
are reversed into "No eagles are lions." But "a11··sentences,
such as '"All tuna are fish," are not true when they are reversed into "All fish are tuna." It was Kevin Wesley who
wanted to be sure I followed their reasoning on this. "All
fish aren't tuna," he confided, "because there are trout and
there are sharks and lots of other fish besides.'' I agreed.
Who would do less?
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The area of logic often comes up with the students. "This
doesn't make any sense," Kathy blurts out after reading a
political advertisement
in the local paper. "Read this:
'Everytime you turn around prices are going up! That's
why I'm voting for McKean.' That's a faulty analogy if I've
ever heard one."

We give children the skills
to make sense of the physical
world, but their world is more.__,
....______________________

I introduce syllogisms to the children much earlier than
they are introduced in Harry. I put on the board:
All fish can swim
A trout is a fish

"Jcan't
decide,"

pondered John, a freckle-faced red head
whose eleven year old face confirmed his uncertainty.
"in some ways I can see how thoughts are real: I mean,
you can see them. You can get them when you want
them. Sometimes you can even feel them! They can even
cause other things to happen. But in other ways they still
don't seem real to me. Like, you can't touch them, and no
one else can see them."

"Well, how do you vote?" his neighbor impatiently asked.
"You said you can't touch them," an anti-realist lobbied.
"I just don't know," John continued. "I can't make up
my mind."
"Maybe there isn't a right answer?" Chris chimed in,
seemingly questioning her own previous pro-realist vote.
"That's not necessarily true," Marcie quickly responded,
looking directly at Chris. (John's face showed tbe ping•
pong match still going on in his mind.) "It's just like
Plato's 'Cave'. Just because we don't know the answer,
that doesn't mean there isn't one."

"What can you tell from those two statements?" I ask.
Silence. Perhaps I have introduced this concept too soon.
I wait a bit longer and then I call upon Nick.
"Well obviously
anything else."

'a trout can swim', but I can't think of

"Yes, obviously," I remark to myself. 'That is what I was
looking for, Nick," I offer, feeling I have betrayed his intense scrutiny of the problem.
Of course it was obvious because gifted children see
logical and illogical reasoning quite early. They need to
learn why various forms are not logical, but they quickly
make sense of the whole proposition.
"Alf people who have red hair are smart. John has red
hair. What can you tell from that?" I ask.
"That the first statement is false", says Mary, as everyone
laughs and looks at John.

At that the bell rang and the students left for recess. On
the playground Marcie and Chris quickly bounced a ball
back and forth to one another. John ran up a wooden
ramp and leaped off clutching as high as he could onto a
stack of old tires.

One day in class I make the statement,
television."

No, this scene is not a new chapter from Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. The discussion was a real (used in a
literal sense) incident involving gifted fifth• and sixthgraders in the Elementary Enrichment Center (E.E.C., a
one-day-per-week
pull-out
program)
in Beverly,
Massachusetts. Admittedly
the precipitant in this par•
ticular discussion was Chapter Four from Harry, but long
before discovering Harry these children had made their
own discoveries. One characteristic
which all children
have in common is that they, like Harry, are naturally
philosophical.

"You have to say 'Some kids like television' now 'most',"
Barry chides me as everyone laughs and looks at me.

Questions of ethics come up naturally
in class.
"Shouldn't we do something for children who don't have
any toys?" Steven asks after hearing a talk by a woman
from the Salvation Army. Kim puts up signs in her
father's store in support of the bottle bill ("Because peo•
pie shouldn't litter," she telli me later), and then cries
when it is defeated. Marcie goes up to a particularly obnoxious visiting student and asks if she would like to
share a snack, not, as she informs me after the girl has
left, because she likes the girl, but because she didn't
want her to feel lonely.

"Alf

kids like

"I have a cousin who hardly ever watches TV. He says it is
boring," Paul interjects.
"Alright,"

I try to proceed, "most kids like television."

As we walk through a hall
and I are alone. We stop
showing some unknown
night when I can't sleep,"
dow and wonder whether

at the Museum of Science Mark
in front of a very large drawing
(to me) galaxy. "Sometimes at
Mark offers, "I look out the win•
all the stars are real or not."

In a class discussion other students acknowledge similar
uetaphysical ponderings. "I always thought I was the only person who thought those things," Marcie contributes,
seemingly relieved.
The question: "Are thoughts real?" produces real involve•
ment by the students. They debate the question as
vociferiously as other children would attack the problem
"ls Charlie's Angels a better show than Happy Days?"
"Does a tree falling in the forest where no person is near
make any sound?" I ask the classic question. The reasoned arguments take place. The realists appear to be win•
ning on the basis of a theoretical tape recorder which
would pick up the sound, people or not.
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".My thoughts

are like a lion in a cage ... at
night ... the lions growl and keep me awake."

"But wait a minute!" It is John again, bursting in after we simply nod and say, "That's good," when students
much thought. "How would you know there was anything share their questions, or end a discussion with "You
know, sometimes I have the same questions", we do our
on the tape if someone didn't hear it?"
students
a disservice. We do them the injustice of thinkAgain the bell rings.
ing that philosophy is just the askin_g of questions, inWhen a parent sees me at the supermarket she com- stead of also providing them with the tools and motivame_nts,"All I've heard the past two days is trees falling in tions to make their own inquiries.
the forest."
"Thinking can be one of the most enjoyable things in the
I hope she has heard. Not the trees, but the young world," says Michael. "When I learn it is like adding a new
philosopher at work.
volume to my huge encyclopedia in my brain."
"My thoughts are like a woodpecker pecking away at my "l like to learn because I am very curious", writes Dana. "I
mind," Mary writes. Unknown to her, Cary expresses a like knowing things. Learning helps me understand too. I
similar impression: "My thoughts are like a lion in a cage. also think about why we die. And I always get different
During the day people look at them, and at night they answers when I think about this. But most of the time I
don't, but the lions growl and keep me awake."
think about why we live. Why do we live?"
The lions are the philosophical questions that all children The questions are real. Dana, Michael, Marcie, John and
have. Our problem, as teachers, is what to do with such the others really want to know. Learning helps them·
questions.
understand their world. But the world for many a gifted
One responsibility which we all have as teachers of the child is the world of the mind, the world of thinking:
gifted (either in a homogenous, heterogenous, or one-to- Thinking about the square root of two.the speed of a
one setting) is to allow them the opportunity to get space ship, the causes of the depression, but also thinktogether with their intellectual peers and discuss ques- ing about why we live, why we act, what is good, who is
tions of philosophy. It is through this bouncing off of God, thinking about thinking.
·
ideas, through this understanqing
that others share We give children the skills to make sense of the physical
similar concerns, that students will grow most fully.
world, but their world is more: it is also the logical, the
But simply discussing is not sufficient. As teachers of
philosophy in the schools, we also have the responsibility
to become better trained in philosophy - especially in
the elements of philosophical reasoning. To the extent

ethical, the aesthetic, the metaphysical. We must give
children the tools to make sense of those other worlds
which are equally pressing for them. We must give them
the tools of philosophy.
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Of the Education of Children
-

Michel de Montaigne, Essays

ince philosophy is that which instructs us to live, and

Sthat infancy has there its lessons as well as other ages,
why is it not communicated to children betimes? "The
clay is moist and soft: now, now make haste, and form the
pitcher on the rapid wheel."
They begin to teach us to live when we have almost done
living. A hundred students have got the pox before they
have come to read Aristotle's lecture on temperance. Cicero said that though he should live two men's ages, he
should never find leisure to study the lyric poets; and I
find these sophisters yet more deplorably unprofitable.
The boy we would breed has a great deal less time to
spare; he owes but the first fifteen or sixteen years of his
life to education; the remainder is due to action. Let us,
therefore, employ that short time in necessary instruction. Away with the thorny subtleties of dialectics; they
are abuses, things by which our lives can never be amended. Take the plain philosophical discourses, learn how
rightly to choose, and then rightly to apply them; they are
more easy to be understood than one of Boccaccio's novels; a child from nurse is much more capable of them
than of learning to read or to write. Philosophy has discourses proper for childhood as well as for the decrepit
age of men.
I am of Plutarch's mind that Aristotle did not so much
trouble his great disciple with the knack of forming syllogisms or with the elements of geometry as with infusing

into him good precepts concerning valor, prowess, magnanimity, temperance, and the contempt of fear; and with
this ammunition sent him, whilst yet a boy, with no more
than thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, and but
forty-two thousand crowns to subjugate the empire of the
whole earth. For the other arts and sciences, he says, Alexander highly indeed commended their excellence and
charm and had them in very great honour and esteem,
but not ravished with them to that degree as to be tempted to affect the practice of them in his own person.
"Young men and old men derive hence a certain end to
the mind, and stores for miserable grey hairs."
Epicurus, in the beginning of his letter to Meniceus, says,
'That neither the youngest should refuse to philosophize
nor the oldest grow weary of it." Who does otherwise
seems tacitly to imply that either the time of living happily is not yet come or that it is already past. And yet, for all
that, I would not have this pupil of ours imprisoned and
made a slave to his book; nor would I have him given up
to the morosity and melancholic humour of a sour, illnatured pedant; I would not have his spirit cowed and
subdued by applying him to the rack and tormenting him,
as some do, fourteen or fifteen hours a day and so make a
packhorse of him. Neither should I think it good when, by
reason of a solitary and melancholic complexion, he is
discovered to be overmuch addicted to his book, to
nourish that humour in him; for that renders him unfit for
civil conversation,
and diverts him from better

"Since philosophy is that which instructs us to live ... ,
why is it not communicated to children betimes?"
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"But to our little monsieur ....
philosophy •
shall be his principal lesson."

• • •

employments. And how many have I seen in my .time part of it at least that treats of man and of his offices and
totally
brutified
by an immoderate
thirst after duties, it has been the common opinion of all wise men
knowledge? Carneades was so besotted with it that he that, out of respect to the sweetness of her conversation,
would not find time so much as to comb his head or to she is ever to be admitted in all sports and entertainpare his nails. Neither would I have his generous manners ments. And Plato, having invited her to his feast, we see
spoiled and corrupted by the incivility and barbarism of after how gentle and obliging a manner, accommodated
those of another. The French wisdom was anciently turn- both to time and place, she entertained the company,
ed into proverb: "Early, but of no continuance," And, in though in a discourse of the highest and most important
truth, we yet see that nothing can be more ingenious and nature. "It profits poor and rich alike, but, neglected,
pleasing than the children of France; but they ordinarily
equally hurts old and young." By this method of instrucdeceive the hope an expectation that have been conceiv- tion, my young pupil will be much more and bette,· emed of them; and grown up to be men, have nothing extra- ployed than his fellows of the college are. But as the steps
ordinary or worth taking notice of: I have heard men of we take in walking to and fro in a gallery, though three
good understanding say, these colleges of ours to which times as many, do not tire a man so much as those we
we send our young people (and of which we have but tco employ in a formal journey, so our lesson, as it were acmany) make them such animals as they are.
cidentally occurring without any set obligation of time or
But to our little monsieur, a closet, a garden, the table, place and falling naturally into every action, will insenhis bed, solitude and company, morning and evening, all sibly insinuate itself. By which means our very exercises
hours shall be the same, and all places to him a study; for and recreations, running, wrestling, music, dancing,
philosophy, who, as the formatrix of judgment and man- hunting, riding, and fencing, will prove to be a good part
ners, shall be his principal lesson, has that privilege to of our study. I would have his outward fashion and mien
have a hand in everything. The orator lsocrates, being at and the disposition of his limbs formed at the same time
a feast entreated to speak of his art, all the company were with his mind. 'Tis not a soul, 'tis not a body that we are
satisfied with and commended his answer: "It is not now a training up, but a man, and we ought not to divide him.
time," he said, "to do what I can do; and that which it is And, as Plato says, we are not to fashion one without the
now time to do, I cannot do." For to make orations and other, but make them draw together like two horses harrhetorical disputes in a company met together to laugh nessed to a coach. By which saying of his, does he not
and make good cheer had been very unseasonable and seem to allow more time for, and to take more care of,
improper, and as much might have been said of all the exercises for the body, and to hold that the mind, in a
other sciences. But as to what concerns philosophy, that good proportion, does her business at the same time too?
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Education and the
Constitutional Rights
of Children
s is well known, Supreme Court decisions over the past
decade have significantly expanded the scope of constitutional protection available to public school students.
Children today enjoy the protections of the first amendment in school by virtue of the Court's decision in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 1
and of the due process clause when school administrators
seek to discipline them, by virtue of the decision in Goss
v. Lopez. 2 These cases inevitably provoke the question:
"How far will - and should - this development go?" Or
to put the matter somewhat more theoretically: To what
extent does the ideal of constitutional equality properly
extend to schoolchildren and entitle them the same range
of protections enjoyed by adults?

A

At the risk of oversimplification, one can today identify at
least two characteristically different responses to this
question. One builds upon the historic attitude that schoolchildren, both because they are young and because they
are in school, are self-evidently "different" and unentitled
to such rights.
Those attuned to this view will regret the Supreme Court's
expansion of students' rights and they will be unsympathetic to any further such expansions. They will, to one
degree or another, find themselves in sympathy with
traditional thought about the power of school officials
over their young charges as embodied in the doctrine of
In loco parentis.

by Leon Letwin

The essence of this doctrine may be captured without extended or technical inquiry. Readers who matriculated
before the mid-1960's need only recall their own implicit
assumptions as public school pupils to remember how
unthinkable it would have been to claim that they
possessed rights and that school administrators were
bound to respect those rights. "Unthinkable" here is no
figure of speech. The notion of "rights" was so contrary to
prevailing assumptions about the natural order of things
as never to require conscious rejection.
The second approach - one which I regard as far preferable - is sympathetic to the extension of constitutional
protections to students in the myriad contexts in which
they daily confront state power as exercised by school
authorities, including the right to free speech, the right to
due process of law at the hands of school authorities, the
right to be safeguarded from cruel and unusual punishment in the school setting,3 the right to immunity from
unreasonable searches or seizures on school premises,
and the privilege against self-incrimination
in disciplin
ary proceedings.
This latter view does not depend on any conception that
children are merely adults whose growth has through
some hormonal quirk been pbysically stunted, such as
the children portrayecl in the paintings of Brueghel.
Rather, it depends on the belief that for all their
differences, their development
as informed,
self-
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WHAT CONTRIB(JTES TO CHILDREN'S
Q(JTLOOK?

ACADEMIC

Three things impress us more and more: one, the early
importance of parents in the academic socialization process; two, the variety of implications marking policies
have for children's expectations and school performance; and three, the complexity of the world when
viewed from the child's eyes.

-Doris R. Entwisle and Leslie Alec Hayduc, Too Great
Expectations: The Academic Outlook of Young Children
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)p. 186.

confident, critical participants in a democratic society
necessitates much the same respect for their right to
share in the core values of the Bill of Rights as is
displayed toward adults.

Wooster was brought before the board to "explain his motive." For the benefit of those insensitive to nuance, he explained that his rhetoric was "intended as a slam" at the
board. The board concurred and demanded an apology.
None was forthcoming and Wooster was expelled. The trial
court affirmed the board action and Wooster appealed.
The appeals court found in favor of the school board saying:
fTJhe whole tenor of the address was well calculated to ... engender ... in the minds of the students a feeling of disrespect for
the defendants, and a secret if not an open hostility to their control of the student body and management of school affairs. Such
being the natural tenor and tendency of the plaintiffs address,
his conduct in making the same cannot be classed as anything
but a species of insubordination to constituted authority, which
required correction ... in order that the discipline of the school
might be maintained ... .

It occurred to no one - school authorities, the court, or
even to Wooster himself - that his speech should enjoy
constitutional protection; his appeal was therefore cast in
narrowly technical terms. The predominant attitudes toward education and the young made it incongruous, even
bizarre, to suppose that Wooster might possess "rights"
enforceable against school officials, even assuming such
speech would have enjoyed protection in the society at
large. The prevailing view of education saw its central
purpose as the transmission of those facts and skills students would someday need to play a useful role in society;
the cultivation of critical, independent thought was not a
proper schoolhouse activity.

This contrast in perspective can be largely explained in
terms of the conflicting assumptions concerning children,
education and the relationship between the two, which
underlie the contending viewpoints. One school of thought
tends toward the view that where children are involved,
educational values and constitutional values are in implacable conflict; the other inclines toward the view that
the very ends of education demand respect for the rights Given the conception of education as a one-way conduit
from teacher to pupil - as product rather than process of those being educated.
it was logical to view student criticism of authority as sand
It is these conflicting attitudes about children and educa- in the machinery of education, undermining discipline and
,tion, particularly as manifested in some court decisions, distracting students from the main task of absorbing
that I wish to explore in this paper.
knowledge.
To better understand the in loco parentis ideology, or at Moreover, the dominant view of life and educaion regardleast one variant of it, it is useful to start with the little- ed unquestioning obedience to official dictates, or as the
known case of Wooster v. Sunderland.4 That case, decided Wooster court described it with such unselfconscious
some 60 years ago, is notable for capturing so neatly one candor, the "subordination" by students to "constituted
set of mind toward children and toward education. The authority," as practical training of a high order. Adult life,
case arose when Earl Wooster, a Fresno high school stud- after all, often required the unquestioning, even amiable
ent, addressed his fellow students during a school as- acceptance of things as they were, however irrational they
sembly. He opened his remarks with the complaint that might have appeared. (I encountered this attitude a number
various schoolrooms were fire hazards and that the exits of years ago during a parent-student discussion in a Los
were inadequate. In somewhat "caustic" terms he de- Angeles junior high school concerning the validity of the
nounced the school board for compelling students to hair-length regulations then in force. One parent conceded
assemble in such rooms. Shifting to another complaint, he could find no justification for a rule regulating the hair
he denounced the school board for prohibiting a student length of male students only. He concluded however that
event known as a "donkey fight." The activity was not not all things in society were rational. Therefore the rule
described but must have amounted to a mildly attenuated should be retained so that students would learn to accept
form of mayhem. He then wove these seemingly disparate such irrational rules.)
complaints into a common theme of school board irrationality. It was unfair to prohibit donkey fights in which "boys Quite apart from such functional justifications, restrictook their own chances of being injured, and force them to tions on student speech were warranted simply because
were immoral. Their
take chances of being injured in a firetrap." Finally, in the "disrespect" and "insubordination"
suppression
required
no
further
justification.
court's words, he "closed and climaxed his incendiary address by offering a resolution ... requesting the [school Given the prevailing sentiments it is not surprising that the
board] ... to 'no longer talk about bonds, but to do all in its school authorities did not consider less repressive repower to put such a bond issue before the people of the sponses to Wooster's criticisms. They might, for example,
district'."
have simply laughed off the incident because Wooster's

Education and the Constitutional Rights of Children - Leon Letwln

WHAT CLAIMS CAN CHILDREN MAKE?

The justification of children's rights under Raw/s's
theory has one major emphasis: children have a right to
make just claims, and adults must be responsive to
these claims. This conception of the just society, if
widely accepted, would lead to a change in attitude on
the part of adults. In according rights to children, the
theory makes adults more accountable to children. They
can no longer assume it is only at their pleasure that
children are permitted to make claims and exercise freedoms. Adopting this new conception of children's rights
would in itself be an important reform.

from Victor L. Worsfold, "A Philosophical Justification
for Children's Rights," in The Rights of Children
(Cambridge: Harvard Educational Review, 1974)p. 44.

comments had not seriously interfered with school life. Or
they might have engaged him in dialogue about his complaints, because the issues he raised were more important
than the perhaps intemperate way in which he raised them.
Or they might have welcomed his forthright criticism of
constituted authority as an excellent example of citizen
participation in the political process. Or, finally, they might
have regarded his speech as offering a unique educational
opportµnity to explore, in microcosm, effective techniques
for social change in a democratic society. To state these alternatives is to recognize that they were unthinkable under
the then-prevailing conceptions of relationships between
young people and "constituted authority."
Now one might be tempted to treat this case as a historic
relic, interesting to one with an antiquarian bent but of no
contemporary practical significance. To be sure, few courts
would decide the case the same way today. But the attitudes
underpinning that decision have yet to be interred. One suspects that the nerve fibers of many a school administrator
and judge, too, would flutter sympathetically to the law-andorder rhythms of the Wooster decision.

Page 13

Tinker v. Des .Moines Independent Community School
District. This case, decided in 1969, marked a major judicial reassessment of the Wooster attitude toward minors,
schools, and freedom of speech. Students had worn black
armbands to school in symbolic protest against the war in
Vietnam. School officials promptly banned the conduct and
suspended those who disobeyed the ban. The case compelled the Supreme Court to confront squarely the issue
whether speech on school premises was entitled to first
amendment protection. It concluded that students did not
leave their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,
saying:
(IJnour system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturb•
ance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire
fear. Any word spoken in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says
we must take this risk ... and our history says that it is this sort
of hazardous freedom - this kind of openness - that is the basis
of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society.

One striking facet of the case is how extraordinarily modest
were the rights clai~ed by the students. The student expression could not plausibly be viewed as "incendiary," "disrespectful," or "insubordinate." The wearing of armbands
"caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder." The fact that it took a
landmark Supreme Court decision to establish even the
modest rights at issue underscores the historic absence of
student rights.

Goss' v. Lopez. This case arose out of a period of widespread student unrest during which several schools in Columbus, Ohio, were affected by racial confrontation, demonstrations and problems of various sorts. Over 75 students
were suspended for their involvement in disruptive demonstrations. Although the circumstances surrounding the
suspensions varied, they shared one common feature: No
It is instructive also that even some judges who are deeply hearing was provided in which the students could contest
committed to constitutional rights in general are prepared their suspensions.
to read students out of the ambit of their protection because
of a view they hold about the "special nature" of school Some of the students challenged the law that allowed their
children. Justice Hugo Black exemplified this view. His suspension by school authorities for up to 10 days without
fierce dedication, as a member of the Supreme Court, to the notice or hearing. The lower court found that these procedfirst amendment in general needs no testimonial for those ures violated the students' rights to due process of law,
with a passing knowledge of his record. Yet in Tinker, he op- reasoning that suspension for even 10 days or less was unposedthe extensionof first amendmentrights to students in constitutional where no hearing was provided.
a bilious dissent,saying that schoolchildren have "not yet On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of five to
reachedthe point of experienceand wisdomwhich [enable] four. The threshold issue was the very applicability of the
them to teach all of their elders ... taxpayerssend children due process clause to school disciplinary procedures. The
to school... to learn, not teach." Furthermore, to acknow- Court found that it did apply, that public school students
ledgethat schoolchildrenhavea right of speech would be to werenot somehow outside the amendment's guarantees.
subject"'allthe public schoolsin the country to the whims What then were the requirements of due process? The Court
and capricesof their loudest-mouthed,but maybe not their laid down a number of what it characterized as "rudimentbrightest,students."
ary" requirements. These requirements reduced themselves
With this backgroundas a frame·of reference, one can appreciate the change of view representedby several of the
Supreme Court decisionsof the last decade, to which we
nowturn.

to "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing." As
will be seen, the Court's characterization of its requirements
involved no false modesty: rudimentary they were indeed.
For to illustrate its meaning, the Court gave apparent en-
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" • • . the proposition that children are incompetent
requires substantial modification in order
to approximate the real world.''

dorsement to an informal scheme in effect in one school.
That scheme, said. the Court, was "remarkably similar to
that which we now require." A teacher observing misconduct would complete a form describing the occurrence and
send the student, with the form, to the principal's office.
There, the principal would obtain the student's version of
the event; if it conflicted with the teacher's written description, the principal would send for the teacher to hear the
teacher's own version, apparently in the presence of the
student. If a discrepancy still existed, "the teacher's version
would be believed and the principal would arrive at a disciplinary decision based on it." 5
From one perspective, the Court's approval of this scheme
suggests.that Goss is much ado about very little. Given the
minisc·ule oppqrtunities it provides for a student's defense,
Goss is remarkable not for its innovation but for the fact
that it was so long in coming, so vigorously contested, so
narrowly affirmed, and so parsimonious in the rights it recognized upon arrival. That such attenuated protections
could be considered progress provides yet another sad commentary upon historic school practices. Nevertheless, Goss
did directly challenge the time-honored exclusion of students from constitutional protections. It affirmed that Tinker
was neither a constitutional relic nor a special rule limited
to first amendment cases.
I turn now to some of the arguments of the dissenters, i.e.,
those members of the court who opposed the extension of
due process protections to students. Though these views
clearly did not persuade the majority, they were neither deci~ively nor explicitly rejected by it. The dissenters' views,
both those expressed and those implicit, represent a residual legacy of Wooster v. Sunderland; they stand as obstacles t9 the further recognition of the rights of students.

1. Incompetence and paternalism.

The notion that children are incompetent is one of the pil_.
lars of the classic in loco parentis view of the public schools.
This view rests on a syllogism of beguiling simplicity: Only
those who possess certain capabilities are entitled to share
in generally held rights; schoolchildren lack some of those
capabilities. The conclusion is that children may be denied
rights take for granted by adults.
The argument, however, is neither as simple nor as compelling as it first appears; both premises of the syllogism must
be qualified. First, the proposition that children are incompetent requires substantial modification in order to approximate the real world. Although history clearly teaches th:,t
children are "different," it has spoken over time with a :emarkable cacophony of voices as to who are "children."
Indeed, that dependent state between childhood and adulthood called adolescence is an invention of modern industrialized society. 6 Even given a culture that takes extended adoJescence for granted, its proper duration is
subject to reasonable dispute and to revision.
More fundamentally, the major premise of the syllogism
- the notion that entitlement to share in generally held
constitutional rights depends on certain capabilities or
competence - is flawed. Competency is, to be sure, at
times relevant and even decJsive for the determinat=·-,, of
rights; but at other times it is not. Competency is relevant
to those rights principally aimed at maximizing the free
choice of persons, as opposed to those principally intended
to safeguard the individual against governmental abuse.
Rights of the first category ought to be limited to those who
have the capacity of avoiding serious harm to themselves
or others as they go about exercising their choices. Thus,
we have the strongest case fnr -~~nying rights to children
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on the ground of their incapacity when the injury we are
concerned with is great, when the likelihood of its occurrence is high, when the opportunity for the child's learning process or for adult intervention to moderate the
danger once the child has acted is low, and when the injury,
if it occurs, is irreversible. Driving cars and using guns are
examples: A momentary indiscretion may unleash terrible
consequences that can neither be checked nor undone. The
child's immaturity certainly argues against free choice.
But with respect to other rights, "competency" is not the
appropriate test. I have in mind those rights aimed not so
much at maximizing free choice but at civilizing the processes and instruments of state compulsion.
Due process of law and the right to be free of cruel and unusua I punishment are archtypical examples. They do not
deny the legitimacy of governmental interference with a
citizen's free choice. Rather, they regulate the terms of that
interference. Procedural due process does not immunize
persons against deprivations of life, liberty or property; it
simply insists on a degree of fairness and humanity. Similarly, the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment does not prevent punishment; it regulates the
ways in which government visits is unpleasantness upon
people. To that deg~ee,the capacity of children has nothing
to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently and
humanely by their government. They are entitled to such
treatment not because they are competent but because
they are persons.
One might reason, however, that other constitutional rights
do hinge on possession of adult competency. The right of
free speech might be offered as a prime example. One of
its central functions, after all, is to facilitate free choice by
that portion of the population regarded as competent to
exercise choice. But that argument, too, breaks down. For
in our society the right to speak is far broader than the right

Page 15

to act on that speech. And the fact that choices may be
foreclosed to children until they reach a certain age hardly
precludes their right to think, speak, debate, and dissent
about those choices.
Furthermore, important choices are inescapable even for
the young. How, for example, should children think about
their peers of other races and sexes? How should they adjust to the competitive values that permeate our society?
How should they evaluate the network of ideas and values
they are exposed to in school? How should they think about
authority - its legitimacy and its limits? How should
they go about selecting their future education and careers?
Schools are, or should be, a training ground for informed,
intelligent resolution of such issues, whether the decisions
are to be made now or in the future. Students, therefore,
should be permitted access to ideas and arguments that
stir the society at large, even if they are permitted only
limited participation in decisionmaking. This educational
process cannot be deferred until the child reaches age 18.

2. The "unity of interest" between school
authorities and students.
The paternalism argument rests not only on assumptions
of student incompetence but on a companion view that
school authorities can and do protect student interests.
Why then do they need legal protections? Justice Powell,
speaking for the Goss minority, described the relation be•
tween the interests of students and officials as "(u]nlike the
divergent and even sharp conflict of interests usually
present where due process rights are asserted." In the
school context, he found those interests "essentially congruent." Accordingly, the adversary stance that makes
sense in the world outside of-the schoolroom makes none
at all within that benign setting, where "the experience,
good faith, and dedication" of the school staff safeguard
student interests.

"Students ... should be permitted access to ideas
and arguments that stir the society at large,
even if they are permitted only limited
participation in decision-making."
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''The requirements of fair treatment at the
hands of government, of humane punishment,
of privacy, or of free speech are protected
not because they are earned, but because they
preserve essential aspects of human dignity
and are necessary limitations upon
government in a democratic society.''
The Gossmajority, in upholding the students' claim to due
process rights, presented one response to this view. Even
assuming the coincidence of interest postulated by the
minority, officials may make mistakes. No one, said the
Court, believes that the school "disciplinary process [is]
a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and
never unfair." The majority here stands on firm ground.
Paternalistic systems can go astray, converting the objects
of their beneficence into abject victims.

But the young are no immune from countless legal requirements, including the duties to pay taxes and to obey the
laws. Furthermore, the right to vote is conferred upon
numerous adults whose claim to entitlement may be no
stronger than that of many minors - for example, those
who do not support themselves, earn enough to pay taxes
or fight in wars. Finally, the arguments are fatally similar
to the long-discredited conception of the right to vote as a
privilege of the propertied class.

But the dissent's easy equation of the interests of students
and school officials also contains a more fundamental flaw:
The "unity of interest" is partial at best. School teachers,
principals, school superintendents, and school boards have
a variety of interests - personal, bureaucratic and political
- that may clash with those of the child. The interest of
school officials in job advancement, political approval,
county funds, peer recognition, ego gratification, or a work
atmosphere free of student "disrespect" is not necessarily
the child's best interest.

More important, whatever validity these arguments are said
to have with respect to the right to vote, they cannot apply
to the protections of the Bill of Rights. The requirements
of fair treatment at the hands of government, of humane
punishment, of privacy, or of free speech are protected not
because they are earned, but because they preserve essential aspects of human dignity and are necessary limitations upon government in a democratic society.

This divergence of interest is aggravated, or course, when
the disciplinary issues arise out of political controversy,
and students find themselves challenging, criticizing and
thereby offending the very school authorities who sit in
judgment upon them. It strains credulity to suppose that
students in such a context would perceive the disciplinarian"s stance as "disinterested" or would see the interests
of the two as "congruent." Why should they?

4. Obedienceas educationalimperative.
One view of the relationship between children and adult
authority considers a high degree of deference by children
indispensable to their proper moral and practical growth.
Thus, the Goss minority postulates an incompatibility.
between due process and a student's understanding of "the
necessity of rules and obedience thereto."

But the students in Goss claimed no immunity from the
"rules." They merely sought an opportunity to challenge
an administrator's decision that the rules had been viol3. The younghave not earnedcertain rights.
ated and that they, the students, had violated them. To deny
Arguably, certain rights are denied the young not only be- them a hearing on this point may or may not produce a
cause they lack rational capacity, but also because the desirable lesson in obedience, but surely the lesson cannot
rights have not been earned. For example, this justifica- be characterized as one of obedience to rules. Obedience to
tion might be offered as part pf the reason for denying the administrative fiat would be closer to the mark.
young the right to vote. Because they have not shouldered The minority, nonetheless, felt that this nonreciprocal apadult responsibilities such as self-support. paying taxes proach to rule compliance contributed to the moral develand fighting in wars, minors have not earned the right to opment of the child:
vote. Denial of the right is the quid pro quo for their privIn an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in
ileged status as children. Moreover, because they are reshaping the character and value judgments of the young, a heavier
responsibility falls upon the schools. When an immature student
lieved of adult burdens, there is no unfairness in denying
merits censure for his conduct, he Is rendered a disservice if ap•
children a voice in the allocation of such burdens. This
propriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for their apposition is the converse of the no-taxation-without-repplication are so.formalized as to Invite a challenge to the teacher's authority ••.
resentation argument.
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But what is to happen when, as in Goss,the student doubts
that "censure" is merited? The minority, with startling
simplicity, eliminated the issue, in the quotation above, by
assuming the very question to be proved: that censure was
merited. The dissenters hoped thereby to teach the young
the meaning of "the social compact of respect for the rights
of others." But these methods teach only that those wielding governmental powers are not to be challenged and that
"respect for the rights of others" is a mildly disguised code
phrase for a unidirectional "respect" for adult authority no
matter how arbitrary it may be.
The history of official behavior, especially as revealed in
recent years, offers precious little that would make one
want to teach this version of the "social compact." Surely, a
better lesson would be to teach precisely the reverse: that
even the young and powerless enjoy rights, and that legal
constraints bind the governors as well as the governed.
From this perspective; one might regard a student's desire
to rebel. against "arbitrary" authority as an impulse that
society should prize.
An altern,ative argument for the virtues of unquestioning
obedience to authority might be couched in practical rather
than moral terms. Students need to learn this lesson as
part of their socialization to adult life. To learn to accept
authority, sometimes even irrational authority, is to prepare for the real world. But if this accurately describes the
real world, educators might well seek to encourage reflection about that world, the nature of the social organization
that produces it, its implications, and possible alternatives
to it, rather than merely to promote the practical advantages of accommodation. To the degree that public education promotes "realistic accommodation" of this sort, it
contributes to the reality just described and abandons more
noble ideals of public education: the development of a
citizenry capable of understanding, questioning and evaluating society and one that confronts authority in a self•
confident, thoughtful and critical way.
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5. Student rights as Incompatible with school
disciplinary requirements.
Uncomplaining obedience may commend itself not as an
ideal but rather as a concession to the harsh realities of the
school world in which teachers are increasingly beset by
disrespect, disobedience and violence. In this view, for example, due process has no place in the "real" world if
_educatorsare to survive, much less to educate. Calling the
students' attention to "rights" is then like waving a red
flag to persons who above all else need more discipline,
not more license.
Now one must concede that school officials may confront
disciplinary emergencies requiring temporary restrictions
of rights. But excessive deference to officials on this score
is itself dangerous. However sincere, officials may tend to
see "exigencies" when the disinterested observer will detect only an inappropriate response to admittedly difficult problems.
Moreover, the presumed benefits of an authoritarian school
regime may not be worth their price. In an effective educational setting "most of the objectionable behavior of
students - their idiosyncratic tendencies, their expressions of opinion on many subjects, the disturbances and
distractions caused by their actions, their statements, and
even their appearance - is actually grist for the educational mill." 7 A system predicated on hostility to student
rights runs the risk not only of forfeiting this educational
opportunity but of exacerbating the very difficulties it is
seeking to cure. Such a system both undermines the moral
claims of authority and diverts attention form the genuine
evils that frequently underlie school disciplinary problems:
racial segregation, staffing deficiencies, overcrowded
classrooms, inadequate physical plant, defects of school
policy, and the hopelessness bred by lack of opportunity.
Schools adopting this route are likely to end up with the
worst of both worlds: the authoritarian environment without the hoped-for peace.

"In an effective educational setting 'most of the obje.ctionable
behavior of students - their idiosyncratic tendencies, ·their
expressions of opinion on many subjects, the disturbances
and distractions caused by their actions, their statements, and
even their appearance - is actually grist for the
educational mill'."
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Peaceful or not, the educational prospects of schools run
on the model of an authoritarian regime are dubious. Such
schools are primarily custodial institutions whose principal
assignment is to keep the young off the streets, out of
_troubleand off the labor market. The resulting atmosphere
is likely to prove incompatible with either learning or
teaching.
Nothing said thus far is intended to dispute the fact that
schools, like most other institutions, need certain conventions of behavior on the part of their participants in order
to accomplish their mission. Conventional education presupposes the orderly consideration of subject matter under
the guidance of a knowledgeable instructor. This view of
education dictates that a classroom not be treated as an
unstructured public forum in which all persons are free to
say or do what they will, when they will, on whatever subject strikes them. The crucial point, however, is that neither
age nor special theories about educating the young are essential underpinnings for such rules of decorum and order.
The need would exist more or less equally in a university
or an institution of adult education, though all the participants were over 18. Nor is this even a unique truth about
schools. Similar needs exist for courts, hospitals, libraries,
business offices, and theaters - in short, for most institutions. Emphasis on age and educational goals· adds little
that is legitimately relevant to the argument for maintaining institutional order. The danger is that such talk will
provide a psychologically potent bit of rhetoric for justifying a host of extraordinary restrictions because of a presumed but unwarranted view that children and the needs
of schools are "different." So far as routine institutional
requirements are concerned, a college or university would
furnish a presumptively appropriate model for drawing the
proper balance between constitutional ·rights and institutional needs, unencumbered by reflexive assumptions that
either age or educational objectives defeat constitutional
claims. The argument I advance for students' constitutional
rights, then, is quite compatible with a recognition of the
need for routine institutional order.

Education, coercion and children's rights

Concerning the extension of the law of equal freedom to
children, we must therefore say, that equity commands It,
and that expediency recommends it. We find the rights of
children to be deducible from the same axiom and by the
same argument as the rights of adults; whilst denial of them
involves us In perplexities out of which there seems to be no
escape. The association between filial subservience and barbarism - the evident kinship of filial subservience to social
and martial slavery - and the fact that filial subservience
declines with the advance of civilization, suggest that such
subservience Is bad. The viciousness of a coercive treatment
of children Is further proved by Its utter failure to accomplish the chief end of moral education - the culture of
the sympathies; by its tendency to excite feelings of antagonism and hate; and by the check which It necessarily
puts upon the development of the all-important faculty of
self-control. Whilst, on the other hand, a non-coercive treatment being favourable to, and almost necessitating, constant appeals to the higher feelings, must, by exercising
those feelings, Improve the character; and must, at the same
time, accustom the child to that condition of freedom In
which Its after-life Is to be passed. It turns out, too, that the
very need for a moral training of children is but temporary
and that, consequently, a true theory of the filial relationship
must not presuppose like the command-and obedience
theory that such a need Is permanent. Lastly, we find reason
to attribute whatever of incompatlblllty there may be between these conclusions and our dally experience, not to any
error in them, but to the necessary Incongruity between the
perfect law and an Imperfect humanity.
-

Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (New York: D. Appleton
and Company, 1873), p. 213.

6. Student complaints as educational diversion.
a. The "floodgates" theory. If rights are granted to students, it is said, school officials will be compelled to spend
much of their time c0mmuting to and from the local courthouse responding to the complaints of their litigious
charges. Administrators regularly make decisions of sericus consequence to students - in grading, in imposing
curricular requirements, in "tracking" them, and the like to which "due process" claims as plausibly might attach
ar in the case of the short-term suspension. Did the Court's
decision, the dissenting Justices asked, imply that all these
heretofore professional decisions were now to be transformed into decisions for judges? The minority feared that unless Goss could be rigidly contained, courts would displace
school officials as the authority in the educational community.

One response to this concern is that compelling authorities
to justify their use of power in terms of applicable legal
standards may not be so bad after all. Education still wou!ri

"To what extent does the ideal of
constitutional equality properly extend
to schoolchildren and entitle them the
same range of protections enjoyed
by adults?"

Education and the Constitutional Rights of Children -

Leon Letwin

occur, but partly in the setting of the judicial system. By
observing the operations of such a system, assuming it
were sensitive to the constitutional issues involved, students and administrators alike might receive a powerful
lesson in the rule of law.
Moreover, the predicted volume of complaints itself may
be exaggerated. For a number of reasons college students
do not appear to have rushed to court to take advantage of
the due process system that dawned on the American
university more than a decade ago. Many college students
who face school discipline are perfectly happy to be treated
paternalistically. When they are charged with traditional offenses, such as plagiarism, cheating on an examination, or
shoplifting from the university bookstore, what they want is
sympathy, understanding and a second chance rather that
"rights," due process and litigation. The exceptions have
come mainly from students disciplined for politically related activity, but even these students have infrequently
sought judicial review.
Rather than fearing a tidal wave of litigation, the opposite
should be feared: Students acculturated to the Goss dissenters' "social compact" may be so conditioned to a
"realistic" assessment of bureaucratic power that they will
give in to it too readily.
In sum, although no one doubts that the activity of teaching requires school authorities to exercise broad discretionary powers, particularly in the area of nondisciplinary issues, this discretion should not preclude challenges to
the fairness of the mechanism or the rationality of the
decisions. 8
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limitations on government in a democratic society. These
commitments should furnish the basis for thinking about
the rights of minors even as they do the rights of adults.
If the case can be made for circumscribing particular rights
of the young because they are young, or because educational needs require it, let the case be made and not simply
proclaimed or assumed. The tradition that permits the
automatic, uncritical reliance on student or youth status as
a trump card to justify the denial of rights richly deserves
to be abandoned.
It is, moreover, misguided to see constitutional values as
fundamentally at war with educational values. The capacity
and willingness of the young to think independently, to
question and to challenge constituted authorities and established ways, are not superfluous luxuries. The development of such talents ought to be central objectives of
educational policy.

"It is .•. misguided to
see constitutional values
as fundamentally at war
with educational values."

b. The harm of "constitutionalizing" teacher-student relationshfps. In opposing due process rights for students,
Justice Powell hinted at greater dangers than merely increased litigiousness. He described the normal teacherpupil relationship as "rarely adversarial," suggesting that
the "constitutionalization"
of that relationship not only
will fail to secure due process to the student but will irreparably damage the relationship as well. Under this
theory, the very adversary atmosphere generated by speaking of "rights" is objectionable: Students need to focus not
on their "rights" but on what the teacher has to teach. A
related argument begins with the observation that students
need structure and limits. Otherwise anarchy reigns, and
anarchy is-incompatible with education.
But rules can be defined with sufficient precision so that
neither students nor teachers are enveloped by an asphyxiating cloud of doubt. Even very young children can and should
learn the importance of both rights and obligations. A genuine commitment to both will, of course, produce occasional tensions. But educators should surely avoid the
parody of education that results when they seek to exorcise
the unavoidable tensions between rights and obligations
by insisting on the obligations and denying the rights.

Conclusion
Constitutional rights express fundamental postulates about
the respect due to human beings and about indispensable

Footnotes
This article largely based on articles published elsewhere with
extensive citations to legal authorities: After Goss v. Lopez:
Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 627
(1977); Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public
School Campuses in California, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 141 (1974).
1.393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). This case and Tinker are each discussed
below.
3. Though this is a view thus far rejected by the Supreme Court.
Consult Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
4. 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P.959 (1st Dist. 1915).
5. Emphasis added.
6. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 38,
61-63 (1975).
7. Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal
Authority of School Officials, 19 J. Pub. L. 209,236 (1970).
8. In Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978),the Supreme
Court declined to decide whether a medical school student dismissed on academic, rather than disciplinary, grounds was entitled to due process protections. The court held, however, that
assuming the student was so entitled, the procedures employed
had satisfied due process requirements because they permitted
her the Informal opportunity to discuss the matter with the
administration and to make her side of the issue known, even
though she was not granted a formal hearing by the medical
school.
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Education and Government

EoacATION AND GOVERNMENT
will be an occasional feature
of THINKING, dealing with
those workings of government
that may be relevant to the
future of philosophy for children.

The Validation

Process

In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, which provided funds for developing, implementing, evaluating and disseminating educational
innovations. The idea was to encourage local school
districts to develop new educational practices, and to
devise means of exporting such practices to other districts. Successful approaches would then come to be
taken as model solutions which would be made available
to other districts through state and national dissemination efforts.

has to be devised which will generate convincing data as
to the value of the program. Upon completion of this
phase of development, the teachers would request state
validation of their program. Different states evaluate programs differently: in New Jersey, the process is accomplished by a visit from a team of three out-of-state
evaluators usually from colleges of education,
although
they might
also be principals
or
superintendents of schools, or educational psychologists
specializing in statistical assessment. After two days of
In 1974 the ESEA was amended so as to consolidate sup- examination of the program, the team gives its verdict for
port for new and innovative programs under "Title IVC." or against state validation.
In the past decade, thousands of educational innovations Obtaining state validation means that the program
have been developed and field-tested. Many of those who becomes one of a select number of programs which are
have conceived and nurtured such programs have turned recommended by the State Department of Education to
to Title IVC for assistance. Winnowing out the more pro- each school district in the state. It also means that there
mising candidates for support has been a concern of both will likely be Title IVC monies in that state for teacherthe national Office of Education and the National lnsitute training, so that districts do not have to reach into their
for Education. A bewildering array of federal and state own limited staff development funds to train their
panels, boards and agencies, not always free from over- teachers in the new program.
lapping jurisdiction, has been charged with overseeing
the long, slow haul which a newly conceived educational Programs that are validated on the state level can subprogram must endure on its way toward state and na- sequently apply for national validation. The route again
tional validation.
may vary, but it seems generally to involve going through
Suppose some teachers in a school have come up with a the Joint Dissemination Review Panel of NIE for formal
new approach in some educational area. They may need approval, and subsequently applying to the Office of
time and money, however, to develop a curriculum, and Education's National Diffusion Network for funding.
so their school (the application must corve from a local The funds allocated by Title IVC for teacher-training must
school district) applies on their behalf to the Title IVC be employed for just that purpose; they cannot be used
agency in their state. If their application ls successful, either for training teacher-trainers, or for teaching
they will get a year's support, perhaps renewable a se- children. And for no program.are they likely to last very
cond and third year, if they can satisfy a careful annual long. After a year or two of dissemination, programs are
assessment by a team of examiners.
expected to find other sources of support. By that time, if
But the development of a new program will not receive
further support unless it can show that it is both
statistically and educationally significant, and that it is
economical and efficient enough for other districts to be
able to adopt it. Usually this means that an experiment

the program has demonstrated that it is genuinely of
academic merit and can be economically delivered to
consumer districts, it is presumed that other local, state,
federal or private funding will be discovered to take up
the slack.
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Philosophy for students
with learning disabilities
by Charlann Simon
nesearch has determined that cognitive and communi"-cation deficits and delays are prevalent among learning
disabled (LD) students (Wiig and Semel, 1976). Since
normal intelligence is assumed with this etiological classification, the educator may assume that potential exists
for deyelopment of both cognitive and communication
skills In these students.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "cognition" will
be operationally defined as the intellectual activities of
the mind, including thinking, knowing, perceiving, remembering, abstracting and generalizing. The term "communication" refers to giving and receiving information;
transference of a message.
As the speech-language clinician at the Devereux Day
School (Scottsdale, Arizona), a grade K-12 educational
facility for LO and emotionally handicapped (EH) students,
the interaction of communicative and cognitive deficits
has become increasingly apparent. Upper grade students
(ages 10-17) in my caseload have not learned to think
critically (or decide whether a conclusion follows· necessarilyfrom the premises offered in support of it) or process
information at higher cognitive levels (Bloom, 1956), such
as application, analysis.and synthesis. In addition, they do
not know how to organize their thoughts prior to expres-

sion or support opinions and positions with facts. In short.
they do not have control of the cognitive uses of language
(to describe, explain, instruct, inquire, analyze, compare
and contrast, evaluate) (Bereiter and Engelmann, 1966).
Communicative effectiveness is severely reduced by the
near absence of what Loban (1961) refers to as the correlates of language proficiency." These factors include
fluency (ability to find vocabulary readily to express oneself), effectiveness and control (ability to order a message
purposely and convey it in conventional and varied grammatical patterns) and coherence (ability to subordinate
related ideas).
11

The purpose of this paper is four-fold: to consider natural•
cultural versus accelerated cognitive development; to
relate research findings from a study of LD and EH adolescentsexposed to the Lipman and Sharp (1974) philosophy
program which was developed through The Institute for
the Advancement of Philosophy for Children; to describe
certain modifications of the program which made it more
relevant to the skill needs of this special population; and
to offer selected suggestions to other professionals similarly interested in using the Lipman and Sharp program
with LD and EH adolescents.
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BACKGROUND
Clinically, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a
student is "LD" or "EH." By the time children have spent
three to four frustrating years in school, and due to the fact
that they do not learn through traditional methods, they
can become quite angry and aggressive in their attempts
to vent feelings of failure and frustration. In many ways,
the old "chicken or the egg" controversy is kindled when
analyzing the etiology of LD and EH student behaviors.
Educationally, LD and EH students spend much of the
school day working on "splinter skills" in the areas of math
and reading. The goal of special programs for these students is to re-integrate them into the regular classroom, and
the achievement tests which grant re-entry tend to focus
on such skills as knowledge of math facts, phonics, vocabulary and comprehension. Improving general cognitive
and communication skills, therefore, tends not be within
the parameters of the classroom teacher's goals, due to
time limitations. These skills, however, are of immense
practical use and therefore might fall into the domain of
those ancillary teachers who focus on "adjustment"
as
contrasted to "academics."
One of the initial questions an educator asks when embarking upon an instructional project is, "Where do I begin?" We know through observation and investigation that
children make steady refinements with age in both their
cognitive and communication
skills. In the area of cognitive development, Jean Piaget has become a primary
r-eference for many educators as they determine the
sequence of program content which would stimulate
progressively more complex cognitive operations (Gorman, 1972).

According to Piaget, by approximately eleven years of age,
a child begins to have the ability to reason from an hypothesis to all its conclusions, which involves thinking about
thoughts or theories rather. than concrete realities (Pulaski,
1971 ). The most important general property of this most
advanced stage of cognition, Formal Operations, concerns
the "actual" versus•the "possible." It is the ability to deal
with the possible, rather than with just the actual, that is
uniquely found in true formal operational thought and
which separates it from the preceding stage, Concrete
Operations.
When considering program guidelines for students in the
age range of 11 to 17, it is necessary to maintain a perspective on this transition from Concrete to Formal Operations.
How much do we let natural-cultural cognitive growth determine or contain an instructional acceleration of potential or readiness for growth? If potential is not capitalized
upon at a prime moment, it is possible that growth may
be stunted and full potential never realized. This is particularly true of Formal Operations, in which thinking about
thoughts might not ever naturally occur within a student's
cultural experience.
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Piaget is considered the leading figure in the study of a
child's knowledge of logic, though not his capacity to
learn logic. A study by Ennis ( 1965), Critical Thinking
Readiness in Grades 1- 12, was directed toward how
children between ages nine to eighteen (with a mean IQ
of 114) responded to instruction in class and conditional
logic. He found that while younger students did not benefit from the fifteen days of instruction given to them in the
course of his study, students from age 11-12 onward were
responsive to instruction in class logic and made significant
strides. By 17-18 years of age, there was considerable
mastery of the basic principles of class logic as the result
of existing natural-cultural influences and that the advance
through instruction was minimal when compared to the
strides evidenced in the 11 to 16 age group. Conditional
logic was a different story. It was not until ages 16-17 that
students were ready to make great strides through the
instructions prov~ded. Ennis noted that students in the
primary grades showed major advances in mastery of the
principles of ordinal logic, also a type of deductive reasoning: ages six through nine were particularly responsive to training. While ordinal logic can be mastered during
Concrete Operations, it would appear that capacity for the
mastery of class logic through instruction might occur at
the transitional point into Formal Operations and then
conditional logic (referred to by Piaget as "propositional
logic") would more completely define this last stage of
cognitive growth.
The following are examples of ordinal, class and conditional logic:
1. Ordinal- She is taller than Jim. Jim is taller than Joan.
Is she taller that Joan?
2. Class- All cars in the garage are Mr. Smith's. All Mr.
Smith's cars are Fords. Are all of the cars in the garage
Fords?
3. Conditional- If the bicycle in .the garage is Bob's, then
it's red. The bicycle in the garage is not red. Is the bike in
the garage Bob's?

1

One might ask of any program devised to promote development in logic, "Are these stages in deductive reasoning
sequenced correctly?° Obviously, of immense importance
is a child's development of critical thinking capacities. To
build judiciously upon current potential and at the same
time consider the next stage of refinement is to make successive approximations to the goal. Since deductive logic,
or the concern with whether a statement follows necessarily from one or more other statements, is central to,
critical thinking, perhaps ordinal logic could be used in
readiness exercises to prime the intellect for consideration
of logical relationships. The fact that these relationships
can be graphically displayed provides support from Concrete Operational thought. Class logic could theA be utilized
as the tool through which thinking about relationships (as
contrasted to seeing ordinal relationships) would provide
the base for the concept of critical thinking. Again, as a
transition from seeing relationships
to thinking

Student Comments:

Piaget would have us believe that thinking
about thinking typically does not appear
until about age 11. But, at least when
there is something practically to be gained
from such thinking, it may make its entrance much sooner. I offer the following
real-life episode as evidence.
At age 6 our daughter, Susan, found it
difficult to sit still at the dinner table.
On one occasion I found myself reprimanding her several times for leaving the table,
not eating, and so on. Each reprimand was
punctuated with an, " ...and I mean it!"
As my irritation was approaching rage,
Susan calmly said, "Unfortunately ... " and
paused to let out a hearty laugh. "Unfortunately ...?" I asked incredulously.
"Unfortunately," she continued "we're not
playing 'I mean it' today." As my rage
melted Into laughter, she explained how
this clever ploy had occurred to her. She
said that she had seen a Peanuts comic
strip in which Snoopy was brooding over his
tennis game, saying, "I should have done
this" and "I should have done that."
Then he concluded, "Unfortunately, we
weren't playing 'should have'." Needless
to say, /"can hardly wait until Susan joins
forces with Harry and his friends!
-Michael S. Pritchard, Dept. of Philosophy,
Western Michigan University.
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THESTODV
Subjects

The things which exist around us,
which we touch, see, hear and taste,
are regarded as Interrogations
for which an answer must be sought ...
-

John Dewey

Teachers in the Upper School (ages 10-17) were requested
in the fall of 1977 to refer their "best thinkers" to participate in a "philosophy seminar," meeting for 30-minute
sessions three days per week. Five boys ranging in age
from 11 to 16 (mean of 12.9) joined the seminar. It was
treated as the equivalent of a gifted program in the school.
In order to collect data on the validity of the Lipman and
Sharp program ( 1974) and determine whether or not there
should be continued allocation of the speech-language
clinician's time for a philosophy seminar, a control group
was formulated. This group consisted of referred students
whose schedules conflicted with the Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday seminar sequence. The three boys ranged in age
from 13.6 to 14.4 mean of 13.7).

Within the entire population of five experimental cases
and three controls, the mean WISC IQ was 96. The mean IQ
for the experimental group was 93 and for the control
about relationships, perhaps-class logic should be intro- group, 102.
duced with a graphic display of intersecting circles instead Procedure
of a heavy emphasis on the "language of logic" (Ennis, 1965)
Prior to entry into the experimental or control group, each
Just as children profit froni instruction in logic by making boy was administered the following tests to acquire data
more dramatic gains that they would have through natural- on baseline performance:
cultur~,1de~elopm~nt ~lone, e?ucators_pr~fit from "pro- 1. Inference Subtest, Level II California Test of Mental
~rams . which provide mst~uct1onal_guideImes for teachMaturity (CTMM) (Sullivan, Clark and Tiegs, 1961)
mg logic.
For example, m searchmg for ways to me·et
the intellectual growth needs of very capable Upper School 2. lnference Subtest, Level 111,
CTMMT
students at Devereux Day School, materials from The 3. Auditory Association Subtest, Illinois Test of PsychoInstitute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children
linguistic Abilities (ITPA) (McCarthy and Kirk, 1968)
call}e to my attention. Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1977) 4 Vi
A
• t·
s bt t ITPA
· • Ies of 1og1ca
.
. suaI ssoc1a 10n u es ,
• 1 t h"mk"mg and d"1scuss1on
descn"be how prmc1p
skills can be developed through student interaction with Although the Inference Subtests were designed to be speed
a "philosophical novel."They contend that the "readiness tests, the time limitations were.not enforced in this study.
period" of which Ennis (1965) speaks, should be capitalized Instead, they were used as achievement tests and scored
upon. Students (of approximately age 10 onwards) follow in terms of the number correct out of the total test items.
the novel's characters through a series of thoughts and This tactic was chosen to partial out reading skill from the
experiences which reveal that one must not rely totally ability to make logical inferences; the emphasis was not on
upon one's perceptions, experiences or prejudices, but reading speed, but critical thinking capacities. Two levels
must call upon the principles of logic in order to draw of the Inference Subtest were used because it was difficult
responsible conclusions. These critical thinking skills are to determine an exact grade level for these LD/EH students,
developed within the context of peer-discussions. The so it seemed desirable to have a reliability check on the dediscussions foster practice in organizing one's ideas prior gree of their critical thinking skills.
to expression, following the line of a discussion so that The association subtests from the ITPA require the sturelevant comments can be presented and learning to re- dent to relate two concepts or sets of concepts. The quesspect differing points of view. The go~ls of this program tion was asked, "Would gains in logical thinking be evwere synonymous with those I had formulated after con- idenced in performance on this type of associational thinking?
sidering the present gaps in the educational programming The five boys in the experimental group attended approxiof some of the EH and LD students in the school.
mately 50 30-minute sessions between October 1977 to
It was decided to offer a "philosophy seminar" composed May 1978. Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery (Lipman and
of the most intellectually capable students. The phil- Sharp, 1974) was read and discussed. Generally, teaching
osophical novel, Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery, would suggestions in the accompanying manual were followed.
be read and discussed, relying heavily upon the accompany- There were some additions and modifications necessary
ing manual to provide necessary guidelines, for the teacher- to meet some special needs of this LO/EH group, and
clinician had interest but no academic training in philosophy. these are discussed in a later section of this paper.
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The novel was read aloud. In the beg.inning, the boys took
turns, but because only two of the five were relatively
facile readers, they suggested that the clinician do the
reading and they would follow along in their books. The
impetus for this suggestion was probably two-fold: 1) they
did not want to belabor the content of the story because
they found it unexciting (it was written with a 10-year old
in mind), and they wanted to spend the bulk of the seminar
time discussing concepts emanating from the story, and
2) they had very little tolerance for the difficulty their p~ers
experienced in oral reading. Since the focus of the seminar
was on the development of thinking and discussion skills
and not the development of reading skills, their suggestiqn
was implemented. They were always reminded, "Be sure
to let me know if you would ·like to read at any time."
Because the discussion was such a dominant part of the
30-minute sessions, usually no more than 2-to3-pages
·per day were covered.

Results
In May 1978 all subjects were re-tested with the initial test
battery. A t-test was done on each of the four pre-tests
and results indicted that the populations in October 1977
were not significantly different; they could therefore be
considered equivalent. The levels of significance were:
LevelII (Inferences)
LevelIll (Inferences)
AuditoryAssociation
VisualAssociation

.55

.83
.83
.82

Discussion
Although the control group had advantages of age and
IQ, the experimental group made greater gains in critical
thinking skills between October 1977 and May 1978. An
intervening condition was the experimental group participation in a philosophy seminar, utilizing materials from
The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for
Children.
Statistical manipulation of the study data showed that the
differences between the experimental and control groups
at post-testing could not be attributed to chance; critical
thinking skills were apparently improved through participation in the philosophy seminar. Certain clinical observations would coincide with this empirical evidence. Two
examples will be offered.
Early in 1978, a classmate of one of the participants visited
the seminar. We were reviewing principles of class logic
and the following problem was posed:
Miss Brown Is a kindergartenteacher.
Miss Brown teachescrafts at a senior
citizens facility. Therefore,
t. kindergartenteacherswork well
with older people
2. peoplewho teach crafts to senior
citizens make good kindergarten
teachers
3. a kindergartenteacher also
teaches crafts at a senior citizens
faclllty

At the time of post-testing in May, however, the populations were no longer equivalent. The differences between
performance of the two groups on post-testing, determined
by a t-test, were significant at the following levels:
LevelII(Inferences)
LevelIll (Inferences)
AuditoryAssociation
VisualAssociation

.08
.10
.20

.10

Looking at the groups separately, each shdwed significant
improvements. Pre-/post-test improvement for the treatment group on all four tests was significant beyond the
.05 level. Pre-/post-test improvement from controls (explained by testing effect) was beyond the .05 level except
for auditory association (.33). Both groups improved, but
~heexperimentals improved significantly more.
Specific differences in performance were analyzed in terms
of the mean percentage of increase between pre-and posttesting in each of the two groups.
Mean.%IncreaseBetweenPre-Post-Tests
Vla.Aaaoc.

Inferences

Inferences

Aud.Aaaoc.
ITPA

13%

22%

1%

7%

35%

38%

8%

12%

CTMMT-11

I. ControlGroup
II. Experimental
Group

CTMMT-111

ITPA

By employing a t-test, il was possible to determine that
participation in the group not only affected the absolute
performance but that the improvement pre-/post-testing
was different to the following levels of significance:
LevelII (Inferences)
LevelIll (Inferences)
AuditoryAssociation
VisualAssociation

.033
.088
.042
.223

'' ... they had learned a
compensatory skill
which enabled them to
engage in productive
problem-solving as
contrasted to

guessing.''
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The visitor responded, "It's number one." One of the boys For both groups, there was a greater increase in the ability
regularly attending the seminar said, "No, I don't think · to make visual associations than auditory associations.
so_.N~";', I would have said that a while back, but now I There could possibly be a language factor operating here.
thmk 1ts number three. We don't have any facts about a While expressive vocabulary plays a significant role in the
people, only Miss Brown, so it's one teacher. We auditory association tasks, the visual association tasks are
lot
don t know how good she is at teaching crafts, so we can't : receptive. Both present conceptual tasks to be completed
say that she works well with senior citizens. It's number but the auditory task requires that the subject retrieve~
three - a teacher teaches crafts."
vocabulary word. It was observed during auditory associaSecondly, during post-testing there was an obvious dif- tion testing that while a student might be "on the right
ference in the degree of comfort and assurance in complet- track" conceptually, he would be unable to retreive the
ing the Inferences Subtests, between the experimentals precise word(s) needed to score within normative limits.
and the controls. Comments from the control group in- Because most of the subjects scored near the top of both
eluded, "Oh, no not these. They don't make sense; These association tests on the pre-test, there was not enough room
are hard; I can't figure these out _ Oh well, so what!" for variance to assess fully the impact of the philosophy
The experimental group, on the other hand, commented seminar on these associational skills. Clinically, it appeared
on how easy the items were in May as contrasted to October·. that the greatest contribution of the seminar experience
"Boy, I remember when I took this a long time ago. 1don't to any of these "cognitive calisthenics" was the interest
think I knew any of them then."
developed in analysis of what would be the most appropriate answer, rather than offering unsystematic guesses.
Error analysis of experimental post-test responses on the
Inference Subtests showed the greatest growth in ordinal Regarding growth in communication skills during the
logic. Of the total of 18 errors from the entire experimental course of the seminar, a pragmatic model developed by
group on both Levels II and Ill, 15 were due to confusion of Halliday (1973) as well as Laban's proficiency model (1961)
value judgments (or opinion) and fact in class logic prob- could be used as reference points. Halliday addresses his
lems. They had learned to compensate at a concrete level model to the various functions that language serves (instruthrough drawing diagrams which showed the spatial and menta I, regulatory, interactional, personal, heuristic,
temporal relationships stated in the ordinal logic problems, imaginative and representational). Clinical observation
and could make appropriate inferences. While they could indicated observable growth in the interactional, personal,
not always manipulate the problem components at an ab- heuristic and representational functions. The seminar prostract thought level, they had learned a compensatory vided a setting in which ideas and viewpoints were shared;
skill which enabled them to engage in productive problem- in the beginning, these were emotional properties. To atsolving as contrasted to guessing. The difference between tack one's ideas or viewpoints was to attack the person.
their performance on ordinal and class logic problems Frequent comments such as, "Hey, you big dummy, I've
might indicate a present ability to deal with logical opera- been around a lot longer than you and I know," were not
tions closer to the Concrete Operational stage of thought uncommon during the early discussions. As the boys
than to the Formal Operational stage. Ability to manipulate gained greater insight into differing views, supported by
factual details easily at an abstract level (or without visual inductive or deductive reasoning, views were treated more
aids) appears to be emerging, judging by the mean per- objectively. This is not to say there were not occasional
centage increase of correct responses on both Inference acid remarks exchanged, but the tone of the seminar
showed that as the students developed better habits of
subtests.

?f

'' ... the greatest contribution of the seminar experience to any of these 'cognitive calisthentics' was the interest developed in analysis
of what would be the most appropriate answer,
rather than offering unsystematic guesses."
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thinking (more carefully and critically}, they reached out
for hard facts or evidence upon which to base their judgments of peer remarks rather than succumbing to emotional attacks on the person.
Of the factors leading to proficiency in language (Loban,
1961), the most apparent advance was in the ability to
express a point of view or describe an event more coherently and effectively. Factors such as grammar and vocabulary did not show obvious improvement. Although no
correction of agrammatical patterns was injected into the
goals of seminar sessions, vocabulary development was
attempted during the discussion of difference in, "kind" and
"degree." We took the word "anger" as our base and found
a series of words that expressed degrees of anger (annoyed,
exasperated, furious, provoked, incensed} and rank ordered
them. We discussed various experiences which might produce anger in these differing degrees and the boys used
the carrier phrase, "When •( a certain event occurred )•
I was • (the word that showed the appropriate degree of
anger)." We used several other words and their "synonyms"
in a similar fashion to show the importance of precision
in word choice for accurale communication of feelings
to occur.

... although the control group
had advantages of age and IQ,
the experimental group made
greater gains in critical thinking
skills ...
PROGRAM ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO
MEET NEEDS OF EH AND LD ST0DENTS
here were five basic additions and/or modifications of
the philosophy program as it was presented in the
manual accompanying Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery:
the method of presentation; the insertion of frequent
reviews of the leading ideas; a total emphasis on the application of the principles of logic; occasional editing of
the story; and ..branching" to include additional activities
for remedial and enrichment purposes.

T

Method of Presentation

Instead of the students silently reading parts of the novel,
discussing the leading ideas and then doing enrichment
activities, the novel was read aloud and the discussion and
activities were inserted at the appropriate times. These
boys needed the variety that this format provided to maintain interest. Because the clinician was drawing from.
leading ideas and activities at the same time, the copy of
the novel printed in the manual was of little use. It was
more efficient to use a copy of the student novel and make
not~s in the margin.

A Second Look at "Childish Behavior"

There is a sense in which small children are recent immigrants in our midst. They have trouble both in understanding and in using the language, and they often make errors.
So many people (you can notice this in the supermarkets,
especially with two-and three-year-old children) talk to their
children and get angry at them because the children don't
seem to mind, and anyone standing around can tell that the
children just haven't understood what mother said, because
the mother's vocabulary happened to be beyond them and
the mother's intention was not clear to them. But mother
feels, "Well, I said it, didn't I? What's wrong with the child
that he doesn't understand. It's English, isn't it?" But, as I
say, the child is a recent Immigrant in our midst and there
are things that the child doesn't understand.
There are curious instances. Once, when our little girl was
three years old, she found the bath too hot and she said,
"Make it warmer." It took me a moment to figure out that
she meant, "Bring the water more nearly to the condition we
call warm." It makes perfectly good sense if you look at it
that way. Confronted with unusual formulations such as
these which children constantly make, It seems to me that
many of us react with Incredible lack of Imagination. Sometimes children are laughed at for making silly statements
when it only requires looking at them - at their way of abstracting and their way of formulating their abstractions to see that they are not sllly at all . ..
We have a set of ceramic ashtrays at home, and when
Alan was about six years old, an aunt was there for dinner,
and she said, "Pass me an ashtray." He said, "Which one?"
There was a set of six ashtrays. My aunt said, "They're all
the same, pass any one." Alan thereupon began to show my
aunt in what ways each of these ashtrays was different from
the other. My aunt no doubt thought he was being childish
and silly, but I must say that we were at that moment very
proud of him.
-from S.I. Hayakawa, "The Use and Misuse of Language:
Some Thoughts on Communicating with One's Children," In
Science and Human Affairs (Palo Alto, California: Science
and Behavior Books, 1965), ed. Richard E. Farson,
pp. 101-102, 108.
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'' ... they reached out for hard facts or evidence
upon which to base their judgments of peer remarks rather than succumbing to emotional
attacks on the person."

Review of Leading Ideas

and that each group be critiqued and discussed. The rules
Reviewof the major points covered in the previous seminar for such an interchange were to include: 1) allowing an
session always initiated each session. Research by many individual to state his position and the supportive facts,
learning disabilities authorities, including Hallahan and without interruption and 2) in refutation, there would be
Kauffman (1976) indicates that memory deficits within no name-calling, but a statement that detailed why the
this population necessitate repitition of content. Not only individual disagreed.
the specifics of the preceding session were included in the When discussing generalizations, one of the sentences in
review, but also pertinent vocabulary (such as reasoning, the activities section to be analyzed was "I can tell a bad
reversibility, inference, analogy) and basic concepts (such guy from his looks." Several boys asserted this was not
as inductive and deductive reasoning principles) were an over-generalization because they were always able to
,periodically included. In addition, following every three or "read a guy's looks." That evening I clipped several photos
four chapters, approximately two sessions were devoted from the newspaper and magazines and mounted them on
to reviewing the leading ideas that had just been presented. 5x7 cards. At the next seminar the boys were asked to rate
The clinician goal was mastery of the concept of critical each person, on the basis of his looks, whether he was
thinking rather than "finishing the book." The emphasis, "good" or "bad." We had a good laugh when the exercise
then, was on quality rather than quantity.
was completed, because among those rated as "bad" were
Emphasis on the Practical Appllcatlon of Logic
the Arizona Attorney General and Zbigniew Brezezinski,
Advisor
for National Security Affairs to President Carter.
Whenever possible, the target of discussion was focused
The
exercise
left them less confident that they were really
on the application of the principles of inductive and deable
"to
tell
a
book by its cover."
ductive reasoning. At times the suggestions in the manual
"activities" section sufficed, but at other times we relied
on personal experiences, spontaneous occurrences or the
mass media. Several examples follow.
During a discussion on inductive reasoning, opinions on
rock music groups surfaced. One segment of the seminar
asserted that "Kiss" was the best group and another segment supported "Led Zeppelin." The interaction began
with name-calling, "Only little kids like 'Kiss'." The clinician suggested that we were operating at an emotional
rather than an analytical level. In addition, keeping in mind
the development of the interactive and personal functions
of language (Halliday, 1973), it was suggested that it was
important to express personal views but these needed to
be supported with evidence or information and then transmitted in an objective manner. How could we gather some
data on the music of each group? The boys suggested
that tapes of both groups be brought into the seminar

The media was used in several ways as a source for exercises in critical thinking. Three examples follow.
1. We spent time analyzing the "hidden persuaders" in
commercials and advertisements and found very little
logical persuasion; they were primarily emotional appeals to indulgence.
2. "Letters to the Editor" in the local newspaper provided
multiple examples of premises that had little, if any,
relationship to the conclusion formulated. The clinician
reduced the "letter" to a syllogism in which two premises and the choice of three conclusions were presented
to the students. They were first asked to choose the
appropriate conclusion (based on the premises), to the
letter. On other occasions, they created the syllogism
from the letter.
3. Political cartoons were analyzed for their representational value in commenting on current events.
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With all of the exercises described above, the clinician
was operating on the assumption that most of these boys
would not be going to college: school had been nothing
but a negative experience for them and they were anxious
to terminate it. It was unlikely, then, that they would be
exposed to another educational experience in which the
concentrated focus was the development of critical thinking skills. This seminar should provide as many opportunities as possible to practice critiquing persuasive
arguments offered by the media or their peers and to ex•
press these critiques in an organized, objective fashion.
Editing

Sometimes sections from the novel were edited because
the story did not move fast enough for these adolescents:
it had been written with the 10-year-old in mind. For example, Chapter Six was just summarized ·by the clinician
and the various interpretations of "mind" were discussed
through suggestions offered in the "activities" section.
Another example was in Chapter Eight, in which the first
three pages enumerate the styles of thinking of students
in Harry's class. The boys were not ready to focus on
"thinking about thought." The content was tedious and
did Plot seem that important to them: it was too abstract. There were many. other areas of the philosophy
program that did maintain their interest and which had
more practical usage. They did enjoy discussing animal
versus human intelligence in Chapter Seven because they
were able to draw upon some experiences of their own and
contrast two living beings. Cognitively, they appeared to
show the most readiness for a transition into Formal
Operations: the clinician chose to emphasize those parts
o·f the novel that were congruent with their current level
of cognitive development and to "plant seeds" for some
more sophisticated thinking about thoughts on a purely
abstract level. The program was edited to meet these AOals.

We had intended
to be surprised,
but
our astonishment
exceeded
our expectations.
- Jane Austen

Branching

Branching is a behavioral process in which the teacher
adds exercises to an established program, or the program
itself provides the exercises. Branching is done to provide
remedial or enrichment experiences. Aq example of
remedial branching would be exercises added to provide
practice on reversibility or syllogisms. Since vne of the
major problems this group experienced was confusion of
fact and opinion, it was essential they become aware of
when they were includfog value judgments in conclusions
that were not integral in the-premises.
There are many examples of enrichment branching in the
'"activities" section of the manual. An example of cliniciandevised branching would be the time we spent contrasting
structural analogies (introduced in Chapter Five) and conceptual analogies (such .as those appearing in the Visual
Association Subtest of the ITPA). The word "analogy"
was new to each of the boys. We began with the Chapter
Five discussion of structural analogies, which included
making inkblots to be interpreted and observing cloud
shapes (both of which were recommended in the manual).

Next, we contrasted form to conceptual analogies by looking at some clinician-devised problems similar to those in
the Visual Association Subtest. They found that both types
of analogies took analysis, but the ~onceptual associations
were more complex because they had to engage in convergent thinking, selecting one of four available "con•
clusions." The task was not unlike the "if-then" conditional
logic problems. As the Ennis ( 1965) research has shown,
this appears to be the most difficult of three types of deductive logic he studied (ordinal, class and conditional)
with regard to student (ages 9-18) readiness for instruction.
With structural analogies, they were able to engage in
divergent thinking, In which they could devise an infinite
number of analogies. Branching, then, involved taking one
of the "leading ideas" in Chapter Five and using it as the
impetus for a related, but more complex task.
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'' ... if students cannot read well, they assume
they are not very smart. It is important to keep

reminding them how smart they are."

SUGGESTIONS FOR EDUCATORS INTERESTED IN
USING INSTITUTE PROGRAMS WITH
LD/EH ADOLESCENTS
The critical thinking and discussion skill development
I focused upon in the program accompanying Harry
Stottlemeler's Discovery is quite comprehensive. The
suggestions that will be enumerated in this section evolved
from the research findings and clinical experience of
working with five adolescent LD/EH boys.
Suggestions Pertaining to Seminar Organization

1. Keep the seminar group small· (4-6 students). The LD/
EH population tends to be sensitive to unstructured
activities and they become easily over-stimulated.
2. Establish a few basic rules that keep the setting relaxed,
but provide some regulatory guidelines.
a. when someone is speaking, try not to interrupt;
if you do interrupt, the speaker has the right to
say, 'Tm not finished yet."
b. no name-calling; construct a statement which
specifies how you disagree with the person.
c. you may sit on a chair or on the floor, but no
lying down.
d. you may bring a soft drink, but no food.
3. Establish baseline behavior through testing.
a. devise a teacher-constructed test, focusing on the
leading ideas delineated in the manual, as a
mastery test.

4.

5.

6.

7.

b. use the Inference Subtests from appropriate levels
of the CTMMT as achievement tests, with no time
limit and score in terms of percentage correct.
c. consider the Cornell Deduction Tests (Ennis, 1965).
Readthe novel aloud, keeping in mind that LD students
show difficulty processing language auditorily, but need
practice in developing the skill.
a. maintain a slower than average speaking rate.
b. have _studentsfollow along in their books.
Provide variety in each session by including. some
reading, some discussion of the leading ideas and some
opportunities for practical application of the leading
ideas.
Let the seminar function as a "gifted program." Because these students have had so many educational
failures, they think they are "dumb." Our educational
system has done a superb job of equating reading ability with intelligence: if students cannot read well, they
assume they are not very smart. It is important to keep
reminding them how smart they are.
Focus on quality of unc;terstandingrather than quantity
of material covered. If only-half of the book is completed during the year, continue· with the remainder
the following year. Begin with a fairly extensive review
of the leading ideas covered in the first half, which
would benefit new members to _the group and provide
reinforcement for older group members.
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SUGGESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CRITICAL THINKING
1. Consider the characteristics of "the critical thinker."
Ennis (1965) has provided the following guidelines
which can be used as educational objectives when
constructing IEP's; "A critical thinker is characterized
by proficiency in judging whether
a. a statement follows from the premises
b. something is an assumption
c. an observation statement is reliable
d. a simple generalization is warranted
e. a hypothesis is warranted
f. a theory is warranted
g. an arugment depends on an ambiguity
h. a statement is overvague or overspecific
i. an alleged authority is reliable."
2. Begin with some ordinal logic exercises to prime the
intellect in preparation for various relationships expressed in verbal problems.
3. Visual stimuli should be used whenever possible, to
reinforce auditory input. The auditory channel is the
weaker for LD students (Kirk and Kirk, 1971). For
example, make a "placard card file" (to be used as giant
"flash cards") of items you plan on reviewing periodieally because of their importance to the concept of
critical thinking.
a. synonyms for quantifiers
b. reversible versus non-reversible sentences
c. syllogisms in which the premises and a choice of
conclusions are stated
4. Make concepts as concrete as possible. Research (Wiig
and Semel, 1976) and clinical observation indicates
that LD students have excessive difficulty relying only
upon the word content (either as a listener or reader)
for conceptual processing. Whenever abstractions can
be made explicit through concrete means, this course
should be adopted. In other words, these students need
to learn compensatory skills which will allow their lntellectto be more realistically judged.
a. they should learn to diagram ordinal logic relationships; for example, in a problem such as, "Tom
runs faster than Jim; Jack runs slower that Jim.
Who is the slowest?" they would note an initial
to represent the position of each person, as the
problem was being processed

T
Ji
Ja
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such a strategy would help them visualize the
correct answers rather than succumbing to guessing because their processing and memory capacities
did not provide necessary support.
b. class logic relationships should be introduced
through the use of intersecting circles instead
of placing emphasis on the "language of logic,"
which spends considerable time discussing subject and predicate roles
c. contrast word logic problems to symbol problems
because this is a difficult transition for this
population; for example
John is as tall as joe.
Joe is as tall as Jack.
A is equal to b.
B is equal to C.
Therefore, John is as tall as Jack
A is equal to C
5. Spend extra time on those program segments that will
directly contribute to their ability to be more responsible citizens by learning to:
a. watch for oyergeneralization (through misuse of
the quantifiers "all" or no," reversing sentences
that are non-reversible, etc.)
b. avoid jumping to conclusions until sufficient data
are gathered
c. follow the line of reasoning in an argument by reducing it to a syllogism, to make sure fact and
opinion are not being confused
d. support opinions with facts and expect factually
supported opinions from others; do not allow a
person's charisma to substitute for his knowledge.
11

Each of us thinks his own thoughts; our
concepts we share with our fellow-men.

-Stephen Toulmin, Human Undflrstandlng
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) p. 35.
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SUGGESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF DISCUSSION SKILLS

alternate method of commenting on someone's actions
1. The guidelines in the manual are excellent for leading
or statements the clinician can give them opportunities
to improve their personal and interactional functions
a discussion and providing "active listening" (Gord(Halliday, 1973) of language. When a comment is rudely
on, 1975 )cues which help the speaker to know if he
has communicated an idea the way he had intended.
or abruptly stated, the clinician can say, "Is there perWith the LD/EH students, the leader's role frequently
haps another way you might have expressed your
needs to be taken a step farther. When there are disopinion?"
ruptive behaviors and inflammatory comments de- 2. Avoid being concerned with grammatical constructracting from the session, it is necessary to send some
tions. A student who is in the midst of sharing an idea
"I messages," described by Gordon in Parent (and
has every right to be annoyed if interrupted with
"brought, not brung." It is discouraging to have someTeacher) EffectivenessTraining (1975). For example,
"When I hear someone call another person 'a big baby'
one concentrate on how you are saying something
it really annoys me because name-calling is a put
rather than on what you are saying.
down'." Sending "I messages" simply tells a student 3. In addition to the emphasis on the organization of
how some unacceptable behavior is making the teacher
messages, con~ider providing multiple opportunities
feel; it is a statement of fact that leaves the solution
to develop language functions. The philosophy pro•
negotiable. For students particularly prone to resistgram format' lends its~lf especially well to the followance, an "I message" is less likely to provoke them, is
ing functions described by Halliday ( 1973):
a more mature and less authoritarian interaction in
a. interactional - getting along with others
("me and you")
which honesty and openess are fostered and it does not
b. personal - expression of self-identity
underestimate a student's willingness to be considerate
("here l come")
of other people's feelings and take responsibility for
modifying his own behavior.·As the teacher-clinician
c. heuristic - learning and exploring reality
("tell me why")
uses this method of interaction with students, it bed. representational - communication of content
comes a model for student-student interaction. After
the students have had a chance to internalize this
("I've got som~thing to tell you")

" •••a student who is in the midst of sharing an
idea has every right to be annoyed if interrupted with 'brought, not brung.' It is discouraging to have someone concentrate on
how you are saying something, rather than
on what you are saying."
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CONCLUSION
earning to become a responsible citizen is a crucial
element of the educational process. Because learning
disabled students have academic skill deficits, their programming is requently monopolized by the remediation
of splinter skills. Adaptive skills such as communication
and reasoning abilities are overlooked. The research
study reported here as well as the Ennis ( 1965) study
. have shown that students are responsive to instruction in
the principles of logic. Instructional advantage should be
take of cognitive readiness states, especially for Formal
' Operations. As educators it is too precarious an assumption that students will realize their potential through
purely natural-cultural forces; there .simply is not that
much opportunity to develop critical thinking skills
informally.

L

I

i

Considering Ennis' study finding that ages 6-9 were particularly responsive to instruction in ordinal logic and the
students between 11-16 particularly profited from instruction in class logic, it would ~ppear that his study
population and this one were not equivalent. It is possible
that the mean IQ difference (114 for the Ennis study as
contrasted to 93 in this study) had a significant effect on
the readiness level of each group, or the research indicating delays in abstract thinking amond LD students
(of varying IQ's) could explain the difference. It was obvious, however, that this population (with a mean age of
12.9) was more responsive to instruction in ordinal logic,
judging by the consistency in correct answers on ordinal
problems, than to class logic. They were also more interested in discussing topics which they could anchor in
the real world than to philosophize about the nature of
man and the universe.

lotted to guiding the program. The data indicate the program is valid, and the degree of improvement in critical
thinking skills merits the continuation of the philosophy
seminar for Upper School students who are referred by
their teachers as the "best thinkers" in the classroom.
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A ..program" should be used as a base for individualized
instruction; it should not be followed as a cookbook. The
greatest value of Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery and the
other materials developed by the Institute is that they
provide a starting point for the development of critical
thinking and discussion skills. Basic principles of logic
and their practical application are spelled out for the
educator who has recognized a need for instruction in
these areas but does not know where to begin.
A program such as the lnstitute's is clay in the hands of
the educator who can sculpt it to meet individual needs.
Analyze the ..leading ideas" and the ..activities" to see if
they are appropriate for the current cognitive readiness
stage of the students and/or will make the best use of instructional time. Having accepted the present level of
cognitive growth, strengthen it before attempting to emphasize more taxing cognitive exercises. Successively approximate an understanding of the world of "the
possible," by providing transitional exercises which
utilize the world of "the actual" in a supportive role.
The author's research study was developed to test the
validity of the Lipman and Sharp (1974) program and to
assesswhether clinician time should continue to be al-

Our present-day knowledge of the child's mind Is
comparable to a fifteenth-century map of the world a mixture of truth and error. . . . Vast areas remain
to be explored. There are scattered Islands of solid
dependable fact, uncoordinated with unknown comments.
Arnold L. Gesell
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Funding Opportunities
National Endowment for the Humanities
Elementary and Secondary Education Grants
The Elementary and Secondary Education Program seeks to strengthen the humanities
in the nation's schools by encouraging the development and testing of imaginative approaches to the humanities through support of demonstration projects which improve
teaching and learn Ing at elementary and secondary levels. Projects often focus on specific
disciplines yet seek broad impact, thereby showing promise of serving as models for, or of
influencing in specific ways, programs in many institutions. (NEH does not support projects which are concerned primarily with teaching theory or technique per- se, or with
educational research, school system management, or child development - these areas
are supported by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In considering where
to submit an application, applicants should bear in mind that DH EW is the principal source
of federal support for elementary and secondary education.)
The Division particularly seeks applications for:
• projects which relate recent scholarship in the humanities to in-service teacher training
and the design of new curricula;
• projects involving collaboration between schools and other educational and cultural institutions, such as museums and libraries, colleges and universities, and graduate schools
of education;
• projects that have the endorsement of large administrative units such as a school system
or state education department;
• projects to improve teachers' and students' knowledge of English literature, foreign
languages and literatures, and history, especially social history;
• projects emphasizing expository writing within the context of humanities curricula.
In re,cent years, successful projects have ,tended to combine the training of teachers in
new approaches to their disciplines with the development of new or improved curricula.
Such projects have been of varying size and scope, single-discipline or interdisciplinary in
nature, -ar:tdhave focused on traditional as well as relatively new areas of study in the
schools. A particularly effective design brings together school and university faculty for a
period of intensive summer work, after which the school teachers --working under the continuing supervision of the project staff - introduce into their classrooms the new materials
and approaches developed during the summer.
Any school, school system, state education department, consortium of schools (including private schools), or other educational institution or organization in the United
States is eligible to apply for project support. lnsititutlons other than schools, school
systems, state education departments, colleges, universities, junior colleges, and schools
of education are eligible to apply for support, but their appllc;atlons are unlikely to be competitive unless their proposed relationship to the formal curriculum of elementary and
secondary schools is well defined.
The Elementary and Secondary Education Program supports three types of activities: extended teacher institutes; regional development projects; and general projects.
Application Deadline: April 1, 1979, for program beginning October, 1979. For further information, contact the Assistant Director for Elementary and Second~ry Education, or a
member of the program staff, in the Division of Education Programs.
The National Endowment for the Humanities is located at 806 Fifteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20506. The Division of Education Programs is located on the fifth floor.
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Bilingual Philosophy in Milwaukee

by A. Gray Thompson and Adrian DuPuis

"Do
you know that some of my seventh graders have
great difficulty in reading English or Spanish on the
third-grade level, but these same learners are working with
and do understand such logical concepts as conversion and
standardization of propositions, reversability of some
relationships, logical contradiction ... ?" This is the kind
of statement has made by Jack Pendergast and Joe Krzyzanowski, teachers at the bilingual Bruce-Guadalupe
Community School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. This school,
in the heart of Milwaukee's Spanish-speaking community,
began working in a philosophy project for elementary,
bilingual learners sponsored by Marquette University in
March, 1977. The project is an outgrowth of the authors'
participation in IAPC workshops.

Bruce-Guadelupe School was identified as a potential
location for a pilot project because, as a community school,
its existence depends completely on the efforts of the
parents, faculty, administration, and the financial support
of the greater Milwaukee community. This school has little
opportunity to utilize curriculum innovations which demand expensive, specialized materials and resources.
Preliminary discussions with the school principal, Sister
Milo, and with the seventh-grade teachers, Jack and Joe,
indicated a keen interest in the potential value of the concerns expressed by the IAPC. The opportunity to help
ameliorate some of these concerns might be achieved
through the utilization of the novels, Harry Stottlemeler's
Discovery, and Lisa. We were reluctant to share a col-
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league's suggestion that perhaps the use of phi'iosophy fo, 1. The materials were authentic. Jack and Joe could identchildren ought to be reserved for the gifted learner.
ify with Senor Benitez, el maestro. His classroom was
their classroom. Ari Hotel es, y Lisa, y Tito, y Toni were
Jack and Joe were very aware that new ideas and approaches
merely extensions of the class roster of Rooms 201 and
in curriculum matters frequently do nothing but continue
202
at the Bruce-Guadelupe School. Lastly, Jack and
the frustration-failure cycle for bilingual learners because
Joe
were
sure their boys and girls would be interested
such materials assume previous learnings or because the
in
exploring
Ari's concern·:
materials themselves are perceived by some students as
symbols of failure. Another concern was that the school
already was "into" individually guided educational approaches to such an extent that whole-group opportunities
were minimal, with the exception of art, music, physical
education, and values education. A third concern involves
a prevailing attitude that bilingual learners (as well as other
learners) are always in need of some kind of compensatory
experience in order to "bring the learners up" to that magical
level at which appropriate teaching-learning can take place.

- Todos las calabozos son vegetales ....
-lSon

pero no era cierto al reves.

todos los vegetales calabozos? 1Claro que no! -

2. Harry presented an imaginative vehicle to support the
teaching of reading and language arts as well as enabling
the teachers to drop the time assigned to values education because of Harry's emphasis on logic and right·
thinking in ethical matters. The teachers did not have to
worry about "where to put it."

3. Working with Harry did not assume prior mastery of
certain knowledge. For example, learners cannot perThese Bruce-Guadelupe educators shared with us the beform tasks in long division if they cannot subtract or
lief that their elementary school is not alone in facing the
multiply. Harry lends itself to whole-class activity as well
challenge of providing rewarding experiences for learners
as to small groups and individually-guided opportunities
who have not been successful in reading, math, or language
arts. Their school staff, like scores of others, attempts to
since it is not based on prerequisite learning.
rekindle the desire to know in the learner, believing that 4. Although Jack and Joe realized that compensatory edwhen such a desire is stimulated, the learner may well reucation usually means little more than the alleviation
discover a need to know. Revitalizing this desire frequently
of symptoms, they felt intellectually and emotionally
is comprom!sed severely when the learner is confronted
comfortable
with the notion that philosophy for
wit'1 situations, materials, tasks, and methods which cochildren as presented in Harry needed nothing more
incide with those elements recalled from the past from
than the boys and girls with whom they were already
which little meaning was derived or failure was experienced.
working.
Obviously, a new dimension needed to be brought to the
learning situation. These teachers could no longer be approached with the age-old curriculum "innovation" syndrome in which they had to swing away from something or
swing back to something else. What was necessary was to
engage in something which not only would appeal to the
imagination of the teacher, as many publishers do, but also
appeal to the imagination of the learners. Philip Phenix
puts thi~ concept into perspective applicable to this
situation:t
Good teaching is imaginative in quality, and the effective teacher chooses
materials that kindle the imagination of the learner ... No matter how high
the quality of curriculum materials may be, if the student has no interest in
them, he will not readily make them his own ... Hence, the materials of instructi_onshould be selected in the light of students' real interests.•

Jack's and Joe's long experience at Bruce-Guadalupe convinced them that their learners did not suffer from any
cognitive deficiency but rather from simple communicative
breakdown. And the first major barrier between the Community School and the authors began to be dismantled
when J~ck asked, "What reading level is Harry?" The response was, "Whatever level you want to make it. The
orthography represents ideas in Harry which are of intrinsic interest to upper-elementary boys and girls, and
that's what's crucial." Students read Harry because of the
ideas. The interest level rather than the reading and level
appears to be paramount.
Jack and Joe took copies of Harry and the teacher's manual
and agreed to give these materials a critical examination.
At our second meeting, the enthusiasm of the two teachers
equalled that of the project directors for the following
reasons:

Blllngual Phllosophy in Milwaukee - A. Gray Thompson & Adrian DuPuis

IN-S~RVICE
nce the teachers decided to become involved with
Harry, they requested that the project directors meet
on a regular basis with them to plan cooperatively approaches to making philosophy a part of their curriculum.
Since Jack and Joe had a background in philosophy, the
in-service needs were limited. Also, they had read IAPC's
PhilosophyIn the Classroom which provided the rationale
for the program. We decided to meet regularly to explore
Harry and the teacher's manual. Microlessons were taught.
One of us explored the purposes of Harry from the philosophical view and the other assisted in matters dealing with
teaching methodology. This formal attention to in-service
resulted in the following decisions:

O

1. Harry Stottlemeler•s Discovery would be the vehicle to
teach philosophy for the twenty-two seventh graders at
the Bruce-Guadalupe Community School.
2. The novel would be available for all learners in Spanish
and in English. Spanish audio-tapes of Harry would
be prepared.
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administering standardized tests at this school. For out
initial purposes, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(Form A), the Detroit Test of Learning Aptitude (Scalt.
15, Social Adjustment B), and the Dos Amigos Verbal
Language Scales were selected.
6. The teaching would take place in whole-class ~ettings,
large groups, and small groups with Joe and Jack in
the leadership roles.
Instruction began late in April and was interrupted by the
vacation calendar early in June. Most of the class sessions
began with large-group teaching which was followed by
small-group activities led by Jack, ·Joe, Red, .and Al. The
large-group sessions were generally guided by Jack or
Joe with Red and Al each being responsible for at least one
large-group instruction session. Two chapters of Harry
were completed during these sessions which included a
broad spectrum of exerci~es and activities from the
teacher's manual.

In addition to the support offered by Bruce-Guadelupe
Community School, and the financial ·assistance of Marquette University, the Midwest Materials Development
4. Red and Al (project directors) would meet with Jack, Center (located in Milwaukee) provided much needed professional support by editing the Spanish version of Harry.
Joe, and the class each Tuesday and Thursday.
Also, the Milwaukee Public Schools gave contingent ap5. A pre-test program would be completed even though the proval to participating in the project in selected bilingual
school staff has serious questions about ..outsiders" schools for future implementation of the program.
3. The class sessions would be held on Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday from 10: 15 to 11:00 a.m.

" ... new ideas and approaches in curriculum matters
frequently do nothing but continue the frustration-failure
cycle for bilingual learners because such materials assume
previous learnings or because the materials themselves are
perceived by some students as symbols of failure."
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Curriculum Implications

After a short time of working with the philosophy program, Jack and Joe verbalized a greater awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the interdisciplinary nature of teaching/
learning. The content and process inherent in such a program are the integrating substances out of whfoh quality
curricula can and should be developed.
More specifically, classifying observations in science
projects were approached positively with the students
stating the relationships between classifying in science
and classifying in philosophy. Students were further aware
that they had been involved with the process of classification in mathematics - "classifying is classifying," regardless of the content area being studied.
In a history class exploring concepts related to culture and
social change, it was the students who asked about the
relationships of these concepts to their philosophical
explorations with differences of degree vs. differences of
kind. These ideas were related to their previous discussions
about man having a culture and the lack of a culture among
other animals. Existence of transfer of learning between
social studies and philosophy is clearly demonstrated in
this situation.
Jack told us that math classes on days on which philosophy
is taught are more intense and meaningful. Comprehension
of math has been deepened, and the children relat~ math
to the real world of contexts as they have done in their
philosophy class. The precision of the language engendered
in th~ philosophical di~cussions transfers direc_tlyinto the
precise language required for successful work m math.
Both Jack and Joe suggested that the children's past
verbal flippancy has given way to thoughtful verbalizing on
important topics and issues. This change in student attitudes toward language also enhances the study of reading
a_ndliterat~re. A_~
part of the class's philos~phical discus10
th
0 th
e mmd, a ~oet was
~ ?s and dialogue al;>out e nature
mv1te~to s~eak ·t~ the class. Perceptions of the mm? from
a poet~ pomt of view have affected language_expenences
for their learners. Students who have never clipped poems
from magazines, and newspapers, do so now. Day-dreaming
and reflection are continuously emerging as useful tools
for creative ideas rather than being considered a waste
of time.

!

An agent can understand fully
only what he has himself made.
-

Giambattista Vlco

" ..• day-dreamingand reflection
are continuouslyemergingas
usefultools for creativeideas
ratherthan beingconsidered
a waste of time. .. "
---------------------IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEARNER

Implications for individual learners are as numerous as the
myriad of thoughts these learners can potentially foster.
Students who might normally be labelled "non-academic"
seem to have become more intellectually assertive. They
are learning in an active manner.
Surprising contributions are made by bilingual learners
who are without the "usual" background. One such student,
while involved in dialogue relating to the concept of exclusion vs inclusion, insisted to an "academically bright"
learner that two diagrams would be necessary to exemplify
the concepts rather than only one.
The recognized "fast learner" has found previously unrecognized peers with whom to conduct dialogue. Tasks
that "bright" children previously saw themselves a~ singled
out to do are now seen by them as tasks to be undertaken
with others as contributors. Also, the "others" see themselves as doing now what the "bright'; on.es alone did so well.
It seems as though the experience with philosophy has enabled class members to cut through various differing
abilities (football vs. thinking), and they sense that each can
do as well as the others with philosophy .-Previously overlooked peers are now gaining respect because "they are
saying something important."
The "space wanderer" or "free spirit" now is okay because
the students identify such human functions as being related
to creativity and imagination. These are viewed as important activities in their philosophical experiences.
CONCLUSIONS

hile we have no statistical data at this time, some concan be drawn from our observations and
direct involvement in the project.
1. Bilingual and monolingual learners see themselves as
being successful in doing what philosophers do.
2. Students are learning more about reading, and-speaking
in another student's language as well· as in their own.

Wclusions

3. When dialogue proceeds in English, Spanish-speaking
learners are less·involved/but when the teaching-learning switches into Spanish, non-verbal as well as verbal
participation is evident.
4. The value of thinking as a vehicle for discovery making connections between thinking a~d dialogue to
the everyday world - was evident in student reactions
to the learning materials.

Bilingual Philosophy in MIiwaukee-A.
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5. Seeing differences in opinions, values, and reactions of
peers for what they are and realizing that differences
may exist even when one applies the tools of logic, such
as conversion, standardization,
reversability and
contradiction.
6. Among the things classroom teachers perceive are: a
higher level of peer sensitivity and toleration for ambiguities; students moving away from the need for quick
"right" answers, particularly from teachers; students
listening more carefully to determine what others really
are saying; students working in both Spanish and English
with better than expected success; "bright" and "slow"
learner labels becoming non-existent; philosophy for
children becoming that much-sought-after focus around
which other subject areas such as reading, comprehension, vocabulary, mathematics (set theory), language
arts, music, and drama can be organized; passive learners becoming active; communication between students
and students and teachers increasing; and students
realizing that their thoughts and contributions to discussion have worth.
The project espouses no "philosophy of life" but provides
learners with an opportunity to gain practice with the
philosopher's tools - logical inquiry and analysis. In addition, the students examine basic issues or themes which
are of lasting human concern. Inquiry and analysis about
these concerns, exercised in a responsible manner and
using the tools of logic and dialogue, might enhance the
decision-making process for children as they are learning,

experiencing, doubting, growing, and maturing in their
daily living.
7. The curriculum utilized in the program is seen as a more
effective and affective way of approaching values than
those value clarification programs which have always
played a key part in the Bruce-Guadalupe experience.
This realization has been due, in great measure, to the
teacher's manual. It is an indispensable aid to planning
and teaching and a veritably limitless resource for
creative ideas, activities and exercises, all of which emphasize the inderdisciplinary opportunity in philosophical experiences.
Thinking and learning with materials in Spanish and English have brought higher levels of respectability to performance in both languages. It does not matter which
language. The language, Spanish or English, becomes the
facilitator for thinking - this is the essence of bilingual
education for the teachers at Bruce-Guadalupe. Philosophy
for children has enriched this aspect of the program by
offering another tool for the teaching/learning of "thinking."
The teachers see Harry as central to the total curriculuma unifying thread which exemplifies several primary aims
of the school. "If someone asked, 'What is Bruce-Guadalupe
Community School all about?' I'd bring him into this
philosophy class."
Philip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning, McGraw-HIii Book Co.,
New York, 1964. p. 342.

1

This figure presents data from the National
Assessment of Educational Progress ( 1972). It shows
that if Ol;lrcriterion of literacy were that people be able
to read reference material, then some 8 percent of the young
adults (25 year olds) in the nation would be ..illiterate".
However, if critical reading is our goal, then some 50 percent
of young adults would be called "illiterate". These data show
that student achievement in reading, as a problem area,
changes considerably depending on our criterion ofliteracy.

Reprinted from
Conferences on Studies
in Reading,
Sheryl Eileen Erickson,
National Institute of
Education, March, 1978.
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Bulletins from the field . . .
•

In Hawaii, a sizeable teacher-training operation in philosophy for children Is operating with
Title IVC funding. In charge of the program are Prof. Barry Curtis, Department of Philosophy,
University of Hawaii, and Prof. Nobuko Fukuda, of the School of Education,
University of Hawaii.

•

Thanks to a three-year grant from the Minnesota Council on Quality Education, Profs. Peter
French and Howard Wettstein of the Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at
Morris, together with Prof. Bruce Burnes of the School of Education, are conducting a
philosophy for children program In five rural communities In western Minnesota.

• The IAPC curriculum for grades 5-8 has been validated by the New Jersey Department of
Education, following a two-day site visit by a three-member out-of-state team of evaluators.
•

The teacher-training affiliate of the IAPC - The Center for the Teaching of Reasoning - has been
established with the assistance of Title IVC funding. During the 1978-79 academic year, CTR is
training 110 teachers, most of whom will be receiving 12 graduate credits for the year's work.

• The Lexington (Mass.) Public Schools are continuing a broad program In teacher-training in
philosophy for children. Children In grades 5-8 are being taught concurrently.
•

As a result of a 1977 grant of $100,000 from NEH, three members of the Queens College
School of Education (Jack Zevln, William Proefreldt, and James Higgins) and two members of
the Queens Department of Philosophy (Peter Manicas and Ralph Sleeper), some 7 5 New York
teachers participated last year In a pre-college philosophy workshop. As a result, a number of
teachers In Brooklyn and Queens have begun implementing programs In grades 5-8.

•

Approximately 25 Chicago teachers of the gifted, each from a different school, participated in
the Spring of 197 8 In a training workshop conducted by Dr. George Dalin, of the Department of
Research and Evaluation, Chicago Board of Education. Virtually all of those trained are
continuing to use the program In their classes.

•

The November/December ( 197 8) Issue of The Social Studies Is devoted to pre-college
philosophy, dealing with traditionally high school philosophy, critical thinking, and P4 C.
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The Return to
".Moral Education"
Should Dick and Jane Tackle
the Categorical Imperative?
by Henry C. Johnson, Jr.
elying upon the schools to make up for their private

R negligence is another of those things which are as
American as apple pie. For two centuries, as participants
in the world's largest scale continuous reform movement,
Americans have given pedagogical answers to every sort
of individual and corporate crisis. Whether the need be
dietary deficiency, economic mobility, or low-cost
therapy, the task is assigned to the American Public
school, the world's most elaborate and comprehensive
humanitar.ian agency. It was predictable, given the "revelations,. of Watergate, corporate bribery and chicanery,
and the dramatic increase in cruelty and violence invading even the schools themselves, that Americans would
rapidly insist that their schools reassume their illegitimately forsaken responsibility for "moral education."
The question, however, is whether the schools (meaning
teachers, administrators, and students) are ready for any
· such enterprise. They are, as usual receptive - indeed,
shufflingly eager to please. But, as with any pedagogical
change, except even more crucially in this case,
competence is not merely a matter of technique and
good will. We have just spent more than a decade watching the "new" science and math wreck upon the shoals of
an instructional incompetence, made inescapable by our
practical persuasion that pedagogical adequacy is exclusively a methodological problem, to be solved by issuing
teachers new instructions without a concomitant change
in presuppositions and concepts. Yet, if the outcome of
that has been sloppiness in the "basics," now being
remedied by a return to the old drill, the results of an illdefined and inadequately grounded campaign for moral
education or development cah easily be far more dangerous. The responsible moral formation of human beings is
not reducible to a program or a classroom technique,
cheerfully (if expensively) furnished by a beneficent
Edubiz or (failing that) a district committee set up to
complete the task of curricular reform on six in-service days."

Before tuning their instruments for still another bandwagon
performance, those with a stake in the outcome need to
consider what "moral education" really is, why it has become a problem, what it can and cannot do, what some of
its peculiar dangers are, and what any significant progress
in the nurturing of moral competence will really require.
These necessarily limited remarks are consequently addressed not just to specialists but to conscientious teachers
and administrators, puzzled members of boards of education, parents, citizens, and, yes, even students themselves.
They are not answers but an invitation to look further and
deeper. They are written in advocacy of genuine moral
education. The necessity of making that distinction, however, signals both the controversy and the dangers which
mark the movement. Whether such a distinction will be
made is part of the danger. Whether such a distinction can
be made is part of the controversy. I also think the school
does now have, and always has had, a peculiar responsibility in respect to moral education. Indeed, it is its principal
and legislative purpose. The contemporary school is not
"adding" anything to its already excessive burden but reassuming a responsibility of which it illegitimately divested itself.
The Nature of Genuine Moral Education

What Is moral education? Answering that vital and difficult question requires some crucial distinctions which
are not mere quibbles over words. The program labels
currently in use form a baffling array: "moral education,"
"moral development," "affective education," "value education," "values clarification .. are some of them. A thorough account of each would require an extensive analysis,
but one difference among them is of the utmost importance
both in theory and practice. That is the difference between
those which approach the process almost exclusively
psychologically and those which approach it phllosoph-
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ically. The psychological approach appears most fre- voluntary self-development, essentially focused in terms
. quently under such titles as "values clarification," "af- of an improvement in the value structures through which
fective education," or sometimes - and ambiguously - we govern ourselves, becomes absurd. In the place of
"humanistic" education. Often based on a crudely sim- "teaching" we are left with little or nothing but a crude
lified and restricted notion of what "psychology tells us," process of manipulation from the outside - a process of
it looks at human "behavior" largely from a so-called "rewarding" or "conditioning" which need not (indeed
"affective" or emotional perspective. The moral-educa- cannot) involve genuinely reflective activity on the part of
tional process, on this view, comprises an attempt to help of the student.
the student get "clear" about what he "really wants," or If, as I think is the case, on this view any notion of responshow he· "really feels" about things. Students are then ible self-development, any notion of education at all,
"guided" to "accept" their "feelings," and those of others, simply seems to have disappeared, the ·assumptions which
to establish their personal "priorities," to look at "con- have led us to such a curious position need to be questioned.
sequences," and so on.
If we are to have not only moral education but any educaThe approach which we can call broadly "philosophical," tion at all, their roots need to be carefully explored.
on the other hand, looks at the choices human beings
make as problems that are to be examined in primarily
rational rather than emotional terms. Furthermore, it examines these choices in genuinely moral tefms, i.e., as
questions about what we ought to do rather than merely
what we want to do or are likely to do. Indeed, as virtually
any philosopher, and most educators, since Plato would
insist, we are not dealing with "values" or "moral" education at all until we think In terms of an "ought" that
applies to our choices, whether they be questions of individual conduct or social policy. On this approach, then,
moral education means helping students to understand
what genuine moral problems are (as questions of prinThe Logic of Moral Education
ciple, not merely of preference), to identify them in their
It Is the teacher's task, In morals as in
own and others' experience, to analyze them competently,
mathematics, to help the children to learn
and to look at the unique way in which we have developed,
the language so that they can do the sums;
his job is not to teach them answers but
justified, and acted on moral principles- as guides to reto raise questions, and at the same time
sponsible human action.
to initiate them Into the logic, which is an
inherent property of the language, in acIt seems to me clear that the schools have, in recent times,
cordance with whose rules those questaken the psychological approach to the virtual exclutions have to be discussed. So the quession of the philosophical. They have done so because we
tion arises crucially: 'What are the logical
properties of the moral words, and what
have committed ourselves, with little further thought, to
restrictions do they place on what we can
some crucial and inter-related assumptions at the popular
or cannot consistently say?' I hope that
and practical level. First of all, we have assumed at the
we philosophers, when we discuss moral
education, will not allow ourselves, in the
popular level that how one "should" behave is merely a
pursuit of relevance, to be diverted from
matter of personal opinion, differing little if at all from
this, the most relevant question of all.
one's other tastes and preferences. It is assumed that one's
-from R.M. Hare, "Autonomy as an
desires and appetites are really supreme, whatever the apEducational Ideal,'' in Philosophers
Discuss Education (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman
pearances. As a consequence, so-called "ethical" considerand Llttlefied, 1975) ed. by S.C. Brown,
ations really comprise attempts to rationalize tendencies
pp. 41-42.
to behave that are just there and cannot really be altered.
Rather than fight against them, one should accept them,
"learn to live with them," for the achievement of true
peace and happiness.
As a further consequence, "educators" have assumed that
one doesn't help people change for the better - as an educator surely tries to do - by appealing to their "minds
or "consciences,, but to their self-interest. One changes
them by making the desired behavior appear advantageous
to-them rather than either good or obligatory. A curious
result then follows: neither moral education nor education
itself makes any sense. Having come to view students as
"organisms" which "respond" rather than as "persons,,
who "choose" and "act," the very notion of responsible,
0
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Why Has Moral Education Become a Problem?
The sources of this all-important distinction between the
psychological and philosophical approaches are very deep
and help to explain why there has been a continuing controversy about the axiological or value dimensions of
American education and schooling. l do not mean to suggest for a moment that the school has no legitimate function in respect to the development of the student's
emotional well-being, still less that there is no legitimate
role for psychological analysis. Education, as a concept of
ideal development, however, is in itself inescapably bound
to principles and judgments of value. What goes on in an
education can ultimately only be grounded in someone's
judgment of what is good and fitting for the individual and
society. No amount of empirical evidence or reasoning can
ever leave us other than in a position of confronting that
question. Furthermore, both education and schooling have
customarily involved a conscious attempt to develop the
student's individual conduct as well.
A number of events, perhaps beginning in the 19th Century,
conspired to call the relatively straight-forward logic of the
educational process into question. Only a few can be cited,
and then only briefly. In part they were broad and cultural:
a growing commitment to positivistic philosophy and
scientific thought, often crudely defined and applied at the
popular level, tended to push into the realm of the "meaningless" any "knowledge" not based on sense-date or experiment. In such a pseudo-scientific ethos, moral rules
and principles, not proper inhabitants of the realm of "fact,"
had necessarily to be relegated to the limbo of attitude and
private opinion. Under the onslaught of an often over-blown
Darwinism, the whole notion of human freedom and voluntary action, presuppositions without which meaningful
moral arguments can hardly be constructed, also became
increasingly suspect. Particularly as appropriated by the
nascent social and behavioral sciences, essentially deterministic doctrines, when converted to explanations of
"human" action, left man with only an "outside." His behavior was, as educational psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike argued, safely and productively understood only when
viewed "objectively," just as one would (necessarily, of
course) view the behavior of an amoeba or a fish or one's
cat. Finally, finding that cultures differed, and that the content of particular moral rules was not always and everywhere the same, the slippery conclusion was drawn that
because there were many, none could be authoritative. A
crude relativism thus gained virtually universal popular
_acceptance.
The schools, as social institutions, followed suit. Faced
with a growingly plural culture, turn-of-the-century educators tried to replace it, when it couldn't be eradicated,
with an equally debilitating ideological nihilism: any
opinions, or none, would have to be accepted as equally
valid. The new "educationists," struggling for a place in
the academic sun, grabbed at the then infant social and
behavioral sciences for support. A crude "scientific"
method borrowed from their immature parent disciplines
(and maintained with paralyzing rigor long after change

.••

and can we say that children lack principles?

He told me that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute
ground of principles; to which I said, that unless he had
a principle of selection, he would not have taken notice of
those facts upon which he grounded his principle. You
must have a lantern In your hand to give light, otherwise
all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot
find them; and If you could, you could not arrange them.
'But then,' said Mr.-, 'that principle of selection came from
facts!" - 'To be sure!' I replied; 'but there must have been
again an antecedent light to see those antecedent facts.
The relapse may be carried In imagination backwards for
ever, - but go back as far as you may, you cannot come to
a man without a previous aim or principle.'
Coleridge, Table Talk, Sept. 21, 1830.
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ETHICAL DIALOGUE AT AN EARLY AGE

Exclusive altruism is absurd. On this point
too I once got instruction from the mouths
of babes and sucklings. The children of a
friend of mine, children of six and four,
had just gone to bed. Their mother overheard them talking when they should have
been asleep. Wondering what they might
need, she stepped Into the entry and
listened. They were discussing what they
were here in the world for. That is about
the size of problems commonly found In
Infant minds. The little girl suggested that
we are probably in the world to help
others. "Why, no indeed, Mabel," said her
big brother, "for then what would others
be here for?"
George Herbert Palmer, The Teacher:
Essays and Addresses on Education
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1908), pp. 15-16.

and growth had marked those dist'lplines themselves)
shaped everything - pedagogical theory, research, and
educational content - in spite of repeated warnings by
broader and more perceptive educational thinkers such as
William James and John Dewey. Eventually joined to the
movement for ..social efficiency" and ..human engineering" and a frequently coercive liberal mythology, this
methodological dogmatism held silent sway. Freedom and
democracy became little more than a provision for value
skepticism. School administrators often pleaded for a hygienic neutrality in the schools, in the midst of social and
moral conflict, oblivious of the moral foundations of their
own agenda. Teachers worked for professional protection
of their "personal" privacy, as a defense against the moral
responsibilities societies have always, and necessarily,
expected from teachers. The assumptions of an impoverished learning theory were facilely extended to generate
the notion that it was only what teachers did, not what they
were inside the classroom or out, that mattered. To achieve
professional status meant becoming a learning technician,
not an exemplar of human virtue.
Such a brief analysis is, of course, entirely inadequate,
though I think not incorrect. The point is that, in this process the curriculum and the schools' regimen became essentially psychologized: "drives" replaced "reasons" and
"motives" as complete explanations of why people do what
they do. Environmental inevitability and physiological
necessity emptied notions such as ..will" and "responsibility'' of any real meaning and thereby deprived education
of its unique co·ntent and discourse. Heroic figures and
exemplary actions - admittedly often puerile and ridic-

ulous in some of their 19th Century textbook manifestations - became an embarrassment. What the younger
Huxley was later to call the "nothing but" school of evolutionary thought prevailed - it was fashionable to see man
as "nothing but" an animal. Children were encouraged to
look to their continuity with "Nature" and to "accept"
their feelings and instincts, rather than see themselves and
form their identity against distinctively human and social
modes of conduct, on the argument that the former would
"liberate" them _whilethe' latter would stifle their creativity.
An army of counselors was created to assuage their wounds
and aid in the process of their "adjustment," an ..adjustment" which assumed that "education" was effected not
by the conflict of thought and principle but by quiet absorption into a "natural" learning "environment" and,
paradoxically, a mechanistically defined social system
which was itself at least in part a fiction of the liberalprogressive imagination.
Consequently, in so far as the schools have, in recent
decades, dealt with "values" at all, they hc,vetended to take
refuge either in a shallow relativism or in a "social morality"
essentially defined by some statistically normative acceptability. Neither, of course, has succeeded in achieving the
schools' purposes. Our shallow relativism has produced
neither openness nor liberality but a state of affairs crudely
contradictory and chaotic. Nor is there any social consensus
upon which the schools can rely. It is, in fact, precisely
because people do differ in how they judge and act that a
critical, rational, and ethical examination of alternatives
is required. Unfortunately, however, the schools now provide little if any guidance for this task.

The Return to "Moral Education" - Henry C. Johnson. Jr.

What School ProgramsCan and Cannot Do

Distressed by what they regard as our signal failure to
maintain, let alone improve, the nation•s moral health by
what were once promising new approaches, many people
clearly hope that we can again use the schools to make
people good. Unfortunately - or, perhaps, fortunately moral education programs cannot promise that. The
schools cannot guarantee that anyone will be good as a
direct and immediate consequence of teaching and learning. To revert to lessons taught at least as far back as
Socrates, we must realize that while we may be able to
teach those who are willing how to go about finding out
something about virtue, we cannot teach anyone to be
virtuous, particularly in the American public school. In a
genuinely pluralistic society we cannot impose the teachings of particular moral systems. Nor, even if we could
legitimately do so. would that produce moral actions on
the part of those whom we had so "taught ... That is true
partly because people do not necessarily act on the basis
of right beliefs even when they hold them. It is also true
because any such imposition of behavior would in itself
contradict the notion of moral growth and integrity, resting
as they do on voluntary, rational conduct.
That is not to say that we can as a people recognize and
apply no moral principles whatever in our common institutions, nor is it to suggest that there is nothing for the
school to do in this case. There are, among others, two ways
in which the schoot•s moral task is obviously warranted
and inescapable. The maintenance of a genuinely free
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society is itself embedded in a prior moral commitment.
Such a society, in contrast to both anarchy and autocracy,
requires, as Horace Mann put it nearly a century and a half
ago, a "voluntary obedience .. to the "laws of reason and
duty." The school, as an instrumentality Jn the achievement
of a free society, has every right to bend its efforts toward
achieving that goal. No school can, however, guarantee the
successful accomplishment of such an objective, because
it rests upon the individuars willingness to be bound by it.
Yet the school can surely require that its students confront
the moral issues implicit in human choices, both individual
and social, take account of the potential consequences of
their individual and corporate acts, and learn how to weigh
them in ethical terms.
Secondly, the educational enterprise not only includes
value content but as a process rests upon ethical criteria
for its very intelligibility. Truth-telling and honesty are implicit in the very notion of self-development, for example.
Furthermore, education and schooling are not solitary
phenomena. The school as an intrinsically social organization may adopt only prudential and bureaucratic rules
for its self-ordering, but the observance of even these
antiseptic conventions rests upon a moral commitment to
be bound by the legitimate claims of others. Consequently,
the school has a right not only to teach the positive ethical
principles and rules which are the presuppositions of its
very existence but to insist upon their observance by all
who choose to be members. The only alternative to this is
,the abandonment not only of free institutions but of society
and community itself.

" ... the educational enterprise not only includes value
content but as a process rests upon ethical criteria for
its intelligibility. Truth-telling and honesty are implicit
in the very notion of self-development ..• "
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The schools, in short, both can and should make moral
choice possible, by providing the student with the opportunity to learn what it means to make reasoned judgments respecting moral issues, to understand at least the
major moral traditions in his culture - indeed, any he
chooses responsibly to examine - and to reckon with
those figures whom we have legitimately regarded as
images of heroic conduct. Undergoing such an educational
experience will not, as I have said, produce good conduct.
But genuinely moral action cannot be achieved apart from
the conscious, critical development of such knowledge
and skill. It is unnecessary to accept all of Kant's moral
theory to agree with him that, in some sense, moral action
is never merely doing what is right but doing what is right
because one has learned how to grasp its rightness as a
demand upon oneself.
There is a third consideration at once more technical and
more controversial. I should like to outline briefly a provisional definition of what I take to be a crucia I element in
the school's province of respon~ibility for moral development. It is the systematic expansion of the person's "moral
universe." My concern for this aspect of things arose
directly from working with both students arid teachers. I
discovered that individuals tend very frequently to develop
their moral rules and principles only in a highly restricted
area. For example, one teacher evidenced a highly devel oped moral rationale in relation to his wife, but no one else
counted. Such reasoning might resemble, on Kohlberg's
approach, both the very low level of "interpersonal concordance" and the very highest level as well. Vet, the treatment he believed ought to be accorded his spouse was, on
the one hand, not the crude prudentialism characteristic
of the lower stages. On the other hand, the higher principles
invoked had logical universalization but only very limited application.
Now it seems to me that one practical task for which the
school is particularly fitted is, if I may put it this way, the
expansion of the moral universe or field of application, not
just the logical expansion of principles and rules to logically universal status. Clearly, the school has some role in
respect to the content of moral rules and principles, though
perhaps more as vehicle than source. The school, likewise,
as Kohlberg and his disciples advocate, has a role in respect
to the form of reasoning, in building and applying moral
rules and principles. The extension of the moral universe
may - I am not sure - constitute a third sort of role not
usefully subsumed, at least for pedagogical purposes,
under the others.
Although it is impossible to complete it here, looking at
this issue seems to me to bring together three important
contributions in the literature: First, Piaget's intriguing
parallel between cognitive and moral adequacy, as embodied in the notion of "decentering." For Piaget both
successful cognitive and moral relations require the systematic dissolution of an egocentric universe, with the
upshot that justice is the moral analogue of truth in the
epistemological domain. Secondly, there is Dewey's
compatible notion of education and schooling as the

deliberate cognitive extension of the environment. For
Dewey, in Democracy and Education for example, intelligent and "educated" persons are those who have
developed a sense of environment, not only physical but
social, not only immediate but "historical," if you will, in
which they come to see themselves as parts-in-relation-towholes. Finally, William James insists that a central element in living morally is to recognize an unlimited universe
of sentient beings who, all and each, have legitimate claims
upon us.
Now, if we take it as a potentially useful definition of the
school's task that students are to develop to their maximum
ability their sense of "environment," of things and persons
in various modes of relation, clearly empirical knowledge
is required. So also is progressively more adequate conceptual evelopment. If the school is, further, to take as its
responsibility persuading individual students that they also
live in a moral environment, uniquely moral conceptualization will have to be developed, in conjunction with their
more general cognitive development. However, if we are
to aim at their becoming moral, more than just conceptualizing such a larger "world" is entailed, I should think.
This is a larger world which cannot be reduced to an abstraction. To avoid that, one's moral Imagination must be
developed as well, a process which cannot be reduced either
exclusively to the cognitive nor to the emotional but
demands the integration of both. It is this all important
aspect, in which one grasps an environment of persons in
their singularity, who have real and not merely titular
claims, that the arts, and particularly literature (including
drama and poetry) play an absolutely irreplaceable role.
That role is t_omake the singular present, without reducing it to an abstraction.

Theaetetus: Yes, Socrates, I stand In amazement when I reflect on the questions that men ask. By the gods, I do! I
want to know more and more about such questions, and
there are times when I almost become dizzy Just thinking
about them.
Socrates: Ah, yes, my dear Theaetetus, when Theodorus called
you a philosopher he described you well. That feeling of
wonder Is the touchstone of the philosopher, and all
philosophy has Its origins In wonder. Whoever reminded us
that Iris (a messenger of the gods) Is the offspring of
Thaumas (wonder) wasn't a bad genealogist.
Plato, Theaetetus
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Although the schools are instruments of a particular society and culture, all depends upon what sort of society and
culture they serve. It was Dewey's point, of course, that the
presuppositions of a free, democratic society differed
essentially and not merely accidentally from those of an
authoritarian society, whether autocratic or anarchic. The
principle of life of a democracy, Dewey in effect argued, is
actively comprehensive rather than passively intensive,
looking forward and outside itself. Hence it consciously
aims at the construction of an environment larger than itself, more extensive than its immediate local or national
interests. If there is any sense to that, the task of schools
and teachers is to see to the expansion of knowledge and
conceptualizing necessary for a comprehensive environment, but also one which is paralleled by a commensurate
ability to see that environment morally and not merely
selfishly or prudentially.
Finally, given a notion shared by all three, namely that the
development of all uniquely human potential is for the
purpose of human action, and that action, as opposed to
mere response, is always and everywhere moral, since it
involves the deliberate choice of means-ends, it is in a
genuine sense the moral element which unifies any curriculum. More controversially. I should also want at least
to try to argue that it is for this reason that both the artistic
and the social studies are the mutually interactive core of
the school's developmental regimen, •round which all else
is instrumental. It also suggests why the school's acts and
purposes cannot be psychologized without being destroyed in self-contradiction.
What Is Required for a Moral Education Program?

The implications of what we have been discussing require
first of all that any adequate program of moral education
pay some rigorous attention to the process of learning how
to make moral judgments in itself. No one is spontaneously wise about values, though everyone may be about
his inclinations - indeed, no one else can be. Moral competence is no more ..caught .. than the ability to do quadratic equations or play the oboe. While both musical and
mathematical virtuosity may, like highly ethical action,
rise from springs the school can seldom divine let alone
bring into existence, each rests upon skills that can be
taught and practiced. But it seems to me that, unless we
are willing to settle for a rather narrow competence, something more than a study of the process by itself will be
required. A satisfactory program of moral development
will demand the restoration of a long-lost ethical dimension wherever it is appropriate in the entire curriculum.
Although we may use ..true to life" examples in the course
of attempting to develop the skills necessary for moral
competence as such, it is equally important to look at the
moral issues which arise in virtually every study in the
student's curriculum. This will mean learning once again
to look at literature and drama, for example, as more than
a discussion of social and psychological dynamics, as
more than the anatomy of feeling. It will involve seeing
history as more than the interplay of impersonal forces
and ideological patterns. It will mean seeing science not as

Student Comments:

Response of 2nd grader in Newark (New
Jersey) to the question posed to her by
Mrs. Edna Isler, "What makes you you?
"I'm me because I'm the only one who
can say what I think."

a colorless technique but as a form of human activity
which has consequences requiring ethical judgment quite
as much as any other.
The achievement of such a pervasive reordering of our
perspectives on the curriculum, not to mention the addition
of conscious philosophical skill development, will obviously
require in turn a considerably broadened competence on
the part of teachers and administrators as well. This _isnot
just desirable. It is absolutely necessary. Here again, recent educational experience should be instructive. As I have
already suggested, most analysts would agree that the important new programs in the sciences pioneered in the last
ten to fifteen years have been severely hampered, and
indeed have often failed abysmally in practice, because
they presupposed not merely new materials but new"
teachers for their success. And these teachers were rarely
forthcoming. The situation in the case of moral education
programs is even more serious, because there is in most
cases little or no competence at all in respect to guiding
moral development, through no necessary fault of the
teachers. Colleges of education have not provided even
rudimentary acquaintance with this matter until very recently - and even then, only here and there. Nor will the
instructidns of the pedagogical merchandisers, nor casually organized "orientation programs" or "in-service"
days. The only possibility of an adequate moral education
rests upon rigorous study of the field itself, and rigorous
restudy of much of the teachers area of specialization as
well, in•order to achieve a genuine integration of the two.
At this point the politics of education becomes a vital
concern. It is unfortunate that the teachers' organizations
and many state departments, together with colleges of
education, are locked in a struggle over the control of
teacher preparation and certification. The crux of the mat•
ter is the proposal to move teacher preparation and certification, as well as much continuing professional education,
off the campus. There is something to be said for the
location of an important part of the teacher's practical
training at the site in which it is practiced, and little to be
said on behalf of unresponsive professional colleges. It is,
however, also difficult to believe that the fundamental kind
of preparation required by responsible programs in moral
education can be handled by practitioner experts, if only
because there are few, if any, at least at this point.
Finally any genuine program in moral education will require
at least one additional element, an element all too easily
overlooked and quite possibly the most difficult of all to
obtain. The principal practical question is perhaps one of
consensus. The moral education movement" is already
experiencing some significant opposition along with its
11
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student's critical moral competence all the more necessary
at this juncture. Finally, it is frequently suggested by the
" •••a variety of moral exemplars, prininadequately informed that there are widely disparate
ciples, and arguments must be actively
moral principles floating about. But, upon more adequate
examination, there is probably a much greater moral
examined by the st1:,1dent,rather than imconsensus than division. There are, of course, certain
pose upon him a single,
issues, many quite serious, in which there is considerable
preferred moral system."
and severe conflict, if only because of a rethinking of these
...
e-nt_h_u-si-a-st-ic_a_c_ce_p_t_a-nc_e
___
Es_s_e-nt-ia_l_ly-th_i_s_o_p_p_o_s_it-io
....
n_t_e_n_d_s
issues in the light of changed situations. But at least a
to take two forms: a sharply expressed concern over what large proportion of the morally bizarre is little more than
specific moral content will be taught and a reluctance to posturing, and its inadequacy would be easily exposed by
see the school as an instrument of moral development anyone who possessed even an elementary competence
rather than the family or the church. These issues are also at moral analysis.
much too large to be dealt with satisfactorily in a limited There is also another kind of consensus that will have to be
space. However, a word or two may be useful. These con- achieved, I believe, if really adequate programs of moral
cerns are real and probably very difficult to dislodge, even education are to be made to work. As anyone familiar
though I do not think they are well-founded. Clearly, both with recent writing on the "movement" knows, the philosfamily and church have legitimate reasons as well as gen- ophers tend to be suspicious of "moral educators" with
erally accepted authority for engaging in their own pro- insufficient preparation or procedural rigor. Mutual disgrams of value-formation. But, it does not follow that this trust characterizes the relations of both with the psycholfact pre-empts the school's authority or renders its efforts ogists, who rightly point out that even given the necessity
nugatory. Family, church, and school do not do the same of clearly distinguishing descriptive social and behavioral
thing, nor do they do what they do for the same reasons or scientific approaches from genuine value concepts and
purposes. Some application may make this clearer. Al- issues, there are significant psychological questions inthough other bases and contexts for moral formation may volved in human moral action. Much of this distrust and
be provided, as we have already noted, the community as confusion arises, however, from long dissociation and
a whole has reasons and obligations of its own to foster a evasion in working with the problems of this realm of
broadly social moral character. An adequate morality from human inquiry. Much also stems from the excessive terthe community perspective is necessarily connected at ritoriality which has grown up in the American academy, a
least in part with some of the functions an individual cus- characteristic which has rendered it frequently unfit to
tomarily learns how to exercise in school. One must learn tackle serious problems in many realms. Some constructhow to look, along with others (whose moral orientation ive peace treaty, without a stifling of serious cross-dismay differ), at questions of social policy as moral and ciplinary debate, will have to be voluntarily signed, or risk
ethical issues - issues that may, but need not, arise in a a destruction born of our specialisms. It is difficult to
personal, family, or religious context. One must learn to believe that the lot of either philosophers, psychologists,
look at one's vocational role, the institutions one must deal or educators would be advanced by such a catastrophe,
with and oneself responsibly shape, and the other contents let alone the public good.
of the society and culture whjch one shares, as problems I have been trying to suggest, then, that the recovery of
in value, not merely as matters of fact. Indeed, unless the serious and responsible "moral education," is both an incommunity sees to it that these moral connections are trinsic~·1y dangerous enterprise and one of supreme immade, the outcome may be an exclusively private and portance. It is perhaps potentially the most significant
therefore, from the community's perspective, an entirely educational movement in our generation, not only because
inadequate morality•
of its own importance but because of its potential effec;t
It is implicit in most if not all the responsible current ap- upon the whole educational enterprise. Whether it will
proaches to moral development that a variety of moral work, or turn into yet another pedagogical bandwagon,
exemplars, principles, and arguments must be actively depends absolutely on our ability to recognize the true
examined by the student, rather than impose upon him a article from those which are bogus - those which will
single, preferred moral system. It is in dealing with con- only further expand the already excessively private and
flicting moral claims and considerations that the student psychological preoccupation of the schools, or those
is provided with an opportunity to grow in his ability to which will lead to the uncritical imposition of some parreason about moral issues.This will understandably disturb ticular form of the moral development we ostensibly seek.
many groups and persons. But it need not, provided that The avoidance of these dangers will entail not only a great
the process of analysis ls maintained with real rigor and deal of careful thought on the part of all involved, from
openness. Furthermore, given thl? Incredible amount of teachers to parents and to students, but an enormous
intercommunication in the world of today, It is doubtful amount of homework. In this ca·se, there simply are no
that any significant degree of isolation from unsatis- crib-sheets and no cram courses. As the ancients knew:
factory" moral concepts and claims could be achieved, corruptlo optlml pesslma: The worst things we do as
even If it were desirable. Indeed, It ls the fact that there are human 1 eings usually stem not from the pursuit of evil as
claims and counter-claims which makes develoelng the such but"from a corruption of .our highest s:ioals.
11
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What is a Discussion?
by Justus Buchler
hat the traits of a discussion are and what the traits

Wof a good discussion are appear to be two different
questions. I do not feel heroic enough to attempt an exhaustive answer to either, although perhaps in dealing with
the first, which it is my inclination to do, some conclusions
may emerge about the second.
1.tmay be true, as the Greeks have told us, that men by
nature desire to know. I have never encountered a student
who did not desire to know. Unfortunately, the real problem
is whether students desire to learn, and whether, among
those who do, there is any sense of what actual inquiry or
discovery entails. The first major job of a teacher, and
maybe in the last analysis the only one, is to implant the
spirit and experience of inquiry - or, better, of query, if I
may import a term I have used elsewhere to designate
probing in the widest possible sense, that is, probing which
can be directed toward making or acting no less than
toward stating. Whatever else a comparison of one
teaching method with another aims at, it should consider
which method is the best means of accomplishing this
job. And in any such comparison the realities of the
school situation within the cultural situation merit attention at the very outset. The school is an institution which
receives young persons from society at large. We need
not fool ourselves; the contrast between the values to
which the student has been subjected and the demands of
the school is enormous, and it cannot be obliterated by
the vague notion that the school is a microcosm of society. The school, though a body social, is not primarily a
mirror of a culture, and if it ever were, it would cease to
have any fl:Jnction.

The student is one among a vast cultural majority who have
about as much understanding of what a school is and of
what its ideal values are as of the other side of the moon.
A current writer speaks of an unprecedented "hunger for
learning," an "adulation of learning" in our time - a pitiable identification of the passion for quiz programs or the
testimony of registration figures with the love of ideas. It
is no mystery why parents who themselves have gone to
school are so often scarcely less ignorant of the sense of
learning than anybody else. They passed through school
in their day with a cultural armor that would have resisted
even the most self-conscious instruction or the most
arduously wrought curriculum of the present. Developments since the first World War have, by and large, made
the situation a more hopeful one. But circumsta·nces contrive to perpetuate the moral isolation of the school.
At its worst, schooling means a decade of baby-sitting,
and, for the most part, it means training in the right
answers. It is a commonplace that students can go through
years of a good school curriculum without experiencing
an iota of intellectual excitement. F.J.E. Woodbridge
warned us, more than a half-century ago, to minimize the
emphasis on education as "a preparation for life." It is better, he said, to think of it as "a discipline in present excellence."
The first consideration, then, that imposes itself when we
try to clarify ourselves about the meaning of the discussion
procedure is the role of this procedure in fostering ideational awareness and in dissipating the machine-like conception of query. Since it concerns the student as person
and not simply as registrant in good standing, it cannot
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possibly be limited to the first classroom hours. ldeational
sensibility does not arrive in the form of sudden illumination, and students already endowed need to be sustained
and fed. Now in the formal presentation (the "lecture"), as
we ordinarily understand it, a product is transmitted. In
the discussion, a product is established. Quantitatively
speaking, "more" can be transmitted by presentation or
exposition than can be established by discussion. But
more can be assimilated of what is established than of what
is transmitted. In both cases, a subject matter engages the
action and attention of a certain number of people. In the
lecture the wheels have been greased, the mechanism operates, and the product is inherited, God willing. In the
discussion the product is necessarily earned, through halting personal labor. By the standards of social efficiency,
one method appears to be rational and fluid; the other,
primitive, wasteful, circuitous. But this is the crux of the
matter. ldeational awareness in students requires precisely
the perception on their part that there is no analogy whatever between entrepreneurial productivity and the productivity of query.
The relative merits of the lecture and the discussion depend
in part on the conditions of their fulfillment: most obviously, on who is lecturing and who is being lectured to,
on who is guiding the discussion and who is present in the
discussion. But, plainly, there are properties intrinsic to
each procedure considered as a situation. I have refrained
from employing a common pair of terms, to the effect
that lecturing entails "passivity" and discussion "activity"
on the part of the student. Postponing for a while the question whether this account is just, it should be clear that
there is no virtue at all in mere activity and that it is often
wise to be passive. Everyone· knows that unmitigated activity is a disease of the times contagious to the school.
What is important in any procedure is the type of activity,
the circumstances of passivity, involved. It is therefore in
the total character and purpose of a method of teaching
that its significance is to be found. If the discussion method
is superior to the lecture method, this is not because of its
degree of activity but because the establishment of a
product of query by students is more fundamental to the
deepening of their powers than their acceptance of such a
product, and because the assimilation of ideas is more important than.the compilation of ideas. I am awre that some
champions of discussion might favor "manipulation of
ideas" instead of assimilation, and, in general, I should
agree to the equal suitability of the term; but, having presupposed its meaning in the notion of "establishing" a
product, I prefer here to lay stress on the distinctive effect
of discussion and to return later to the question of "activity" in general.
The term "discussion", occurring in a variety of contexts,
carries a variety of associations. Notwithstanding their own
practice, a great many teachers as well as students still
labor under the idea that the lecture is the normal mode
of academic communication and that the discussion is the
anomalous mode, introduced not primarily to subserve
query but primarily to promote "democracy" or to gener-

ate fraternal feeling. It is important, therefore, in determining what classroom discussion is, to determine what
it is not. First of all, it is simply not true that "discµssion
is discussion" regardless of its conditions. Classroom discussion is a continuing enterprise, with a content that is
sequential, and above all, cumulative. The members of a
social club, who discuss what their luncheon speaker has
told them about traffic deaths, religion, or an ~frican
safari, bring to the meeting no moral commitment toward
query. They come with no substantive preparation. Unlike
students, they have no responsibility for the framing of
ideas. They are present to be entertained, to evince interest in the world about them, to be "stimulated"~ little,
to be "civic-minded." They are inherently distrustful of the
abstract, of the effort to generalize, of "big words." The
club discussion is a discrete occasion of comradeship. The
classroom discussion is a persisting community of query.
There are many people who are inclined to belittle sharp
distinctions between the different circumstances of discussion. Even those who do have a strong sense of the
uniqueness of the classroom often belie it in practice. For
example, the typical observer of another school's curriculum, having received permission to visit classes, goes to
one hour of discussion in the social studies course, perhaps another hour of discussion in the mathematics course,
and departs. I have often insisted upon greater hospitality
than a visitor is prepared to receive, not merely b_ecause
casual observation is absurdly unrepresentative, but because false perspective can give the air of travesty to an
hour of labor. The individual discussion is part of a ~ourse;
it presupposes products earlier achieved, evolving interests,
and future obligations. It is not a one-act play giving way
to another on the morrow. The specific techniques and
procedures can vary greatly from day to day. To the onehour observer (the largest species) a discussion can seem
excessively narrow in scope, excessively broad in scope,
or well-nigh unintelligible.
CONVERSATION AS AN (JNREHEARSED
INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE.

As clviliied human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of
an Inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accum ulatlng body of information, but of a conversation begun
in the primeval forest and extended and made more articulate In the course of centuries. It is a conversation which
goes on both in public and within each of ourselves. Of
course there is argument and inquiry and information, but
wherever these are profitable they are recognized as
passages in this conversation ... Conversation is not an
enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest
where the winn,ergets a prize, nor Is it an activity of ex·
egesis; it is an unrehearsed Intellectual adventure .... Education, properly speaking, an Initiation into the skill and
partnership of this conversation in which we learn to
recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of
utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and
moral habits appropriate to conversation.

Is

-Michael Oakeshott, In "Poetry as a Voice In the ConPolitics (New York:
versation of Mankind," Rationalism
Basic Books, 1962), pp. 198-199.
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What is a Discussion? - Justus Buchler

THE. TEACHER AS A THINKING MODEL

"What and how much do children know about what a
teacher thinks? It is inevitable that children will know
something about how a teacher thinks, how much depending
on the teacher. I have never heard anyone argue that a
teacher is not a model for children of how one should think
and act. It is not a matter of should a teacher be a model
but rather that he is a model .... The point I wish to emphasize is that it appears that children know relatively little
about how a teacher thinks about the classroom, that is,
what he takes into account, the alternatives he thinks about,
the things that puzzle him about children and about learning, what he does when he is not sure of what he should do,
how he feels when he does something wrong - there is
quite a bit that goes on in a teacher's head that is never
made public to children ....[T]here is a good deal of anecdotal evidence strongly indicating that the more a teacher
can make his own thinking public and subject for discussion
- in the same way one expects of children - the more interesting and stimulating does the classroom become for
students .... If my experience with school children - in fact,
with all levels of students, from elementary through
graduate school - is any guide, that large part of a
teacher's "thinking about" thinking", which is never made
public, is precisely what the children are interested in and
excited by on those rare occasions when it becomes public."

-From Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and
the Problem of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971)
pp. 185-187.

I should ·not dwell on the differentia of discussion, were
it not for certain additional facts: (a) some people distrust
discussion because they think it cannot be other than a
loose form of learning; (b) others, who may actually prize
discussion, consider it a charitable or hospitable form of
learning; and (c) most non-educators think of the classroom as the "immature" stage of discussion, to be distinguished from the plain-spoken sessions of men of
affairs. The average citizen, thoroughly unaware of his
alienation from query, is anything but defensive. He thinks
condescendingly of "kids at school": kids are kids and
schoolteachers are schoolteachers. Kids train for adulthood.
Men of affairs, having obviated or superseded the jargon
of the books, talk about reality. The educator can do little
about disenchanting fellow-citizens. He can do a great deal
about seeing to it that the cultural myth does not infiltrate
-the school and take possession of his own soul. The simplest way to paralyze students is to regard them as kids on
trial and not as earnest inquirers. I take it that the moral
relation between the teacher and the students in the classroom is as much an ingredient of the discussion process
as the discourse itself is. Quite apart from the attitudes of
individual teachers, there are ways in which the school as
such may reflect lay standards and perpetuate infantilism.
A program which asks children to study materials of
classic stature and then makes the newspapers or T.V.
panels the basis of its own discussions is faithfully deferring to the cultural fable about the passage from kidhood
to adulthood. The academic community cannot possibly
snub the materials of public communication: they are indispensable. But so are breathing and sleeping, getting
haircuts and buying groceries. Discussion in school is a
costly process. If it cannot penetrate the crust of common
sense or transcend the particularities of gossip, it is a
· wasteful luxury i:lnd a miserable failure.
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The contentions embodfed in a and b can be dealt with implicitly by various considerations. In referring to discussion as community of query and as committed to the establishment of a product, I do not mean to romanticize the
process or to overestimate the extent of its accomplishments. The classroom never will be the scene of grandiose
research or of systematic thought. As anyone who has
spent any time in it knows, the talk is not consistently inspiring and can sometimes be dispiriting. Yet it can engender values truer to the spirit of free speculation than
any other instance of community, within or without the
academic world. The ingenuousness, the insight, the mad
spontaneity of children discussing fairness or friendship
or personal identity is like nothing else in the realm of discourse. It may not be the peak of invention, but it is very
much the beginning of query. Given sufficiently challenging
fare, accorded a status of reasonable equality within the
confines of the classroom, students have begun the revolution of awareness. To establish a product is in itself a very
modest process. It implies, of course, not the exhaustion
of a subject but progress in the ascertainment of complexities. The classroom discussion is as different from the "bull
session" as it is from the club luncheon, the T.V. panel, or
the town meeting. Profitable and necessary as the informal
gabfest may be, it is no ideal for the classroom, where
economy and the sense of reflective order are the partners
of exuberar-1ce.
No doubt there are as many conceptions of the actual conduct of discussion as there are practitioners of the method.
I gather, both from direct observation and from the testimony of colleagues at various institutions, that practice
ranges all the way from the rigorous specification of classroom norms to utter chaos. In between are to be found
meetings like those of the Society of Friends, lectures to
small groups in small rooms, and hour-long interrogation
of students in alphabetical order. I am myself a little suspicious of strict canons for the "art of teaching" or of
legislation as to what is or is not authentic discussion. On
the other hand, since certain aims and values in a school
are of greater importance than others, it seems to me that
such aims and values are what any discussion ought to
subserve. The view that no aims whatever can be specified
as guides and that the values of learning are unpredictable
or fortuitous may not be exactly nihilistic, but it questions
the very existence of organization in learning. If, then, the
actualization of the student's powers for query and the
widening of his or her imagination are the values at which
academic learning aims - naturally there are other values
intellectual and moral of the total school experience these are the guideposts for the conduct of discussion. One
can scarcely take exception to any particular discussion
technique if it does promote these values. Whether all
current techniques do, in fact, promote them and whether
the views on which these techniques are based have been
carefully weighed, I rather doubt.
Consider, for instance, the view that a discussion should
be characterized by the widest possible participation of
students. Some years ago a visitor from the West Coast
attended a class of mine. At the end of the hour he came

Page 52

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 1.

up and congratulated me on the number of studen~s who
had taken part, specifying the percentage to the first
decimal place. When I told him that the day before only
four or five students had carried the burden, his response
was that not every hour could be a "good" one. And when
I expressed the feeling that the earlier hour had been the
better discussion, with greater benefit to the group, he
smiled as though I had uttered a paradox. He had not paid
much attention to the lines of argument and could not appraise the substance of anyone's contribution, but had
occupied himself with computations about the number of
times students spoke, the number of times they signified
willingness to speak, the number of times they looked out
of the window, and the number of doodlers among them. I
do not know how many exponents of the discussion method
find such criteria significant. I do know that several of my
colleagues express a sense of defeat when only a small
number of students speak during a discussion hour.
Among other questions, we are back to that of "activity"
and "passivity." All things considered, wide participation
is an index of vitality in the discussion, and participation
itself is a symptom of intellectual energy in the participant.
Yet if the ends of discussion are to be kept in view, the
quality of the talk is more important than its quantity, and
it is in the teacher's discre~ion whether at a given time it
is of greater value to students to ruminate on the argument
or to help build it. Neither pedagogical maxims nor an unseen hand can replace the variable, but ever responsive,
judgment of the teacher. I suppose it would be generally
acknowledged that the dialogues of Plato are pretty good
"discussions." Yet the merit of these discussions does not
depend on the number of participants, and in most of them
one speaker dominates. The quantitative emphasis goes
hand in hand with what might be called a therapeutic conception of discussion. It is sometimes contended that, since
a school exists primarily to help students, it is good for
them to "blow off steam" and good for them to acquire the
responsibilities of communal participation. To this there
are two main answers. First, a school does indeed exist to
help students; but some conceptions of help are in effect
the very reverse. None is of greater disservice to students
than that which prescribes indiscriminately for their welfare,
lumping together the functions of the dormitory, the advisory interview, the front office, and the classroom. It is
good for students to blow off steam, even in the classroom
- but occasionally, not principally. In the classroom there
are other values which take precedence. The desirable
degree of participation in discussion varies with the particular subject, the extent and nature of the background
reading, the ability of students to discern what is going on,
the psychological readiness of students, and a host of other
factors. Since participating can mean raising questions as
well as expressing viewpoints, a large number of participants is a fact which, taken by itself, signifies nothing.
Second, so far as the Individualstudent is concerned, not
the group, "participation" in the discussion does not necessarily take the form of oral activity. Every class exhibits
wide differences in the emotional makeup of its members,
and the shy, reticent, or modest student may pro_fitgreatly

THE RELEVANCE OF DIALOGUE

Entering the culture is perhaps most readily done by entering a dialogue with a more experienced member of it.
Perhaps one way in which we might reconsider the issue of
teacher training is to give the teacher training in the skills of
dialogue - how to discuss a subject with a beginner. There
is a Russian proverb to the effect that one understands only
after one has discussed. There are doubtless many ways in
which a human being can serve as a vicar of the culture,
helping a child to understand its points of view and the
nature of its knowledge. But I dare say that few are so
potentially powerful as participating in dialogue. Professor
Jan Smedslund, at Oslo, has recently remarked on our
f ai/ure to recognize that even in the domains of formal
reasoning, logic, and mathematics, the social context of
discussion can be shown to be crucial .... One of the most
crucial ways in which a culture provides aid in intellectual
growth is through a dialogue between the more experienced
and the less experienced, providing a means for the internalization of dialogue in thought. The courtesy of conversation may be the major ingredient in the courtesy of teaching.
-Jerome

Bruner, "The Relevance of Education," (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., 1971), pp. 106-107.

from discussion by others, even as the witnesses did in the
Socratic conversations. Neither direct coercion nor coercive expectation is a technique becoming to teachers who
wish to identify with the minds and needs of their students.
The student who participates through reflective activity
alone is not shirking the collaborative obligation of the
group as the chronic absentee is. Suc-h students are, as it
were, creative auditors in the community of query. The
problem of self-confidence is one that they must solve for
themselves and the teacher can help by lifting from th~m
the tension that comes with external pressure. The "responsibilities of communal participation" must not, therefore, be construed as a yoke; they can be fulfilled in more
than one way. It is a positive good, not a necessary evil,
that a class should be diversified. Numerically speaking, a
discussion group can be too small. And it doE!snot make
sense to value diversity without respecting the human dif•
ferences it implies.
A key di~tinction between the expository and discussion
situations emerges at this point. It is possible fpr the
student's intellectual activity to be as great in a lecture as
in a discussion. Between the auditor of a formal presentation and the silent member of the discussion group there
is no basic difference - so far as energy and movement of
thought is concerned. Moreover, the skilled expositor can
anticipate typical stumbling blocks in student understanding and deal with them by judicious restatement.
Nevertheless, there is one thing that the fo_rmal presentation cannot do. It cannot reproduce the cpnditions of actual
query. The silent student in the discussion, fully as much
as the vocal one, witnes~es and experiences the manipulation of subject matter from its initial circumstances. He or
she observes pitfalls as they occur in student probing and
not merely as they are formulated in the more finished
perspective of a form~I exposition. Such students experi-
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WHAT PHILOSOPHY DOES

"A philosopher's genius lies not in his giving one new
answer to one old question, but in his transforming all the
questions. He gives mankind a different air to breathe. But
the differences that he makes are as hard to describe as the
differences made by growing up. The adolescent cannot
realise what these changes will be like; the adult cannot
recollect what they had been like."
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or of an exhibiting than of an affirming. The product is the
concrete achievement of the hour - this is the language of
students themselves. Students may have no right to demand final answers, but they certainly have a right to expect some sense of intellectual motion or some feeling of
discernment.

Those who would remove the teacher as much as possible
from overt participation cannot evade either the nonsense
-Gilbert Ryle, "Hume", Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (New York:
or the pathos of the consequences. Strictly, "as much as
Barnes and Noble, 1971), p. 160. Reprinted, in English transpossible" means the total disappearance of the teacher and
lation, from the original French in "Les Philosophes Celebres"
the replacement of the class by the bull session. Should
edited by M. Merleau-Ponty in 1956.
the teacher be a patrolman keeping physical order? Or a
ence the natural history of query sometimes with their guts purely formal logician, interrupting to detect inconsistency
as well as with their intellects. The expositor can re-enact in argument? Or a parliamentary chairman, democratically
problematic experience dramatically; but in discussion the distributing opportunities to speak? Or a mere representstudent is party to the original. Perhaps the most import- ative of the school, symbolizing the sponsor of the disant consideration of all is that in the discussion the teacher cussion? Or a silent judge, meditating future rewards and
has the opportunity to do all that the formal expositor does, penalties to the performers? Or an enigmatic contriver of
and with more direct awareness of student needs. Teachers, puzzles, throwing out "hints''? Or "one of the boys," making
too, can dramatize ideas, introduce factual information,
himself as stupid as possible in order to spur them on? No
prepare the ground, and clear the ground. But they can do doubt it is possible for a teacher so to dominate the prothese things in their urgency as well as by design, in the ceedings as to terrorize or stultify students into total nonsame way that they can answer questions as well as anticip- participation. But I am assuming throughout that when we
ate them. Thus in the discussion, not only is a product speak of the "lecturer" and the "leader of discussion," we
established collaboratively; it is experienced in its life-cycle mean individuals representative of the respective methods
as well as in its consummation.
and sufficient in reasonableness to permit comparison of
It may be clear now wherein lies the error also of another these methods. By "discussion" we cannot possibly mean
group of teachers who stoutly insist that discussion should "tyrannical lecture."
be wholly a student affair, with a minimum of contribution
How can teachers be the midwifes of ideas if they merely
by the instructor. As the typical expositor places too much look on at the dubious birth of such ideas? To legislate
emphasis on the product and too little on the process, they that they deliberately suppress their possible contributions
place too much on the process and too little on the product. to the discussion is to suppose them less than human or
.They contend that it is not the business of children's dis- less than teachers - or less than responsible. If they are
cussion to reach conclusions; that for students the experi- concerned with promoting awareness and not just en_enceof learning is far more important than the concoction couraging speeches, they can no more refrain from conof half-baked results. This school of thought, though not tributing themselves than from permitting the best of their
identical with that which wishes to widen participation at students to contribute. Rigid prescriptions of just how much
all costs, overlaps with it. It certainly must be conceded teachers should talk at one stretch or what the intervals
that half-baked results, if mistaken for what they are not, should be between their comments convert the discussion
can be worse than no results at all. And I think it must be from an instance of learning into an exercise or a rite. Withconceded also that, if a choice had to be made, the process drawing them from the group is like withdrawing the books
Iof learning might merit more emphasis than the product. from the library or tearing out the odd-numbered pages in
But the products of classroom discussion do not have to order to improve the guessing power of the students. Of
be half-baked in order to be results, and a choice between course, teachers may often contribute injudiciously. But
the product and the process does not have to be made in a "contributing"
and "contributing
injudiciously" are no
discussion.Two simple confusions are imbedded in the more synonymous than "teacher" and "unskilled teacher."
approach of this school. One is between a product of query It is possible for teachers to utilize their cognitive authority
and a conclusion of query; the other is between a defini- without flaunting it or to be periodically authoritative withtive conclusion and a functional or provisional conclusion. out ever being authoritarian. The fact of the matter is that
they have to be not only positive contributors but exWe have agreed that students cannot aim at authoritative
termini. Where we can speak of a conclusion at all, it may emplars of discussion •. And if they are not, then to that·
be developed only after' many hours, and then with qual- extent the formal expository method is the superior method ..
ifications befitting the circumstances. But, regardless of
this, a product is inevitably established in any given hour
of discussion. For the product need not take the form of an
assertive conclusion. It may be an enumeration of possible
views, or a fuller definition of a problem, or a growth of
appreciative awareness. It may be more of an envisioning

Having mentioned one great student of education, Woodbridge, it would hardly do to overlook his colleague Dewey,
who, by some strange quirk of history, is often invoked to
support, and is supposed even to have developed, the conception of the quiescent teacher. As Dewey puts it, on
the contrary:
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There is no spontaneous germination in the mental life. If !the student]
does not get the suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody
or something ... The implication that the teacher is the one and only
person who has no "individuality" or "freedom" to "express" would be
funny if it were not so sad in its outworkings. And his contribution, given
the conditions stated, will presumably do more to getting something
started which will really secure and express the development of strictly
individual capacities than will suggestions springing from uncontrolled
haphazard sources. The point is also worth dwelling upon that the meth•
od of leaving the response entirely to pupils, the teacher supplying, in
the language of the day, only the "stimuli", misconceives the nature
of thinking. 1

A notorious pitfall of the discussion method is the danger
that a thin line often separates discussion from pure
rhetoric. But this is a controllable circumstance. Innumerable threats are always present, such as unco-operative or
rebellious student personalities, and the temptations of
self-aggrandizement. None of these is an objection to the
practice of discussion. The thin line is no thinner than that
between listening to a lecture and sleeping at a lecture. A
more serious pitfall, I think, lurks in the now widely held
view that as much attention should be given in discussion
to "form" as to "content," to the use of language as to the
development of ideas; that, indeed, the improvement of
expression and the articulation of ideas are one and inseparable. I am by no means a dissenter from the ideal
which underlies this contention. A standard which holds for
the teacher should hold for the student. One of the indisputable virtues of the discussion method is the experience
it provides of the travail of formulation and of the test
whether opinions which seem intuitively sound can bear
the light of day.
Nevertheless, I am wary of any emphasis on the correlative status of language and ideas which does not realize
its qualifying conditions. Some ideas, of our students no
less than of our colleagues, resist conventional formulation,
and we are too prone to insist on what turns out to be an
oversimplification or an abortive version. By sanctifying the
requirement of overt expression or of coherency, we can
•as easily smother a deep idea as expose a vapid one, and
get to prize rapidity of response rather than thoroughness.
It seems to me that excessively conventional thinking in
the classroom is a much greater danger than slovenly expression. The latter is in no sense to be condoned as an
end, but sometimes it may have to be tolerated as one stage
in a means. One of the maladies endemic to this generation
of scholars is an impatience with "unclear" speculation. The
cries of "metaphysical" and "obscure" fly thick and fast,
as though any sincere thinker were ever deliberately obscure or as though all metaphysics necessarily treated of
the fantasies that positivists have in mind. It is common
knowledge that many of the best students, whose written
performances can be impressively coherent, have trouble
in oral discussion. As often as not, this is the consequence
of their being confronted at one and the same time with
many more ramifications of an idea than are average students. Students who are hesitant to volunteer in discussion
are frequently grappling with more than they can readily
formulate. When to encourage them to share their wealth
and when to let them work through their ideas is a perennial problem. I am disposed habitually to trust their judg-

ment more than my own. Generally speaking, if we would
curb the glib student enthralled by the sound of his or her
own voice, we might well be patient with the student who
refuses to be glib and who is unable to be clear. With those
teachers who construe "expression" primarily in terms of
diction or grammatical niceties and who would interrupt
a discussion to expose lapses, I have no sympathy whatever. Where a problem of this kind exists, it cannot be
dealt with ad hoc. The best basis of satisfactory speech
habits in the student is the continuing example set by the
books he reads and by the teacher in action.
Continuous discussion, then, appears to be the superior
mode of learning, when it is intensified by an imaginative
teacher and supported by a powerful reading program. Sustained discussion has, if you will, an openness that the
lecture cannot have, and a persistent promise as an avenue
of discovery for the student and as an instrument of perception for the teacher.
Like all values, discussion is a value for persons. The most
immediate aspects of a value do not, of course, always coincide with its most fundamental aspects. For the teacher,
discussion is one of the great reminders of fallibility. And,
like all values for the student, it is not separable from other
values which conditior:1 and environ it. It can barely survive
in effective form without good concomitant reading or
without the co-operativeness of the teacher outside the
classroom. The fact that it needs to be distinguished sharply
from other school functions does not mean that it lacks
connection with them. The community of discussion and
other forms of academic community contain the same
persons, who need to know one another as inquirers no less
than as companions and contemporaries. At its lowest ebb,
discussion is simply one more cultural ceremony; at its
best, it is a force in the total constitution of the student.
Too often this force is dissipated by the pressures and
currents of the student's later life. Still it is imperative,
academically, to do costly labor for small social fruits and
to remember that even the student who has forgotten
almost everything may now and then, from an influence
remote to him, perceive the moral power of query.
Notes
1. lnte/1/gence in the Modern World, ed. J. Ratner (New York: Modern
Library, 1939), pp. 624-25.

" •••a discussion .•• is a force
in the total constitution
of the student."
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Philosophy,Childrenand "Doing Science"
Paul A. Wagner.

ven with all the recent developments in science and the nature of a class of phenomena.
far too many elementary school
children fail to develop any appreciation for "doing science". Just as the scientist is fundamentally concerned with the
To have an appreciation for the doing of science suggests formulation of clear and perspicuous arguments, so too the
something more than a tendency to be intrigued by clever philosopher's activities are almost wholly predicated upon
experiments, awed by recent scientific mechanical pro- his ability to develop and understand well-formed argucedures pertinent to a particular discipline. To have an ments. That careful argument plays such a central role in
appreciation for the doing of science is to recognize that philosophical deliberation is evidenced by the fact that
the scientist does not content himseTf with the discovery philosophers of early Greece self-consciously named the
of new phenomena but that he strives to explain the nature study of argument, logic. Today the study of logic remains
of phenomena to others who are familiar with the discipline a distinctive object of philosophic study. The scientist looks
in its present stage of development. In this respect, scientific. to logic as a tool to be used in developing his explanations
explanation is a public activity. If Newton had watched an about the physical world. The philosopher not only uses
apple fall to the ground and did no more than think to him- logic as a tool but in addition regards logic as a legitimate
self that there must be an attraction between the two ob- area of study in its own right. Consequently, the philosopher
jects, we would not remember Newton today as a scientist. and the scientist have much in common to the extent that
Newton is recognized as a scientist because he gave a com- the success each might hope to achieve is largely dependprehensiveand well argued explanation which characterized ent upon f acili.ty of each with logical operations.

Escience education,
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Any advance in the study of logic by either the scientist or
the philosopher may be of great consequence to the other.
Since logic is a traditional object of study for the philosopher and not simply prized only for its instrumental value,
one might expect more advances in logic to originate
among philosophers than among scientists. Indeed, historically this has been the case.
A significant development in logic in modern times, and
of significant interest to the scientist, has centered around
the study of semantics. Philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap
and Alfred Tarski recognized that the meaning of an expression depends both on its structure and the meaning of
the terms. Other philosophers such as Charles Morris and
Ludwig Wittgenstein showed that much of the meaning of
a statement depends too on the context in which it is uttered. Thus, for example, if a scientist wants to make clear
his conclusion regarding a particular phenomenon, he must
be skilled in recognizing how it is one uses language in a
precise and unambiguous fashion. Learning to give clear
and precise explanations in science is a skill that can be
greatly enhanced by initiating children in philosophical
activities.

" .... learning to give clear and
precise explanations in science
is a skill that can be greatly
enhanced by initiating children
in philosophical activities."

At the Uni(lersity of Missouri-Columbia Laboratory School,
a project has been under way during the past two years in
which students have participated in philosophical discussions. Each discussion session has emphasized the idea
that the students' newly developed philosophical skills
can be put to immediate use in helping the students make
greater sense of their everyday world. At one point the
students went so far as to suggest that in terms of the
practicality of the experience, dorng philosophy was most
similar to their coursework in the industrial and practical
arts. 1
One prominent and very practical aspect of philosophy for
children is that it serves as a method for demonstrating to
children the character and personality of other more
traditional subjects in the elementary school curriculum.
For example, in science e~..-...ation children are more likely

to experience an appreciation for doing science when they
realize that science is much more than a methodical process for discovering chunks of the physical world. To
learn that science is also a social enterprise, that the scientist cares that his explanations are logical and hence
clearly understood by his colleagues is often regarded by
many elementary students as a rather astonishing revelation.
To illustrate this social aspect of the scientific enterprise,
students at the Laboratory School are asked to consider
what makes a scientist a scientist. Students are asked to
consider further how it is that a scientist differs from a
mathematician, a philosopher or even a laborer. For example, on one occasion students were asked to consider
what makes the conclusions of a laborer regarding a particular artifact any different from those proffered by an
archeologist. The childrens' response was that the archeologist's conclusions are based on facts or evidence. However, when the children considered that the laborer may
have been the very person who actually discovered the
artifact and subsequent to doing so formulated a conclusion regarding its origin, their next inclination is to
wonder whether or not there really is any difference between the arguments of a scientist and the empirically
based musings of the ordinary man. Surely, the children
conclude, there must be some difference between an
ordinary man's observations of an old vase and his subsequent conclusion that the vase was used by Caeser and
the same conclusion drawn by a professionally trained
scientist.
In the course of further discussion, the children recognized
that the additional information to which a scientist has
access cannot be the deciding factor, since the laborer
may be well read and privy to a great deal of information
himself, The children reasoned that information with which
each is familiar must be related to the topic at hand if the
information is to be relevant to the hypothesis under cora
sideration. Still this did not seem enough. One imaginative
child pointed out that a person may know a great deal am:~
yet not kno\li how to use that knowledge. Hence two men
may possess identical information but, if only one knows
that the information is relevant to the claim under consideration, his explanation will be much more comprehensive
and hence qualitatively superior te that suggested by the
other. The childrens' analysis of this situation led them to
conclude that a distinctive feature of doing science is not
simply the discovery of new facts about the world, but the
careful characterization of those facts in the form of a
logically argued and comprehensive explanation. Too, the
children recognized that scientific explanation has a
distinctive quality about it. The scientist is not satisfied
with just any conclusion that might be reasonably based
upon a limited set of empirical evidence, but instead attempts to identify all the evidence that might be relevant
to the que_stion at hand. Finally, the responsible scientist
takes great care to order the evidence in such a way that
his justification of the hypothesis can be readily seen by
his colleagues to be the most reasonable explanation
imaginable. In short, the children learned that scientists
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are identified not by their credentials or even solely by the Those who did not agree with this definition were usually
object of their studies, but rather by their ability to make content to assert more modestly that they still suspected
sense of a phenomenon to their respective colleagues. there was such a thing as time although they were unable
Having determined the fundamental role of logical ex- to demonstrate its existence. In light of how the philosophy
planation in the doing of science, children at the Labor- for children classes have so far progressed, I have little
atory School are subsequently asked to consider various doubt that the dissenters will one day resurrect the issue
aspects of giving a clear and perspicacious explanation. of the meaning of the term "time" and perhaps base their
On numerous occasions children are asked to consider own newly formed case on some such notion as duration,
features of a clear explanation, such as its logical consistency, simultaneity or the idea of one event succeeding another
semantic clarity, comprehensiveness and so on. Only when regardless of there being any human ebserver.
children understand something about what counts as an What will come of such further discussions I can hardly
adequate explanation in the sciences can they be described predict, for genuine philosophical discussion as well as
as having some genuine appreciation for science.
responsible scientific research establishes its own direction.
This
is not to suggest that whatever happens in an elementThus, to illustrate the essential role of semantic clarity in
ary
school
philosophy class is purely a matter of chance;
scientific explanation it is often helpful to ask children to
it
is
not.
The
teacher, particularly in the early stages, must
analyze the meaning of a term used commonly by the
play
a
very
active
role in demonstrating to children how a
children themselves as well as by practicing scientists. One
rigorous
philosophical
discussion proceeds. However, as
such term that is particularly amenable to this sort of
the
children
acquire
the
requisite skills, the teacher's role
analysis is the term "time" .2 Ten and elven year-old children
diminishes
to
that
of
participant
in an activity where the
have been using the word time for nearly half their lives
ideas,
claims,
queries
and
arguments
of each participant
and typically regard themselves as familiar with its meanstands
on
all
four
with
those
of
every
other participant.
ing. Yet, when asked to define the term, they find that
Philosophical
activity
requires
that
each
argument be
this very commpn expression, which they have been using
judged
on
its
own
merits
and
not
on
the
social
role or
for years, has a meaning which at first blush seems extraordinarily obscure. Although time is used like many other polemical abilities of its originator. Genuine .philosophical
nouns, it does not seem at all clear to the children that time discussions proceed unrestricted by teacher prejudice,
names any thing. Even though the children have grown though restrained by a respect on the part of the participants
accustomed to queries such as "What time is it?", "What for well-reasoned arguments which are clearly and caretime will we arrive?", and so on, many have never thought fully articulated.
to ask - or have never been exposed to - adults who are
willing to entertain such queries as "Does time exist?",
''What is time?", and "What am I really asking when I ask
'What time is it?'
After considering any number of substances and processes
as the object possibly named by the word "time," the
children, finding each candidate deficient in some respect,
come to consider the alternative that time is the name of
an idea. The children/investigators then consider that if
time does in fact re(er to an idea, they must try to determine
what sort of an idea it is. Certainly time does not refer to a
fanciful entity in the same way that the word "unicorn"
does. Hard-nosed empirical scientists use the term in their
descriptions of events in the physical world, and ordinary
people use the notion to plan their activities for the day.
By setting forth hypotheses regarding the use of the term
"time" and considering the objections to such hypotheses
by their peers, the children eventually reach a rather
startling conclusion. The conclusion is not startling in the
sense of its unconventionality, though indeed a hundred
years ago that certainly would have been the case, but
rather because of its degree of sophistication. In each of
several classes, the majority of the chiidren respectively
concluded that, "Time is an idea that marks off a place
within a succession of events." The degree of sophistication demonstrated by this definition is evident when one
considers not only Aow the definition accounts for our
daily use of the term "time," but how it accommodates
physicists' use of the term. "space-time" as well.

Philosophy for children programs promise not only to
develop in children more mature and reflective skills for
making sense of their world, but as the above discussions
illustrate, philosophical activities allow children to discover
something about the fundamental characteristics of an
enterprise such as the doing of science. 3 It has been our
experience at the Laboratory School that as children become more familiar, through philosophical analysis, with
the fundamental personality of a discipline such as seience,
the more amenable they become to learning the necessary
mechanics for further study in that discipline. Althou'gh
the effects of these early studies warrant further empirical
investigation, our experience with philosophy for children
encourages us to recommend strongly a more generalized
use of philosophical tediniques in the elementary school
curriculum, particularly in the area of elementary school
science education.
'Paul Wagner, "A Maturing View of the Practical Arts," School Shop,
February, 1978, Vol. 37, No. 6, p. 35.
2
A video tape tltled "Philosophy In Mathematics and Science Education" showing fifth graders discussing the meaning of the term
time is available for examination through the Academic Support
Cen~er, University of Missouri-Columbia. The tape Is also avallable
through the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children,
Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.
'For a discussion of how philosophy can be used to Introduce children
to such fundamental notions in science as induction and the difference between an analogy and a model see Paul A. Wagner and
Christopher J. Lucas, "Philosophic Inquiry and the Logic of Elementary School Science Education," Science Education, Vol. 61, No. 4,
Fan, 19n, pp. 549-558.
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Children Discuss Degrees and
Kinds of Difference
In the summer of 1975, it was decided to hold a small demonstration class in
philosophy for children, as part of a teacher-training workshop at Montclair State College. The teacher was Mrs. Gerry Dawson McClendon (then as now a teacher at the Morton Street School in Newark), who had participated in a previous training workshop. One
group of students was bused in every morning from the New Ark school in Newark, a
privately-operated, alternative school. These students were in the 14-15 year-old range.
The other group was drawn from the Montclair-Clifton
area, and consisted of 11 and
12-year-olds.
After two weeks or so of being on display, the children began to verbalize their
discontent with the arrangement, so the class was moved into a separate classroom and
was videotaped. This unedited videotape transcript (prepared and annotated by Miriam
Minkowitz) is a verbatim record of the twelfth and final class session. The teacher is
guiding the discussion by following the questions in twp discussion plans contained in
the instructional manual for the course.
Although the wealth of visual cues is lacking in this written version of the classroom
discussion, there is much that is instructive in it as well. The logic of conversation and
the etiquette of dialogue can often be scrutinized more meticulously in this fashion than
can be done where one is present in the classroom. Especially worthy of study are the
patterns of group reasoning, in particular on those occasions where the children build
on each other's contributions, thereby penetrating as deeply into the issues (of considerable difficulty even for skilled philosophers) as might a smaller number of older individuals. Equally noteworthy is the readiness of the participants to establish a youthful
community of inquiry, and to display the characteristic features of a truly reflective
education.

Gerry

Renata
Gerry
Gerry

Kirk

Gerry
Kirk

-All right - when Mr. Portos was discussing with
the girls about the minds and the differences between animals and men ...
he mentioned two
types of differences. (Works on board) One was
the difference of degree, and what, Renata? ...
and one was the difference of ...
- ... Kind.
- ... and kind.
-How did he explain those differences? What's the
difference between a difference of degree and a
difference of kind? What did he use to show the
girls what he meant? Because they didn't understand. What did he use?
-Height and weight.
-As an example of what?
-Difference
of degree.

Gerry

Jeanne
Gerry
Mitchell

Gerry
Mitchell
Gerry
Mitchell
Gerry
Renata
Gerry

-Height and weight. What do the rest of you think
about that? What type of difference is that?
Height and weight?
-Difference
of degree.
- That's what Kirk says. Difference of degree.
-Well like if one girl weighs 59 lbs. and someone
else ... weighs ... uh ... 29 lbs ....
in between
there is ... uh ... degree.
-A difference of degree but you used two what?
- Two people.
- Two people and their what?
- Their height. I mean their weight.
- Two people and their weight. As a difference of
degree?
- That's a difference of kind.
-Why is that a difference of kind?

Transcript of Video Tape

Could a child's question be answered this way?

The simple "I don't know" deserves respect' but it shouldn't cut
off dialogue. The teacher can shift the question so that the student can respond, and thus, through a series of such questions,
demonstrate that students do know things they don't think they
know. Enthusiasm for all responses, not just for the right answers,
is both a courtesy and an incentive. Never deliberately ignore a
question or demean the questioner.
A recent experience of mine seems to violate this principle
though actually it supports the point. I was challenged in a
question-and-answer session to support my claim that
characteristics of good and bad teaching could be identified.
"Can you give even one example of bad teaching?" this f acuity
member asked. I thought a moment, then said abruptly, "That
seems to me to be a trivial question," and turned to another question from across the room. I went on for some moments, keeping
the first questioner in the corner of my eye to make sure that he
wasn't stalking out of the room. Then I turned back to him,
apologized for my rudeness, and said, "That's your example."
-Kenneth E. Eble, The Craft of Teaching (San Francisco: JosseyBass Publishers, 1976), p. 60.

Renata
Gerry

-Because ... uh ... (long pause) ... I don't know.
-Well, uh, one girl she was talking about ... she
weighed 59 lbs. and the other weighed 29 lbs. 29
lbs., right? So can you see that he was saying that
in between 59 and 29 we're talking about the
same two things, right? Pounds! How much each
girl Y.Ceighs
.... Okay.

And while pounds isn't different the amount of
pounds that they weigh is different, right? But is
it totally different? It's just a difference of degree.
One is larger than the other or one is smaller than
the other.
Renata
-(Looking in her book) - Over here she says the
same thing is a difference of degree.
Gerry
-Read that for me.
Renata
-(Turns open her book and reads) - "Laura is the
heaviest," said Jill. "Then comes Fran and then
me." Are those differences of degree also?
Gerry
-Are they?
Renata
-No.
Gerry
-All right. We were talking about heaviness and
when you weigh how heavy we are we weigh that
in what?
Kirk
-Pounds.
Gerry
-Pounds. They're all weighed in ounces or pounds.
So that's a difference of ...
Jeanne
-Height or weight.
Gerry
-Is that a difference of degree or kind?
Child
-Degree.
Gerry
-Right. Does everyone understand that? When we
are talking
about comparing
the ... uh ... the
weight? How about if we're comparing your
height, Renata, to Karen's height'? Would that be
a difference? Are you both the same? Stand up.
Let's see. Are they both the same height? Are
they the same height? Let's not use you then.
How about uh ... Karen and Pamela? What would
you say about Karen's height and Pamela's
height'?
John or Walt -Difference
of degree.
Gerry
-All
right. It'~ a difference of degree. Because
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John or Walt
Renata
John or Walt
Renata
John or Walt
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry

Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry

John or Walt
Child
Jeanne
Child
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Jeanne

you're talking about the same thing. How tall they
are.
-If they were the same size it would be a difference
of kind.
-A difference of kind would be ... uh ...
- The same.
-Uh uh, different things. Like ...
-Your height and weight.
-(Simultaneously)
Black and white, right?
-Well I don't know. That's very interesting. Is black
and white a difference of kind?
-No, but they both colors. Right? But they different colors, though.
-Yes, they're different colors, but are they ... are
they a difference of...
-Okay. 1didn't (unintelligible) Like the chair and ...
purse.
-A chair and a purse shows what?
-A difference of kind.
-A difference of kind. All right. They're totally different things. Right. Any questions about the difference of degree and the differences of kind? All
right, let's see if you had ... uh ... She ... Renata
brought up a very interesting one. Black and
white. ls that a difference of degree or a difference of kind?
-It's a difference of degree.
-Why would you say it's a difference of degree?
-Because they're both colors.
-Mmmhmm.
-So it's the same thing.
-What do you mean it's the same thing?
-It's the same. Both of them are colors.
-Colors are the same. What about the rest of you?
Is... uh ... the difference between black and white
the same as... say ... as the difference between
light green and dark green?
-Right.
-Right.
-Ummhmm.
-Yes.

-What kind of a difference would dark green and
light green be?
-(several voices) Difference of degree.
-A difference of degree. Well is ...
-Since they're both green. So they're different
shades of green.
-All right, so they're both green but of different
shades. Well, then, what about black and white?
-Plus they're different shades. Plus they're both
colors.
-Yes, but they're both the same color, only different shades, right?
-But they still colors.
-Mmmhmm.
-It's two different things that's alike. It's a degree.
-Okay ... so you're absolutely certain that black
and white are differences of degree?
-Right.
-Okay. Un ... how about nine apples compared
with nine alligators?
-(many voices) Difference of kind.
-Why?
-Because they are both different - completely different things.
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Gerry
Child
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Child
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Child
Gerry

Walt

Child
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Karen
Gerry
Karen
Gerry

Child
Gerry

Child
Child
Gerry
Walt
Renata
Gerry
Pamela
Gerry

-All right. O.K. How about ... uh ... dark red compared with light red?
-(many voices) Difference of degree!
-Absolutely sure?
-Yep. Ummhmm. Difference of degree.
-O.K. How about. .. uh ... freezing temperature
compared to boiling temperature?
-Difference of degree! ·
-Damp compared to wet?
-Difference of degree.
-We're unanimous. Uh ... I think I'll put this one on
the board. (Stands up and goes to blackboard).
-1 don't know (unintelligible) ...
-(laughs) This is called an acute angle (says this
while drawing it on board.)
-Obtuse ...
-Took me a long time ... (unintelligible) ... and this
is an obtuse angle. What would the difference
between these two be?
-Difference of kind.
-(Many voices) Difference of degree! Degree!
-Who said a difference of kind? Walt?
-(Walter shows hands).
-And everybody else thinks it's a difference of
degree. What do you think about that?
-Difference of kind.
-Why do you say it's a difference of kind?
-Because they aren't shaped the same ...
-They aren't shaped the same way.
-Yeah, but they're both angles, though.
-Tell him.
-(repeats) They're both angles.
-Do you understand what she's saying? They're
shaped differently but they're both angles. Let's
take ... um ... (draws on board - chalk makes a
scratchy sound) ... excuse me ... What would you.
say about these two figures? This is a triangle and
this is a...
-Rectangle.
-Rectangle.
-(Simultaneously) Difference of kind
-(Simultaneously) Difference of degree.
-1 hear "kind" and "degree".
-Kind.
-Difference
of degree because they're both
shapes.
- They're both shapes... What?
- They're both shapes.
-They're both shapes so that means they're a difference of degree. Those of you who said they're
a difference of kind - why would you say they're
a difference of kind?

COMMENT: By asking this question Gerry is ( 1) opening
up alternate possibilities; (2) allowing the children to
come to discover that context is significant In making
this Judgment. As one of the children on the tape later
remarks, It really depends on the reasons that you are
looking at. That Is, If you look at It from one point of
view something may seem a difference of degree;
however, If you look at the same thing with something
else, I.e., some other standard, In mind, It may then appear to be a difference In kind.) See• below.
Mitchell

-Because when they're triangles ...

-(Unintelligible) ... they're different shapes.
-Huh?
- They're different shapes.
- They're very different.
-But they're both shapes... and them were different angles.
-But the two girls are both girls, only they're difMitchell
ferent.
-So it's a difference of degree.
Renata
-It could still be a difference of kind ... You could
Melanie
put either one anyway.
-Why?
Gerry
-Because you could find different reasons for each
Melanie
one.•
-All right. Well, why is this a difference of kind?
Gerry
-Because they're both different shapes. Just like
Melanle
those are different angles. So we use this reason
for saying ...
-Well, then, are you saying that this could also be
Gerry
a difference of... uh ... kind, too?
-It could ... if it has smaller reasons. So it could be
Melanie
just simply smaller reasons for it. .. and tt'\en you
could always go to the big reasons of (unintelligi•
ble) the different shapes.
COMMENT: By using the terms "smaller" and "bigger"
Melanie seems to be calling for an appreciation for. differences in degrees of generality. I.e., "Smaller"
reasons would apply to things that are more specific,
whereas "larger" reasons may apply to things considered more generally.

Donna
Gerry
Melanie
Jeanne
Renata

Gerry

Melanie

Daniel
Gerry

Karen
Gerry

Child
Gerry

-All right. Well, let's take the alligators and.the apples. O.K.? Now, these are different angles, but if
they're both angles, they're different angles.
What would you say about the alligators and the
apples?
-One is an animal and one is a apple.
-One is an animal and one's a fruit.
-One's an animal and one's a fruit. We said that
that was a difference of kind. Because they were
totally different.
-But if there was nine alligators and nine zebras,
then it would be a difference of degree.
-Why would it be a difference of degree if it was
nine alligators?
- TheY:re both animals.
-Because they're both animals. But they're both
totally different animals!

COMMENT: Gerry here Introduces a criterion for Judging
something to be a "difference of kind" "Total"· difference.
Child
Daniel
Rod
Gerry
Renata
Rod
Gerry
Renata
Gerry
Karen
Gerry

-But there's still nine ...
-One's a reptile and one's a mammal...
-Right. Right.
-One's a reptile and one's a mammal ...
- They stlll animals.
-Difference of degree.
-You say it's a difference of degree. You say it's a
difference of kind. So you can't ...
-1 said degree.
-Oh ... you say it's a difference of degree.
-Which one?
-An ... uh ... zebra and an alligator.

Transcript of Video Tape
-Yeah. Difference of degree.
-Even
though they're both totally different
animals?
Karen
-Yeah. They're still animals.
Oerry
-Are those totally different angles?
Child
-(many) Yes.
Boy?
-Yes, but they're still angles.
Oerry
-But are they totally different?
John or Walt -Yeah. They different.
Renata
-Not totally different because both of them has a
point.
Oerry
-Yes. (at board). If I took this angle and put it over
here all I would have to do is move this line up to
here to make ... and here's the acute angle in here,
right?
Child
-(many) Yeah.
Oerry
-And if I just moved this line up to here I would
make this angle, right?
-Right.
Child
Renata
- They still angles.
Oerry
-Could I... yeah... if I were dealing with... um ...
um ... light red and dark red ... If I started out with
light red and I could just add maybe a darker col•
or to it until I finally got dark red, right?
Karen
Oerry

COMMENT: Here Gerry shows that a criterion for
distinguishing a difference of degree Is the capacity for
one, thing to "become" the other.
-What could I do to a zebra and an alligator so that
I could get them together?
John or Walt -Make them fight.
Oerry
-But would one ever come close to being the
other?
Child
-(many) No.
Daplel
-Well, we could get them both the same colors.
Oerry
-But would that still make them come close to
each other in things?
Daniel
-NoIt won't make them closer.
Oerry
-But does the zebra ever become the alligator or
the alligator ever become the zebra?
Child
-(all) No! No!
Renata
-Just like in the book when they say something
about Jill and you know ... it's a difference of
degree as far as they go, and one of them can't
turn into the other.
Oerry
-No, but we weren't talking about girls, were we?
What were we talking about?
Renata
- Their weights.
Oerry
-Their weights. Could one girl keep eating and
eating and eating and become the same ... the girl
who weighs less, could she become the same
weight as another girl by eating or putting on
weight?
Child
-Yeah ... Ummhmm.
Oerry
-Or could one of the girls become the same weight
by dieting ... and losing weight?
Child
-(several) Yes.
Gerry
-Could their weights become the same?
Child
-Yes.
Child
-But they couldn't ...
Gerry
-But they wouldn't become the same, no. So we're
not talking about the two girls. We're talking
about their heights or their weights.
Renata
-Okay, so you use two people for the difference of
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Oerry
Renata
Oerry
Renata
Qerry
Renata
Oerry

degree.
-Yeah, but what are you comparing? We're com•
paring two people all right ...
-But that's what I'm doing!
-Okay.
-Like you or her.
-All right.
-It's a difference of degree because, you know,
she's her and you're you.
-All right. But how is that a difference of degree?

COMMENT: Gerry's use of persons and personal attributes to demonstrate the distinction between a difference of degree and a difference of kind will enable her
to make a natural and easy transition later from this
topic to the topic of "individuality."
Renata
Karen
Oerry
Karen
Qerry
Daniel
Qerry
Walt
Qerry

Oerry

Walt
Renata

Oerry

Renata
Oerry
Renata

Gerry
Renata
Gerry

Renata
Daniel

-Because ... uh ...
- ... they're people ...
-We're both people, right?
-Yeah, but you're an adult and she's a child.
-Well won't she ever become an adult? Could she
ever become an adult ... like I am?
-Yeah.
-So if we're comparing our ages, what would that
be?
-Difference of degree.
-A difference of degree. All right. So in comparing
our age that's a difference of degree. Now what
else would you like to compare?
-Your height.
-Still using this ... and ... uh ... she can't change to
you and you can't change to her. It's still a difference of degree.
-Well if I can't change to her ... when we say that we
couldn't change the alligators to the zebras we
said that was a difference of what?
-Kind.
-Kind. If she can't change to me and I can't change
to her.
-Yeah, but counts the same that. .. was it a difference of degree or kind between a alligator and
a zebra?
-Well what is it?
-A difference of degree. 'Cause they both animals.
And ...
-Yeah, but we didn't really come to that conclusion. Somebody said it was ... other people said it
was a difference of kind.
-(unintelligible)
... so we could know that it was a
difference of degree.
-What are you measuring between the alligator
and the zebra?

COMMENT: Daniel is asking for the standard to be
stipulated.
Gerry

Pamela

- That's a very good question. What are we measuring when we say the alligator and the zebra? Who
brought up the alligator and the zebra? Well for
that matter, what were we measuring when we
said... uh... nine apples with nine... oh... nine
alligators?
(giggles from the class)
-Things.
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(long pause)
-Yeahwe were comparing the ... the ... the ...
things apples with the things alligators. You
know, fruits 'n alligators.
Daniel
-You can't. 'Cause there's so many properties of
each of them.
Renata
- That's a difference of kind, though.
-Yeah, but if you were talking about ... what.. the
Daniel
water content in a... a ... um ... alligator you'll get
difference of degree. If you compare the form of
an alligator and the form of an apple you get only
a difference of kind.
-Ummhmm.
Gerry
Daniel
-An apple can never grow to look like an alligator.
Gerry
-All right... but in this one we were ... I guess you
were comparing, you know, that they are, their
physical properties... to apples and alligators.
Form. You know. But what about Kathy ar\d I?
(unintelligible)
Child
-Difference in degree.
Gerry
-Jeanne and I? (aside)• That's what you get for
always sitting there (unintelligible) Jeanne and I.
What about Jeanne and I?
Child
-Difference of degree.
Gerry
-Difference of degree.
Melanie
-Because ... um ... she could get... like, everything
about her could (unintelligible) not everything
out- parts of her could become to look like you,
and then ... um ... well then she could (unintelligible)... then it would be a difference of degree.
Because she could become to look like you.
She'll grow up to be a woman, and she'll ... she
has brown eyes now ...
Gerry
-Umm ... her eye's already same ...
Melanie
-Umm ... She may grow up to be the same height
as you. Maybe taller.
Gerry
-Ummhmm.
Melanie
-But she will sometime be ... (unintelligible)
Gerry
-Still with all of those differences between ... bet•
ween our heights and the difference between our
ages and the difference between our weights, the
difference between all of those are all differences
of degree?
Child
-Degree.
Gerry
-Does that make the thing that's Jeanne and the
thing that's me - is that difference ... if all of the
things about us is a difference of degree does that
make us ... the difference between us, a difference
of degree?
Children
-Yeah, sure.
-OK. You're absolutely sure about that? Well. Let's
Gerry
go on to some others ... how about dead things
and living things?
Kirk
-A difference of kind.
Gerry
-Why do you say a difference of kind?
Daniel & Klrk-(together) Well, one's alive and one's dead.
Kirk
- They're not functioning no more.
Gerry

COMMENT: Kirk Is introducing a standard by which he
Is judging whether something is living or not living - the
standard of function.
Gerry
Kirk

Daniel

-Ummhmmm ...
-Being considered ... not functioning ...
-I think it's degree.

Child
Child

Gerry
Daniel
Gerry
Karen
Gerry
Karen

Child

Kirk

-Degree.
-1 think it's difficult...
-Why do you say ... (noise from class) Wait, wait.
you'll get a chance. Why would you say ...
-A live person can die.
-Ummhmm.
-A dead person can't. ..
-Can dead things ...
-Well he could have lived before that, but he's not
gonna live again.
-So it's a difference of degree.
-Well, he might be resurrected.

COMMENT: Gerry apparently doesn't hear this remark.
Gerry

-But somebody brought up the point that a dead
person can't ever become a live person.

Walt
Gerry
Renata
Karen
Gerry
Walt
Renata
Gerry
Renata
John or Walt
Karen

-But a live person could become a dead person.
-Uhhuh. So it's a difference of ...
-Kind.
-Degree.
-Degree. Kind.
-Degree. It's a difference of degree.
-Kind. Because it's different ..
- Totally different?
-Yeah.
-Yeah.
-No, but they're still things, though. Even though
one might be dead and one might be alive,
they're still things.
-( un inte II i g ib le)
-Because ... one ... one ...
-Well, we're not just talking about persons. We're
talking about a dead ... a dead thing and a living
thing, O.K.?
-We're not talking about persons?
-We don't have to be talking about persons.
-Both of them things.
-Let's take an animal...
-All right. So if we take an animal...
-We still consider him ... dead. I certainly think ...
-Yeah ...
-(unintelligible)
-So you're saying that they're ... they're so different
from living things, that a dead animal is so different from a living animal that it's a difference of
degree ... of kind? (pause) And you, too?
-Uhhhuh.
-No, ...
-1 heard a "no."
-Well, no, degree, because they both things.
-Ummhumm ... Oh, degree.
-Right.
-O.K. Degree, Use degree.
-No.
-1 still heard a "no." Somewhere. David?
-Well yeah. I say that's a difference of degree.
-Degree.
-'Cause it's just like the obtuse angle. The acute
can widen and become an obtuse.
-Uhhnhuh.
-And a live person can die and become a dead person.

Child
Child

Gerry

Kirk
Gerry
Renata
Kirk

Gerry
Kirk
Gerry
Child
Gerry

Kirk
Renata
Gerry
Renata
Gerry

Child
Gerry
Daniel
Gerry
Daniel

Child
Daniel
Gerry
Daniel

Transcript or Video Tape
Gerry
Child
Child
Daniel
Gerry
Child
Gerry

Child
MUchell
Gerry
Mitchell
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Walt
Gerry
Child
Child
Child
Child
Renata
Gerry

Chlld
Child
Gerry
Jeanne
Gerry
Daniel
Gerry
Jeanne
Daniel
Gerry

Mitchell

Child
Mitchell
Gerry
Mitchell

-Uhhuh.
-(unintelligible)
-Whafs
your opinion?
-If they could become and change ...
-Do you really want to know what my opinion is?
Why?
-Because rm (unintelligible)
-Well my opinion is ... you know it's just my opi•
nion. Your opinion is worth just as much as my
opinion. I happen to think that they"re a dif·
ference of kind. Between dead things and living
things.
-(some conversation, several children speaking at
once• unintelligible
on tape)
-Well like say there are two dead rabbits. And two
live rabbits.
-Umhum.
-The dead rabbit still looks like the live rabbit.
-But all the same ... (unintelligible)
- ... that are alive .. .
-Yeah, they're still. ..
- They look the same ...
- They're still rabbits ...
-Dead or alive ...
-But, but ... but a dead rabbit is such a totally different thing between a... from a live rabbit...
- This is only a (unintelligible)
-He was alive.
-(another
child says something unintelligible)
-(repeats) He was alive. He was alive.
-But they still rabbits.
-0.K. You're right. But they're ... they're totally different things. The dead rabbit can't do any of the
things that a live rabbit can do ...
-Just like a live rabbit can't do any of the things
that a dead rabbit can do.
-(simultaneously)
A live rabbit can be killed and
become a dead rabbit.
-Right - right.
-A dead rabbit can't do nothin'.
-So ... so ... that's why I think it's a difference of
kind.
-A
live rabbit can't kill himself (unintelligible),
dead rabbit can.
-I can't hear you.
-A dead rabbit doesn't do anything.
-How can a live rabbit kill himself?
-Kill himself? I don't know about that. I don't know
whether. .. He could be killed. Or get... or gosh!
Well, I don't.know that.
-Well, he commits suicide, okay, (unintelligible) ...
something like that (unintelligible) ... from drink·
ing too much water. If a rabbit... if a rabbit...

-W .. w.. what?
-Let me talk.
-Go on.
-And
they said he was pronounced
dead ...
(children giggle) ... how would you know if he was
dead or not?

COMMENT: If something must be pronounced dead by
an expert, perhaps the difference is not so "total".
Gerry

-Well, see, that's my point exactly. If ... if you take
one rabbit... all right. This rabbit that's hopping ...
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you know, let's all see this rabbit right now. (gig•
gles from the class) I can really see it. There's a
rabbit there! Let's make this rabbit that's right
here and it's hopping around. (Unintelligible
remark from a child) ... No, it's white. (giggles
from class). It's hopping around ... all right, it's my
rabbit, OK? And it's hopping around and all of a
sudden, it dies. (giggles from class). I think that
the dead rabbit is so totally different from the liv•
ing rabbit. ..
-He was alive.
- ... as to be ... Yeah. You're absolutely right.
-Well,
you didn't have the dead rabbit to start
with ...
-You·re right. I had a living rabbit.
-But thafs (unintelligible)
two rabbits.
-Ifs gonna jump around so you·re gonna ...
-No, no. The same rabbit died.
-Don't
you have to have a live rabbit and a dead
rabbit. .. a dead rabbit that ... (unintelligible)
-Put
it this wayGo around the room ... go
around the class. Let's have a vote, what you
think it is.
-Aww, that ain't. ..
-(laughing)
- How many of you want to have a
vote?
-Oh, I don't want to have a vote. (Other children
raise their hands.)
-All
right, Eugene? Difference of degree or dif•
ference of kind?
-Degree.
-Degree. One degree.
-Degree.
- Two degrees.
-Degree.
- Three degrees.
-Degree.
-Four degrees.
-Kind.
-Four degrees and one kind.
-Five degrees.
-five degrees and one kind.
-I don't know ... uhh ...
-Five degrees and one kind, and one I don't know.
-Right (giggles).
-rm getting confused. Five, one and one.
-(unintelligible)
... write it on the board.
-Five degrees, two kind (points to herself), and one
I don·t know.
-Degree.
.....:Sixdegrees, two kind, and one I don't know.
-Degree.
-Seven degrees.
-Degree.
-Eight
degrees.
-Degree.
-Nine degrees.
-Um ... um ... degree.
-Ten degrees.
-rm not gonna say anything.
-I
don't know, Melanie,
rm not gonna say
anything ...
- Ten degrees. two of a :~ind ... I mean ...
-And three I don't know.
- Two of a kind ... two kind, and three I don·t
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-And on you now.
-I said it. I did it. I was one of the kinds. O.K.?
-Mmmhmm.
-Nowask her. (Points to other teacher in the
room.)
-I believe it would be degree. That"s my opinion.
-Eleven degrees (laughs). Okay, the degrees won.
(Laughs).
-(unintelligible
chatter from class).
-I still don"t know.
- Thafs right. We both still have our opinions.
-But still and all. .. (unintelligible) that's wrong.
-(Laughter).
-(child says something unintelligible).
-Maybe so.
-Yah...
but not to us. Unless you·re here by
yourself.
-All right. How about... fish and apes?
-(many) Kind.
-Difference
of degree or difference of kind?
-(all) Kind, kind, kind.
-Kind. We're all sure that they"re kind. We're not
gonna have an argument about that one? All
right. Apes and men?
-Degree, degree, degree.
-Because you can have an ape who can become a
man ... Well. ..
-A man won't become a ape.
-A man won't become an ape!
-Yeah, he could"ve come from some sort of. ..
-Man·s became from apes.
-Yeah. Uhhuh.
-So, ifs a difference of degree.
-Of degree.
-Anybody
else?
-(murmurs)
-I guess ...
·-Degree?
-If you put it that way all animals are ...
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-Degree!
-Well... well.. what were you saying Daniel?
-Everything ... everything"s the same when you
consider that men ... umm ... um ... that everything
used to be the same thing.
-What do you mean everything used to be the
same thing?
-Everything
used to be the same thing!
-(unintelligible)
an ape ... a mammal. .. a man ... a
person is a mammal.
-It developed from one more ...
-One more what?
-All right, well, what Daniel is saying is that... according to scientists in the beginning ... all life
came from one-celled ...
-Apes.
-Animals ...
-Right.
-All life. One-celled ...
-Ape.
-Animals ...
-Apes.
- ... started with the beginning of all life and
everything ...
-Right.

- ... evolved from that.
-Right.
-So ... but what he·s saying is then is ...
-But so .. ,
-But there's still those one-celled animals today.
-Yes .. .
-So ... uh ...
-So they can·t all be together.
-No ... apes are ... are there apes and men today?
-Yes.
-But
you still think those are differences of
degree.
- That"s right.
-What Daniel is saying, though, is that between all
animals then its a difference of degree.
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Gerry summarizes

Daniel's position.

-Right.
-It's still mammals.
-(murmurs
from class).
-Shhhh.
Does anybody want to say anything to
Daniel?
-No.
-No, anybody can ... (unintelligible)
-But then if you think that he"s right you still think
that the difference between, like, say a zebra and
an alligator is a difference of. ..
-I was the one who said kind.
-Of degree or kind?
-Degree.
-Oh, well, then that's right.
-(continuing)
But you said ifs a difference of kind.
-Right.
-Between a zebra and an alligator.
-I say ifs degree.
-Kind.
-(unintelligible)
... what makes you say that? ... We
all ... we all think that the difference between men
and apes is a difference of degree. David just
because it was said that man evolved from
apes ....
-Right.
-But now it do not.•
-Yeah.
-I don·t understand.
-I think she's right.
-What if a ... what did she say?
-She said now it don·t.
-Now it doesn't what?
-I didn"t say that.
-Now it don't come from apes.
-Yeah, ·cause how come you don"t see ... um ...
men ... um, in the jungles.
- That's right.
- ... being born from ...
-Yeah!
- ... lower apes?
-Well, well. .. if we say that man ...
-He was created by apes!
- ... descended from ... you know, he came from
apes.
-But now ...
- ... does that mean now we don't have to come
from apes? We could come from other human be-
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ings?
-Right, right. -Yeah, but why can't apes still have
people?
-(giggles).
- That's a good question. I don't know.
-Because the problem is that way back then apes
and man were one thing. And ... uh ... and ... uh ...
one thing looked different from apes and different from men.
-Ummhum.
-Some ... some ...
-So, way, back, it's the same thing.
-Some had to live there and became us, and some
lived in other places and didn't. ..
-And just stayed on ...
- ... and developed into different. .. then the dif- Rod
Gerry
ferences ...
-Two different what?
- ... wasn't as much.
-Oh! Different. Uhhuh. so what are they?
Kirk
-So ... so different. .. I don't know!
Gerry
-(unintelligible)
-Some ancient, ancient kind of ape. Not the kind
Renata
of ape they have today.
- Then real human beings ... them too are ... what? Children
They (unintelligible)
have apes that stay apes and Gerry
Renata
many apes that stay people.
-(giggles).
Gerry
-What he's saying ...
-What distinguishes the apes that are apes ... that
stay apes ...
-We developed into different areas.
Children
-Shh.
Melanie
-(uni ntellig ib le)
Gerry
- ... and the apes that stay people?
-What's ...
-I still ain't him.
-You mean why did ... why did the apes ... some ... Child
-Certain
apes be apes and certain apes became Gerry
Child
people.
Child
-Oh!
-That's
a good· question.
Anybody
know the Gerry
Child
answer?
Gerry
-I might have been the apes ...
-I'm sure ... I... I guess that would be a good question for ... uh ... research, you know, as to why certain apes just stayed apes, and certain apes
Daniel
became people.
Mitchell
-I saw ... I saw the film on it. It was ... uhm ... whatGerry
chamaca I lit. ..
Walt
-How come you the only ~ne who see the show?
-I saw the show. Uhh ... un ... I forget what it was, in Gerry
it was a show and it showed how man had evolvChild
ed ... evolved.
-Ummhum.
Child
-And I... in the end, you kriow. some people died. Child
-Oh?
Daniel
-If the plane crash ...
Gerry
-Ohh.
Child
-That way.
Gerry
-What way;;>
-If the actors, all the actors crash up.
Child
- ... think that's sad.
-That's
at the end. But ... anyway, they ... they... Child
um ... like there was one animaland some of Mitchell
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the animals, like, were ... were ... lived in the
jungle, and some, and some of the animals were
given out real plain (unintelligible)
and they were
expanding and the ones that went out in the fields
experimented
more, and the other ones in the
trees just sort of lopped around and became ...
(unintelligible)
and after these guys they explored, they came back and they could easily
overtake the smaller ones. Because they had
adventured. And once they had dominated them
they got bigger and they didn't die. (unintelligi·
ble) just because of what they did. They went out
in the fields and they used ... they needed to invent more than the ones ... who were living in the
trees loafing around eating oranges.
-Oh jeez!
-Okay.
All right, well. .. well. .. we were talking
about the difference of ... uh ... uh ... kind and differences of degree. Oh, well, we're still talking
about differences, right?
-Right.
-Ummm.
I'd like to get into differences. Would
you say that all of you are different?
-No.
-No. The same.
-You're all the same?
-We're difference of degree ... 'cause we're all peo•
pie.
-Uhhuh.
Well, then, if we·re all people ... and ... and
you think that we're all the same, I guess you
mean ... just in the fact that we're all people. But
as individuals, are we different?
-Uhhh.
Yes.
-Because we think different.
-All right. Well, that's what I want to get into now.
That our differences ... what is it that makes you,
you? I guess in the same way ...
-Our mind.
- ... we're talking about differences ...
-Our mind.
-Our mind.
-Uhh ...
-Between
who and who?
-You! What makes you you? Not whether ... you
know ... just thinking about you now, what makes
you you? Uhh ... your face, your clothes, your
name, your mind, your thoughts ...
or

Your mind and thoughts ...
-Your mind and your thoughts?
-Right,
right.
-Not
the others? Your name,
clothes?

your

face, your

-Yes, yeah!
-All of them.
-Your mind.
- There could be two people just alike. Different
minds would be completely different people.
-Umhum.
-If you had different clothes.
-If you had different clothes. Could you have the
same clothes?
-mmm.
-Yeah.
-1 knew this family that had twins, and they looked
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exactly alike and the mother bought them each
clothes and then she had to stop after. .. when
they were five years old, because the kindergarten teacher couldn"t tell them apart.
-Uhhuh. Well, before they were five, and they were
wearing the same clothes, not only did they wear
the same clothes, what else did they have that
was the same?
-Well. .. they ... looked exactly alike.
- They looked alike ...
-And they had ... kinda similar names.
-Uhhuh. But were they different?
-Uhhuh.
-Mmmhum.
-(unintelligible)
... difference of degree.
- ...one was Craig and one was Bob.
-Well, what was it that made them different?
- Their names.
-Just their names?
-No!
-Well, suppose my name ... have you ever come
across somebody else who was ... who was named
Renata?
-Yeah, but...
-Was she you?
-No, but we had different minds and everything.
-Did she think ...
-Uhhuh, so ...
- They had different ways.
-What happens if ... they have different minds, and
have the same name? Are they the same thing?
-But it's a difference.
-Nope. Difference of kind.
-Well. .. well that's just one of the differences, that
one name was Craig and one name was Bob.
-Well. .. if they have both the same minds and one
was named Craig, and one was named ...
-But how dumb! Two people don't have the same
mind.
-Yeah, but you said before, that if. .. uh ... the name
makes you different from everybody else.
-But your ways doesn't.
-1 didn't say exactly different! It made them different.
-Yeah, but which one was ...
- Their two names made them different.
-Is this your ... Is your name you?
-Yes! Not really. Part of me.
-Uhhuh. Is that what makes you you? If I change
your name, or if you went to court and you changed your name, and you said you didn't want. ..
-I'd still be me!
-Would you say ... what would you ... then ... that...
what would it be then that would make you you?
If you could change your name?
-Your mind, I guess.
-Your mind?
-Yeah ...
-Somebody
said "personality," what do you mean
by "personality"?
-It's the way you act and the way you do things.
-Is that the same ... when you used ... when you
said, your ways?
-Yeah.
-Or a part of it.

Walt
Gerry

Children
Gerry
Children
Child
Melanie

Karen
Melanie
Gerry
Karen

Gerry
Child
Danie!
Children
Gerry
Daniel

-Yes.
-Okay. Umm, I'd like to ask you some questions. If
for some reason you couldn't use your arm ...
would you still be you?
-Yeah, yeah, sure.
-Why?
-Because ... it is ...
-Because your arm ...
-When I was (unintelligible)
of your arm or your
finger or something (unintelligible)
hurts a lot
like a splinter or something - you don't stop
thinking the same way. And sometimes it makes
you feel sorry for yourself because you can't do
some things, but you never really ... uhm ... think
differently.
-But you might have to use different ways.
-If I came in here today, and I had a broken arm, I
probably would still say the same thing.
-Uhhuh. What were you saying, Karen?
-Like
if you lost your right arm, and you were
right-handed, even though you'd have lo learn
with your left hand, you're still you. Even though
you'd change your ways.
-Okay. If for some reason, you couldn't use your
mind, would you still be you?
-Yes.
-You'd be dead.
-(giggles)
-If you couldn"t use your mind, you'd be dea-:i?
-You wouldn't be able to do anything. Nothing.
You couldn't breathe ...

COMMENT:
"mind".
Child
Daniel
Child
Daniel
Children
Daniel
Mitchell

Children
Mitchell

* Daniel Is equating

the "brain"

with the

-You·re talking about your brain!
-Your mind is the same thing.•
-Your mind is ... your mind can tell. .. your mind is
your thoughts.
- ... everything you do.
-(Unintelligible
conversation and laughter.)
- ... If you can't think ... (unintelligible) ... haven't
enough to breathe.
-Did you ever have a dream where you didn't. ..
um ... did you ever have a night where you didn't
dream?
-Uhmhum.
Yes. Uhmhum. No.
-Well, I did. Am I dead? (giggles from class)

COMMENT: Notice how the children have taken over
the discussion, and how they, themselves, are posing
the questions, arguing, presenting examples, etc.
Gerry

Daniel
Gerry
Daniel

-Well, I guess when they say that they ... if you
couldn't use your mind ... uh ... if you couldn't
think, or if you couldn't use your own imagination, or your own wishing, or your ... your own
ideas - would you still be you? If you couldn't
have these thoughts, and you couldn't do these
things ... your thoughts, or your ways, as you say.
-No.
-Why wouldn't it be you?
-No, because ... You couldn't distinguish yourself
from anybody else. You'd just... you'd just sit
there, you'd be just like the other guy.
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Walt
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-I don't know, I don't know, I don't know ...
-All right, what were you going to say, Jeanne?
-If you had all of everybody else·s ideas and
everything ...
-No. not if you had anybody else·s ideas. Just that
you couldn't use your own mind.
-You·d be dumb.
-Could you have ... uh ... any kind of. .. um ... ideas ...
you know ... I mean ... out of your brain?
-Do I have any ideas?

COMMENT: Did Gerry accurately
tion, or was he asking

a different

restate Walt's
question?

ques-

-Uh ...
-Not right off hand. You could get that information ...
-I went to the doctor the other day, he told me my
Walt
brain weighed eight pounds.
-Your brain?
Gerry
-Eight
ounces.
Walt
-Eight
ounces.
Gerry
-Seven and a half.
Walt
Children
-(giggles)
-Um ... are you the same person you were yesterGerry
day?
-Yes. No. Yup.
Children
-All of you?
Gerry
-Yup. No.
Children
-Why did you say "no"?
Gerry
-Well, like if you learned something, or. .. uh ... if
Mitchell
you had a new experience or something, that
would change you a little.
-It would change you a little, but would it make
Gerry
you ... it would still ... are you still you?
-Yes!
Children
-It would still be you, only not the way you were ...
Mitchell
-Not the way you were?
Gerry
-But you!
Mitchell
-But you.
Gerry
-Yes. (laughter)
Mitchell
-You still be you, though.
Renata
-But would you be the same person?
Gerry
-Yeah.
Karen
-You·d still be the same person if you had a new
Gerry
experience or learned something new?
-Well, yeah.
Karen
-Uhhuh.
Child
Daniel
-You couldn't use your mind at all.
Gerry
-But wh ... ?
Child
- ... you couldn't... um ... do anything.
John or Walt -Brains.
Daniel
-You still couldn't breathe.
Gerry
-Yeah, well ...
-Because
your mind tells you what to do.
Daniel
Everything.
John or Walt -Just like you're brain-washed.
Daniel
-Just
like ... your thoughts ... imagination ... tells
you what you're seeing, what to do, because of
what you see. If you see ... If you're driving and
you see a car coming right at you, your mind tells
you to swerve.
-Mmmhmm.
Gerry
-Swerve?
John
-So. Your mind tells you to breathe, too. If you
Daniel
Walt
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can't... if you can't breathe, you can't eat.
-You can't eat if you don't know you're hungry!
-But are you still you?
-No.
-Okay. Well, assuming that you can use your mind
and you can do all of those things, are you the
same person that you were yesterday?
-Yes. Oh, sure.
-Everybody
but Daniel, right? Daniel's different.
Are you the same person you were yesterday?
-Yes.
-Now you are the exact same person?
-Nope.
-Why do you say "no"?
-Well.
I'm taller.
-Does that make you ... ah ... different?
-No. Outside, but not inside.
-Mmmhmm.
-Rod, when you say the inside. what do you mean
by the inside?
-Personality's
still the same.
-Umhmm ... (long pause) ... Are you the same person you were ten years ago?
-No.
-No. (giggles)
-You're
the same person you were yesterday. and
you're the same person you were last year, but
you're not the same person you were ten years
ago?
-Yes.
-She didn't say ...
-Nol
-No.
-Why do you say "no," Walt?
-Because you don't react the same.
-Why do you say that?
-Because
ten years ago, you could'a been a little
(unintelligible)
boy.
-Yeah.
-Now you're still. .. (laughs) ...
-All
right, so ... so that those two are different
things?
-Right.
-All
right. You said that you were, that you descend.
-I'm still Renata, I'm stay me my whole life.
-Are you the same Renata that you were ten years
ago?
-Uhmhum.
Yup .... except for, as far as my mind
goes 'n everything, but I'm still Renata.
-Uh ... well. .. yes, you're still Renata, but if your
mind is ... has changed, ·n everything like that,
that you said ... are you the same person?
-Yeah. I'm still Renata. I'm still the same as she.
-You're
still the same... you're still the same
name ...
-But it's still me!
-Uhhuh.
-I was me ten years ago.
-Yes. You were you ten years ago. But are you the
same you now that you were ten years ago?
-Oh ... (unintelligible)
-What made you change?
-Because ... I'm not. .. I'm smarter than I was ten
years ago.
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-Ummmhmmm.
Anything else?
-I'm developing ...
-You're not two years old anymore.
- ... more than I was ten years ago.
-Uhhuh. Anything else?
-(unintelligible)
-What about the rest of you?
-I'm not two years old anymore. (giggles)
-Uh ... does that make you different? Uh, the fact
that you were two years old ten years ago, and
twelve now? How does that make you different?
-We didn't know as much. We were just. .. (laughs)
-(unintelligible)
-Shh. Shh. John .... Go on, I'm sorry.
-(laughter)
-Well. why are you different now than ten years
ago? Besides your age. I'm talking about...
(unintelligible) ... because you didn"t know that
once?
-(unintelligible)
... like. as many experiences and
things like that.
-Uhhuh. (laughter) Anyone else?
-Yeah, you could say more ...
-Daniel?
-And Mitchell said ... it's the same (unintelligible)
wouldn't make much difference ·cause ... like you
can learn here and there little things, but after ten
years all those would add up some ... you know, ...
you ... most of what you know about is either you
gained more knowledge or you·ve gotten a different opinion because you know more about it.
-Uhmmmm.
-Like sometimes you say ... no, no, no, it ... I agree
with this, and then you gain more knowledge
about the subject and ten years later ... that time
you know you're definitely uh ... yeah, that's right.
You know because you realize then you probably
will... let"s say it's a big political
decision
(unintelligible)
... run America
bankrupt
(unintelligible) ... now you realize what you're
gonna do. You say ... oh, no.
-All right. So you're different. You"re different...
-You've changed ...
-You've
changed your opinions. When you've
changed your opinions that makes ... makes you a
different person?
-No! Different. .. In what way? The way your personality ...
-Well ...
-Or ...
-1. .. that's what I'm asking you!
-Well ... well if. .. well if when you add up a whole
bunch of knowledge, that makes you different
than you were, and then you'll be able to
(unintelligible) ... I mean, does it matter whether
you add up a lot or a little?
-I think what David is saying is that if you get a little bit of knowledge ... David was saying that if
you get a lot of knowledge, it changes... it
changes the way you look al things, sometimes.
Does it always change the way you look at
things?
-No.
-But sometimes it could change the way you look
at things. Mitchell was saying, if you gel. .. what's
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the difference between a little bit of knowledge
and a lot of knowledge? Can't you change from
just a little bit of knowledge? Thal you could
learn ... that you can gain maybe in one day?
Could you change ...
-No.
- ... your opinion in one day? Daniel doesn't think
it's possible.
-Only ... on one subject.
yeah.
But not
(intelligible).
You can't change yourself almost
completely.
-Okay. When you"re very old will you still be the
same person that you are now?
-No.
-You"d be the same person, but uh ...
-You just have more wrinkles.
-You have more what?
-Wrinkles.
When you're old. you don't look the
same like you did before.
-Uhhuh.
-When
you walking
down
the street ...
hunchback ...
-Does that make you a different person, because
you look different?
-It doesn't.
-It doesn't really make you different.
-It makes your looks different.
-It makes your looks different.
-Right.
-Yes, but what about the person that you are?
Does that make you ...
-No.
-You still have the same ... you still have the same
mind.
-You're still ... ahh (unintelligible)
-But you know yourself (unintelligible)! You"re still
the shape that you give. You know you look a bit
different but if you take care of yourself, it's
possible you could pass for young.
-Yeah. But would you still be the same person?
-Umhum,
yes.
-You'd still be John Carroll!
-Would
he still be the same John Carroll? Well.
you'll probably be ... you might. .. most of us stay
the same name, like, all our lives, right? But does
that mean you slay the same person just because
your name stays the same?
-Umhmm.
-Always? You never change ... ?
-You just don't know as much as you did when you
were younger but you still the same person.
-Uhmmmm.
-You can't change ... or, I can't change t'her.
-No. Absolutely. But are you the same Renata?
-Right.
-I'm ... I'm ... yeah, I'm ...
- The same Renata?
-Not ...
- ... and all your life?
-As you get older, as you get bigger and bigger,
you could gel a little ... As you get bigger and bigger you are getting old.
-Uhmhmm.
-Right.
-Ummm.
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-So ...
Walt
-ls this your last day here?
-Yes.
-But when we ... when we were talking before, you
Gerry
were talking about your ways, and your personaliWalt
-No wonder you're asking such questions!
-(laughter)
ty, and your minds, and your thoughts!. ..
Children
- That don't change you.
Gerry
-Do you ... do you think the fact that I'm asking
these questions ... is just because on the last day ...
-Do your ways and your personalities and your
minds ... well, well, what is you? (simultaneously)
I guess it is, because this is my last day here ...
Walt
-A person. It don't change a person. You might
-I know what you're trying to find out. You want us
to find out how much we learned.
change the knowledge of a person, but it don't
Gerry
-How much you think you've learned.
change the person itself.
Walt
-Uhmhmm.
-I think I learned ... everybody think he learned ...
-You never can.
To let you know, right?
Gerry
-Yes.
-Well, what do you think of as the person? Before
Walt
- The last day ...
you told me that it was your mind, your thoughts.
Gerry
-Yes.
Can your thoughts change? Can your personality
Walt
-I learned a lot.
change?
Gerry
-You learned a lot. All right. Donna said she learn•
-Yeah. That can't change.
ed a lot...
-But they ... you don't change?
Donna
-Me too. I thought it was fun.
-(simultaneously)
You don't change much.
Gerry
-You thought it was fun? I'm glad. Anybody else?
-No. I'm still the same person that. ..
Child
-(unintelligible)
-Okay. All right.
Gerry
-Yes?
-It's ten o'clock.
Mitchell
-I hate to see you go.
-Uhmm ... I... you know. I... I want to put this away
Daniel
-(simultaneously)
It was boring.
for now, Okay?
Child
-Call us sometimes.
-It's ten o'clock.
Gerry
-I'm gonna cry. (laughter) Uh ... I was thinking, ...
-No. I told you. It's not ten o'clock. I've got to ... I
no, I was thinking (unintelligible).
I'm sorry ... go
wanted to ask you some questions...
and I
on.
wanted, you know, you just tell me how you feel
Mitchell
-Sometimes
it get a little boring.
about ... about what you've done for the last three
Gerry
-Uhhuh.
What about it makes it boring?
weeks ... and how you think it's affected you, and
Mitchell
-Well,
like sometimes ... like something dragged
how you feel about it, whether you liked it,
out a little too long.
whether you liked it, whether you didn't like it ...
-Uhhuh.
Gerry
-(unintelligible)
Pamela
- There were arguments.
-Yeah. Your experience of being here for the last
Gerry
-Were our arguments boring to you?
three weeks.
Pamela
-No.
-It was nice to me.
Gerry
-Oh. For you they were boring.
-What about it was nice to you?
Mitchell
-No. Only like some of the subjects I was bored
- The group sessions.
with.
-What did you like? You liked talking like this?
-Hmmm.
You didn't like the arguments?
Gerry
-Yes.
Pamela
-Yeah, I did.
-Anybody
else? How did you feel about it? Do you
Gerry
-Oh.
think that this did anything for you?
Daniel
-I love the arguments. I could argue all day long.
-Yeah, ·cause some of the things that we've been
-You could argue all day long? Well, well, I want to
Gerry
talking about... it's not that I didn't know, but I
ask you another question now.
didn't have ... uh ... definite answers.
Walt
-(unintelligible)
say you ... um ... sad because you
-Uhmmm.
Now you do have some definite
were leaving today.
answers?
, Gerry
-Uhh. I am too ... in a way, and in a way I'm not.
-(simultaneously)
Now I got...
'Cause I need a rest. (laughter)
-Okay.
What about the rest of you? What do you
Child
-(unintelligible)
feel that this has done for - coming here in the
Renata
-I need one.
morning?
Gerry
-Yeah!
-Did a lot.
Renata
-I'm tired, like ...
-What?
John or Walt -Well,
we don't have to come back to uh ... we
-Uhh ... uhh ... made me think better. Usually I like
don't have to come back no more.
to play around ...
Gerry
-Exactly.
-Huh?
John or Walt -We don't have to come back until Monday, right?
-I like to play.
Gerry
-Yeah. Umm. I wanna ask you one more question,
-Yes?
okay? What d'ya think ... suppose ... this group, all
-Well, it made me think. Now I like better to think.
of us, we met every day like this for a year?
-You're gonna stop playing?
Children
-Uhh ... Ahhh ... Ugh ... (laughter)
-I don know (giggles)
-What would you think about that?
Gerry
-What about the rest of you?
-It would be nice. It would be nice. I think it would
Walt
-(unintelligible)
... bored all day.
be nice ... um ... we could do ... uh ...
-You learn how to say things better. .. uhmmm ...
-I think if we ... if we started .. .
Pamela
-Uhmhum.
Anyone else?
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-Uh ... wait. ..
- ... later.
-(laughter)
-If we could start a little bit later? Okay. That
would be all right.
-I would like it not so ... not 9 o'clock.
Walt
-Well, what do you think ... how do you think that
Gerry
you would change if we had ... if we did this for a
year? How do you think it would affect you? What
would happen?
-We would -:hange ... a lot.
Walt
-(Speakin~. all at once).
Children
-Let's take ... can I... one at a time? 'Cause I can't
Gerry
hear. You're all doing the same things ...
Walt
- ... change a lot.
Gerry
-How would it change ...?
Walt
-It helps you learn a lot.
John
-(simultaneously)
... change a lot...
John or Walt -'Cause you know if we was meeting for a year,
right?
-Uhmhum.
Gerry
- Then maybe, you know, probably wouldn't have
John
no discussions, we'd be doing some work. 'N
that's (unintelligible) ...
-Are you gonna let us watch before you leave?
Walt
-Are you ... do you think that this is not work?
Gerry
-Discussion
is all the time we spend really.
Walt
-No, uh, you know it's doing good.
John
Gerry
-If we stay here ...
- ... because some people didn"t know some things,
John
you know, like you know ... (unintelligible)
Gerry
-Mmmm ... Renata?
Renata
-It's the (unintelligible) of our lives. For some of
the people. Some people that don't notice things,
or the things that we might do.
Gerry
-Uhhuh.
-I know everybody don't know everything.
Renata
Gerry
-Yeah.
Renata
-And then once we do that then (unintelligible)
everybody react just like we will.
Gerry
-What would it. .. what would it do ... You're talking
about knowledge. What do you think would hap•
pen between you?
Renata
-Well it would build up my knowledge.
-But I mean, say between you and Karen, or you
Gerry
and Donna?
-That's another thing ... that's another thing ...
Child
-We got to know each other better. I made a lot of
Child
friends.
-Do you think ... do you think that's a good thing
Gerry
that they got to know each other better?
Children
-Yeah. Uhhmm.
Gerry
-Why?
-Because you know a lot.
Child
Renata
-Because you don't have to be all suspicious about
another ...
Gerry
-Uhhuh. Donna and Melanie, what were you saying?
Melanie
-When you know people better, it's easier for you
to get along better with other people that you
didn't know ...
Gerry
-Uhhuh. Donna?
Donna
-Well, it's better (unintelligible)
-Uhhuh.
Gerry
-(unintelligible)
Child
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-What knowledge ... do you think that would increase your knowledge about yourselves, about
you?
-Uhmhmm.
-Yep.
-You·re just smiling over here, Pamela. What are
you smiling about?
-About...
there-ain't-no-difference.
-What? ... What were you saying? What did you
say?
-(unintelligible)
-(laughter)
-I want to tell you that I really did enjoy these
mornings. I really did. I liked talking to you. I
didn't like getting up early, but I did like talking
to you.
-It's our summer vacation and we had to get up
early.
-It's my summer vacation. too. I Had to get up
early. But I think it did some good.
-But we have to get up early for three more weeks.
-Mmmm.
Isn't that terrible? (laughs). Uhmm, Mrs.
Isler?
-Un ... I hope you will. I'm not as young and pretty
as Mrs. Dawson, but rll be ...
-She's not as pretty ...
-But I'll be very (unintelligible)
-(simultaneously)
... that's for sure.
-I would really like for you to come, because ...
uh ... I think that uh ... I that we had a good time
because I'm one person, but I think you could
have a good time with Mrs. Isler, too. She's really
a good old lady.
-(laughter)
-We're very good friends.
-We're good friends.
-So I allow her to say things like that about me.
-(laughter)
-And she helped me a great deal, you know, when
I first started teaching. She teaches in the school
where I teach at. She's been teaching for many,
many years.
-What school is that?
-I teach at Morton Street School.
-(unintelligible)
-And she was there. I teach the sixth grade, now,
but she helped me a great deal.
-(To Mrs. Isler) What grade do you teach?
-I teach the first grade.
-OOOh!
-You have to have a lot of patience with little kids.
I can't (unintelligible)
-(laughter)
-At the (unintelligible)
school. They so bad.
-You don't have to have any patience with big
kids?
-NO.
- That's interesting.
- That is really interesting. I would like to go into
that a little longer, but. ..
-(unintelligible)
-All right, all right. you can go. Be here on Monday. Read chapter 8. Wait a minute ... would any
of you like to see (unintelligible) ... would you like
to see yourselves?
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Forthcoming in THINKING ...
v Professor Kenneth Aman and Sister Anna Marie Hartman
will relate their experiences training teachers in philosophy
for children in El Salvador. In a subsequent article, they will
tell what it was like conducting two workshops during the
summer of 1978 in Chile.
v Reports from professor-teacher teams who have begun
working together to introduce philosophy into local classrooms. Louis Katzner (Department of Philosophy, Bowling
Green University, and Frances Brent (Conneaut Elementary School,
Bowling Green, Ohio) will recount their adventures in Ohio. Henry
Frankel (Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri), and Nelda
Gosnell (Loretto School, Kansas City, Missouri),will give an account of
how it happened in Kansas City.
v An exchange of views on the educational presuppositions
of
philosophy for children, with John Wilson
of Oxford University responding to a statement by Matthew
Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp.
v THINKING will take a fresh look at some of the older views
of education which need to be re-examined in the light of
philosophy for children. Relevant articles or selections will
be reprinted from such authors as Henry Sidgwick, George
Herbert Mead, Leonard Nelson, Floyd Dell, George
Santayana, Herbert Spencer, Leo Tolstoy, Hilda Taba and
Lawrence Metcalf.
v

Books relevant to children's thinking will be reviewed in
subsequent issues.

v Peter Yang (of Fu-Jen University) will comment on the
philosophy for children movement in Taiwan, and Pierre
Belaval (University of Lille) will take note of similar stirrings
in France.
v

Shipman, of Educational Testing Service, will
report on a year-long experiment in philosophy for children
in New Jersey, and Ray Karras will describe an experiment
in Lexington, Massachusetts.
Dr. Virginia
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